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ABSTRACT
This research builds on the literature on information technology and organizations to suggest an
alternative to the current understanding of the production of computer-generated formal
representations of work. This literature sees computer-generated formal representations of work
as automatic outcomes of information technology that managers use to scrutinize employees. My
ethnography of a desk-based sales unit suggests that managers have incentives to forfeit
surveillance and instead apply their efforts to use information technology to build a facade of
compliance with prescribed goals and prescribed rules, roles, and procedures. I show that such a
facade requires continuous maintenance work and that it is employees, not managers, that have
to engage in this work. Specifically, I show that employees need to engage in unprescribed work
to earn the right to use formal information systems to represent work that they have not actually
carried out. I explain how employees improvise a shadow information system to coordinate their
unprescribed work across time. I also show how employees enact a set of personal and
impersonal tactics to enlist the cooperation of other parts of their organization in their
unprescribed work
I seek to shed light on the many hidden labors behind representations of compliance and place
agency again in the center stage of the process of producing computer-generated formal
representations of work. In doing so, I aim to contribute to the understanding of visibility of
action in social theory by showing that it is possible to manage how visible one's action is, even
when that action unfolds in a front stage.
Thesis Supervisor: Wanda J. Orlikowski
Title: Eaton Peabody Chair of Communication Sciences and Professor of Information
Technologies and Organization Studies
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Pardon me while I switch to Portuguese.
FILIPE, meu querido filho! Este e o "livro do Papa" e 6 para ti meu querido filho. Podia ser para
ti pela culpa que sinto de ter passado estes anos longe de ti, mas nao 6. Fiz mais de 50 travessias
do Atlantico e quase 40 travessias do Canal da Mancha para estar contigo. Fiz mais do que
muitos outros fariam no meu lugar. E faria tudo outra vez porque te amo muito meu filho. Por
mais cansativas que as viagens fossem o cansago desaparecia todo e valia todo a pena sempre
que te via e te abragava. Nao e por sentir culpa que este livro 6 para ti. E pelos lacos que nos
unem. Tu costumas dizer que "eu e tu somos iguais." De certa maneira tens razao, filho. Sinto-
me muito compreendido e amado quando estou contigo e por isso e que esta tese te e dedicada.
Porque s6 tu 6 que podes perceber o que eu escrevi aqui. Mais ningu6m. Nao sei o que vais fazer
no futuro. Podes nao perceber nenhuma das literaturas em que tento participar. Mas os iltimos 5
anos e meio da minha vida estao todos aqui escritos nas entrelinhas e s6 tu e que me conheces
suficientemente bem, mesmo s6 com os quase 6 anos que tens agora para os conseguires
descodificar. Tivemos muitos c6digos secretos s6 nossos durante estes anos: tu a falar com a
minha Bete que era uma parade, os nossos Bonanzas, o nosso Monstro dos Pipiscos, o Joao
I)ourado, o nosso pra cima pra baixo ao som do contrabaixo e outras pequenas coisas do dia-a-
clia que serao sempre s6 nossas. Gosto muito de ti filho. Durante os iltimos quarto anos passei
rnuitos momentos dificieis, de muita tristeza. Pensava que era por estar a passar momentos
dificieis no meu doutoramento, mas nao era. Qualquer pessoa que tenha o privil6gio de passar
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nem que sejam uns segundos contigo conhece uma alegria to grande que estar longe de ti e
passar para o lado negro da sombra e da escuridao. Todas as minhas decisoes, meu querido filho,
tem que passar apenas por um crit6rio: que tu te sintas orgulhoso do teu pai. Adoro-te cada vez
mais meu amor, e o melhor de acabar esta tese 6 que vamos poder estarjuntos para sempre! !!!
Ilda, devo-te muito por sacrificios e esforcos enormes. Estou-te eternamente grato por
tudo o que fizeste para me ajudar. Sei que isto soa pateta, mas para mim, o mais importante de
tudo foram as nossas chamadas telef6nicas. As 5:30pm foram sempre o ponto alto dos meus dias
nos ultimos cinco anos. As vezes parecia que tudo o que fazia durante o dia era para fazer horas
at6 as 5:30. Sei que te devo o amor que o Filipe tern por mim. Tu fizeste muito para que eu
estivesse sempre presente quando estava ausente. Dou muito valor a isso, mais do que podes
imaginar, e sinto que tive muita sorte em ter o teu amor todos estes anos.
Back to English, to say that I am very grateful for all that Wanda Orlikowski, the chair of
my committee has done for me. If there is one thing I have been lucky about in my academic
career is the people that I had as advisors. Being Wanda's student was very intellectually
stimulating, but it was Wanda's commitment to my work and to my development as a person that
I really feel grateful for. Wanda was always very generous with her time. She not only read
carefully all that I wrote throughout these years (and it was a lot), but also set a lot of time aside
to spend with me. During the most difficult times of my PhD, Wanda always had a word of
encouragement. Wanda once said that a piece that I wrote on social theory was "intellectually
stimulating" for her. I used that statement to light the darkest passages of my experience at
Sloan. I lucked out because Wanda's human qualities are at least at the same level of her
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qualities as a researcher. I really benefited from that. There is no way I can ever repay the
kindness and support that Wanda has given me. Nonetheless I want leave heartfelt thanks for
posterity and congratulate Wanda on the great human being that she is.
Miguel, my advisor during my master's, was not only the greatest of colleagues but also
the greatest of friends. He was always there for me when I needed him and he was the first one
that I called when in academic distress. Our lunches at Portugdlia are some of the fondest
memories that I have from the past five years, not in the least because some of the ideas in my
dissertation were developed in intellectual banter with Miguel. Like Wanda, Miguel is a fabulous
human being. I treasure his kindness and I am very proud to be able to call him my friend.
There were others that will be forever entwined with my experience in the past five years
for better and for worse. It was an honor to have John and JoAnne in my committee. I am
grateful for their feedback on my dissertation and for their commitment to my development as an
academic. I also want to extend my heartfelt thanks to (in no particular order): Lourdes, for a
postcard in one of my most difficult moments, and the separation between unprescribed and
informal; Tony, for his friendship and companionship; Karin, for driving me in Boston; Neil, for
my dissertation (I really owe him big time) and his friendship; Tiago, for early mornings; Steve,
for Lord of the Rings; Tiffany, for hardened bagels; Paulo, for illuminated evenings; Allison, for
Italian lessons; Arild, for Norway; Liz, for poetry; Paul, for intellectual heroism; Michelle, for
candy on my birthday; Ethan, for gaming; Els, for music; Karim, for conversation; Ruthanne, for
ephemeral friendship; Will, for Will; Chris, for South End bread; Patricia, for her help; Miguel,
for his; Graga, for hers; Jesper, for the first-line managers' dilemma; Annique, for
companionship; Luis, for friendship and hospitality; Andrea and Pemrnille, for weekend mornings;
Cita, for driving me in England; Paulo, for being there; Ant6nio, for art; Nelson, for nature;
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Mamy, for love; Ttd, for postcards; Arlindo and Gracinda, for their love of Filipe; Jeroen, for
comments; Sinan, for insights; Kevin, for insight; Annalia, for Tango; Mara, for patience; Rita,
for happy returns; Isabel, for a warm welcome; my students, Isabel, Cristina and Elsa, for
cheering me on; Joaquim Menezes, for our yearly lunches; Ken, for stimulating co-authorship;
Mary, for helping me with my applications; Sharon, for being Sharon; everyone at E-Tel (sorry,
can't say your names), for friendship and great data; and to the many others that I have not
named but that have given me some of their time and inspiration. And finally, all heed what
Treebeard said to Merry and Pippin, all except Filipe that is.
I leave you with one of my favorite lines, "I don't know half of you half as well as I
should like, and I like less than half of you half as well as you deserve" (Tolkien, 2002: 22). I
really don't.
Time to go.
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CHAPTER 1:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM OF AGENCY IN FORMAL
REPRESENTATIONS OF WORK
"Morgoth held the Orcs in dire thraldom, for in their corruption they had lost almost all
possibility of resisting the domination of his will. So great indeed did its pressure upon them
become ere Angbandfell that, if he turned his thought towards them, they were conscious of his
'eye' wherever they might be. " (Tolkien, 1993)
How can employees engage in unprescribed work in informated organizations (cf.
Zuboff, 1988)?
The dominant view in the literature on information technology and organizations argues
that unprescribed work is jeopardized by managers' use of information technology for
supervision (Garson, 1988; Zuboff, 1988). Many of the studies in this literature have documented
how managers use information technology to increase their visibility over employees' action
(e.g., Dandeker, 1990; Findlay & McKinlay, 2003; Sewell, 1998; Townsend, 2005; Webb &
Palmer, 1998). In these studies, managers' use the information provided by management
information systems to enforce prescribed goals, roles, rules and procedures and to discipline
that do not comply with them. The emphasis is on control and compliance, not on allowing
unprescribed work practices to emerge, no matter how helpful these practices are for the
organization. Bentham's (1787/1995) panopticon is a frequently used metaphor in these studies
to evoke a sense of ever-present supervision (Bain & Taylor, 2000; Winiecki, 2004; Zuboff,
1988). To be sure there is plenty of room for agency in the use of information technologies in
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organizations. Employees are not mere subjects of technological progress. However, these
studies suggest that employees are more inclined to reproduce managers' practices of
surveillance, even if by resisting them, than enacting alternative practices of shared learning and
collaboration (Coombs, Knights, & Willmott, 1992; Orlikowski, 1991; Sewell & Wilkinson,
1992).
Nonetheless, the literature on the use of information technology for prescribed
collaborative work has shown that these technologies have the potential to be used to engage in
unprescribed work more effectively. Research on computer-mediated work, especially in the
context of virtual teams (see Schultze & Orlikowski, 2001 for a review), has shown that
information technology can be used to share information widely and quickly. Orlikowski's
(1996) study of the implementation of a work tracking system in a customer's service unit has
shown that this type of system can be used to facilitate and disseminate learning. Jarvenpaa and
Leidner (1999) have shown that information technology can also be used to facilitate the creation
of a basis of trust that would otherwise require prolonged interaction. All of these possible uses
of information technology have been shown to improve collaborative work on prescribed tasks.
Therefore, if it were not for managers' use of information technology to engage in close
supervision of their employees' actions, employees could use information technology in similar
ways when engaging in unprescribed work and thus contribute to their organization's
adaptability.
In this study, in which I present my analysis of my 15-month ethnography in a desk sales
unit, I intend to show that managers' use of information technology for supervision is not
incompatible with employees' use of information technology to engage in unprescribed work.
Indeed, I want to show that managers have incentives to forfeit surveillance and instead apply
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their efforts to use information technology to build a facade of compliance with prescribed goals
and prescribed rules, roles, and procedures. But my message is not one of unbridled optimism.
These facades require perpetual maintenance work and it is employees, not managers, who have
to engage in this task. To this end, I put forth an ambitious research question. Ambitious because
it questions the assumption of tight coupling between work and its representation, and instead
takes the creation of formal representations of work as a labor in itself, quite separate from
employees' everyday work.
How do employees produce formal representations of compliance without doing the work
that such formal representations require? By answering this research question I seek to shed light
on the many hidden labors behind representations of compliance, and place agency again in the
center stage of the process through which work is formally represented in organizations. In doing
so, I aim to contribute to the understanding of visibility of action in social theory. My ambition is
to show that it is possible to manage how visible one's action is, even when that action unfolds in
a place regionalized as a front stage.
These intentions were not the outcome of a careful and prolonged study of the literature
on information technology and organizations from which I deduced a research problem and a
research question. Instead both were the outcome of the emergent process through which I used
my knowledge of the literature on IT and organizations to make sense of my experience at
DeskSales as it unfolded. The next chapter, which makes the case for my study's value, should
thus be read as a post-facto justification, not as a pre-existing intention. What did precede my
joining DeskSales was my commitment to ethnography as a research method. When I look at the
world I see agents enacting strings of practices building upon each other, constraining each other,
enabling each other. I see structures as having a virtual existence and being only instantiated in
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these practices and I see practices as arrays of actions within a material context (Giddens, 1986;
Greene, 1999; Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, & Savigny, 2001). For those of such a disposition, only a
close and prolonged contact with agents' practices gives some assurance of understanding. Any
other method, qualitative or quantitative, seems too far removed and based on too abstract a
notion of social phenomena to make sense. Therefore, the chapter on methods that follows the
statement of this study's research problem and research question should be seen as an attempt to
justify my enactment of my own position in the field of science, not as a logical deductive
process that takes method to follow a research question. That is a dangerous model that, in my
observation, is only empirically valid for the choice of particular variations of techniques within
an espoused method.
The three chapters that follow make three empirical cuts at the data that ground my study.
In my first data chapter, I articulate the first-line managers' dilemma. I posit that first-line
managers are subjected to two opposite forces: the bureaucratic push and the improvisational
pull. I suggest possible tactic to address this dilemma: the facade-creation strategy. In this
strategy, first line managers limit their interpretation of both forces to create a representation of
compliance with prescribed rules, roles, procedures and goals. First-line managers forfeit the
supervision of their employees' everyday work and restrict themselves to enforce the creation of
representations. This suggests that managers not only manage work down the hierarchy, but also
representations up the organization. I further show that supervision based on formal
representations of work facilitates the creation and maintenance of a facade of compliance in a
way that direct supervision does not allow.
In the next two data chapters, I address the two consequences that the enactment of the
fagade creation strategy had for DeskSales employees. Desk Salespeople engaged in service
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work so as to create a representation of compliance in Siebel. However they had no prescribed
system to scaffold the coordination of their service work across time, nor did they have the
prescribed ties they needed to enlist the cooperation of their company's service units in their
service work.
In the first of these two chapters I create a model of the main tasks that employees engage
in to coordinate their own work across time when the habitual prescribed scaffolds for this
coordination - the production process and managerial orders - are not available. I show that for
two of those tasks -- keeping a record of outstanding work and keeping a record of the
information related to that work - employees rely on an improvised information system. I show
that the material basis of this improvised information system matters for managers. If it is
difficult for managers to see their employees' work because of the materials used to improvise
this information system, then managers will have little if any possibility to supervise and
influence the progress of such work. I also show that the third task of temporal coordination -
prioritizing outstanding tasks - is successfully delegated to agents outside the organization. I
show that employees' work can be prioritized according to outsiders' interests, which can easily
be at odds with the interests of the organization.
In the third data chapter, I present three alternatives to personal ties to engage in
unprescribed cooperation in organizations. I show that unprescribed cooperation does not require
enduring personal ties. Unprescribed cooperation can happen through spot personal ties with
agents within and outside the organization's boundaries, and unprescribed cooperation can also
happen through impersonal tactics, such as using forms to enlist the cooperation of other
organizational units.
- 14-
Before concluding the study with implications for theory and practice, I weave the three
chapters that present my findings into an alternative approach to the role of agency in producing
computer-generated formal representations of work and an alternative approach to the problem
of managing the visibility of one's work.
To begin, I start with the justification of the research problem and research question that
guided my study.
- 15-
CHAPTER 2:
APPROACHES TO VISIBILITY AND THE PRODUCTION OF FORMAL
REPRESENTATIONS OF WORK
The challenges of showing and hiding work were the dominant themes in my
interpretation of employees and managers' experience at Desk Sales - the sales unit where I
conducted this study.
Managers spent most of their time at work supervising employees' creation of a formal
representation of their work in Siebel (the information system adopted in their company),
preparing reports based on that formal representation of their employees work, and presenting
these reports to upper-level managers. Employees spent most of their time doing service work,
but they often complained that they only did service work to be able to earn the right to report
others' sales as their own. When not engaging in service work, employees spent their time
creating a representation of compliance with sales and saleswork targets in Siebel. Making work
visible in Siebel seemed to be the unit's main task.
DeskSales' employees, however, did very little, if any sales and saleswork. Most of the
sales that employees reported in Siebel were done by other parts of their company's sales force.
Most of the calls to customers reported on this system were never actually made. The
representation of DeskSales employees' compliance with sales and saleswork targets in Siebel
was thus a fagade which required continuous effort to be sustained.
DeskSales' employees and their managers were successful in creating and sustaining
such a facade. The unit and its managers were often rewarded with some of the most prestigious
sales-performance awards in the company. This achievement suggests that my research at
-16-
DeskSales can contribute to the social study of practices and the study of information technology
and organizations. The visibility of practices is one of the central problems in the social study of
practices. Some of the most prominent authors in this literature (e.g., Giddens, 1986) argue that
the visibility of agents' practices is agents' main resource to shape the practices of others. The
dominant view on the visibility of practices suggests that agents use front stages and back stages
to manage the extent to which others have access to their action. The use of front stages and back
stages for this purpose has two limitations. The first is that, according to the dominant view on
the visibility of practices, a space can only be a front stage or a back stage at any single point in
time, not both. The second is that front stages and back stages are a joint accomplishment
between agents and their audience. If a space is jointly defined as a front stage, then the audience
will interpret agents' practices as a performance put on with a specific end in mind. Only if a
space is jointly defined as a backstage will the audience interpret agents practices in that space (if
the audience is granted access to those practices) as genuine - a window into the agents'
behavior and thoughts. DeskSales' managers and employees were able to use Siebel, their formal
information system, as a fagade. A facade incorporates elements of front stages and back stages.
When enacting a facade, actors attempt to shape their audience's interpretation of their
interaction space as a back stage - thus offering the audience a transparent view of agent's
genuine practices and thoughts. However, agents use that space of interaction as a front stage to
present a performance put on for their own benefit. DeskSales' managers and employees used
Siebel as a facade. They attempted to shape the interpretation of upper-level managers to have
them look at Siebel as a transparent window into DeskSales' everyday operations. But
DeskSales' managers and employees used Siebel as a "shop window", in the words of one of the
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unit's managers, to create a representation of compliance to avoid scrutiny and earn monetary
and career benefits.
The visibility of practices or, to be more precise, the visibility of work is one of the
central topics in studies of information technology and organizations (Orlikowski, 1991). The
dominant approach to the visibility of computer-mediated work argues that agents can do very
little to shape how their work is represented by information technology. The dominant
assumption is that it is technology, not people, which produces computer-generated formal
representations of work (Sewell, 1998). Managers and employees can only shape those
representations by sabotaging information systems or by resisting their implementation (Zuboff,
1988). DeskSales' managers and employees, however, were able to use Siebel to represent
compliance with sales and saleswork targets without engaging in the amount of sales and
saleswork necessary to reach those targets, no matter how difficult these targets were.
DeskSales' managers and employees were not the subjects of computer mediated supervision.
They were the agents of computer mediated representation.
The remainder of this chapter reviews the literature on information technology and
organizations and the literature on the visibility of practices to articulate the research problem
and the research question that guide the presentation of my analysis of managers' and
employees' everyday experience at Desk Sales.
FORMAL REPRESENTATIONS OF WORK AND VISIBILITY
As organizations grew from small establishments into large modem corporations,
managers implemented formal systems to represent their employees work. Managers used these
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information systems to keep themselves informed about their organizations' operations. As these
representation systems became computerized, managers and employees faced greater challenges
in keeping even part of their work away from upper-level managers. Computer-generated formal
representations of work seem to leave employees and lower-level managers with only two
choices - complying with prescribed goals and prescribed roles, rules and procedures, or
sabotage information systems to keep some space for unprescribed work.
The way employees address this challenge holds a potential contribution to the social
study of practices by sharpening our understanding of the process through which agents manage
the visibility of practices.
The rise of management mediated by formal representations of work
The twentieth century witnessed the diffusion of the large corporation to an ever-
increasing number of industries (Chandler, 1962; Noble, 1977). Large organizations with
thousands of employees, extending across multiple geographical regions, often in different
countries are no longer the prerogative of a handful of industries. Instead they have spread across
the majority of business sectors (Chandler & Mazlich, 2005).
The size and complexity of the modem corporation created new managerial challenges
(cf. Barnard, 1938; Fayol, 1949). As the modem corporation became more commonplace, so did
these new challenges. Chief among them was the supervision of large workforces. The size of
the modem corporation and its geographical dispersion made direct supervision prohibitively
costly and physically impracticable (e.g., Blau, 1955). As Yates (1989) has shown, the growth of
the problem of large-scale supervision led to, or at least coincided with, advances in
communication technologies. Upper-level managers used these communication technologies to
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establish reporting and accounting systems to supervise the work of lower level managers and
employees (for a example see Sloan, 1964). Supervision and management itself became
mediated processes.
To earn legitimacy (Dalton, 1950; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and increase efficiency
(Taylor, 1947), smaller organizations also adopted formal representations of work to supervise
employees, leading to a more generalized use of those representations in everyday managerial
work (see also Igbaria, Zinatelli, Cragg, & Cavaye, 1997). Formal representations of work -
particularly quantified accounts of work processes and outcomes created according to prescribed
procedures - reigned supreme at the core of managers' material experience at work.
The computerization of work in large corporations and small enterprises reinforced the
centrality of formal representations of work in managers' experience of organizations.
Computer-generated formal representations of work are broader, more detailed and more quickly
assembled than human-generated formal representations of work (for an account of such a
change see Mann & Williams, 1960; also compare Yates, 1989; with Zuboff, 1988). Computer-
generated formal representations of work are cheaper to produce when compared with their
human-generated counterparts (e.g., Bain, Watson, Mulvey, Taylor, & Gall, 2002). As a
consequence, managers have been provided with increasingly broad and detailed views of the
process and outcomes of the work carried out by lower level managers and by employees.
Computer-generated formal representations of work are instantaneous, overcoming the lag
between employees work and its reporting in human-generated representations of work.
Managers can observe their employees' work as it unfolds (see Ciborra & Schneider, 1992).
The computerization of work has also made formal representations of work more encompassing,
thus reinforcing their centrality in managers' work (e.g., Nidumolu & Subramani, 2003). In
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modem organizations, be they large corporations or small enterprises, formal representations of
work are at the core of managers' material experience of their work and at the core of their
relationship with their employees.
Current perspectives on the formal representation of work
Only a limited number of studies have examined the production of human-generated
formal representations of work (Crozier, 1964; Lombard, 1955; Manning, 1977; Van Maanen &
Pentland, 1994). These studies show that employees are acutely aware of managers' use of
formal representations of work to supervise and reward their work. Each of these studies
documents a set of tactics that employees enact to shape the formal representations of their work
to display compliance and earn the praise and rewards that it entails. Although the specific
features of the tactics used by employees in each of these studies differ significantly, they share
one important aspect. In all of these research settings, employees participate in the production of
these formal representations and therefore they have an opportunity to shape these
representations to display the compliance they need to ear their managers' approval and its
attached rewards.
The literature on information technology and organizations is far more pessimistic when
discussing employees' opportunity to shape formal representations of their work. This literature
suggests that studying this topic in modem corporations where work and communication are
computerized is, at best, a futile enterprise. To be sure, the literature on the computerization of
work has placed formal representations of work squarely in the center of the relationship
between managers and employees and in the center of each group's experience at work (e.g.,
Doolin, 2004). However, this literature has removed all but the slightest trace of agency from the
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production of formal representations of work (e.g., Sewell, 1998; Sewell et al., 1992). This
technology-centered view is based on the tight coupling between computer-assisted work and its
formal representation.
Human generated formal representations of work are one step removed from work itself.
Blau's (1955) social workers could see citizens in need of help without automatically creating a
formal representation of their visit, and Burawoy's (1979) factory workers could manufacture
products without adding to the level of output recorded in formal representations of their work.
Research on computer-generated formal representations of work paints a very different picture.
This research suggests that the computerization of work merges together the tools that employees
need to carry out their work tasks and the production of formal representations of work. Typists
cannot transcribe letters without having their keystrokes counted, call center representatives
cannot answer customers' calls without having their call recorded and point-of-sales operators
cannot make a sale without having it reported (for a description of electronic monitoring in each
of these functions see Garson, 1988). According to this literature, even those employees whose
work cannot be automatically formally represented by computers have little if any possibility of
directly shaping the formal representation of their work. As Orlikowski's (1991) research on
consultants shows, employees' need to scaffold the coordination of their work across time
coupled with the pressure to comply with norms in their corporate culture and with formal
procedures leads them to voluntarily report their work in formal representation systems. The
computerization of work embeds the process through which work is formally represented in the
very tools that employees need to carry out their work tasks. It is this tight coupling of work and
its formal representation which limits agents' ability to directly shape the process of producing
formal representations of work.
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Tensions in the use of computer-generatedformal representations of work
As a whole, the above suggests that formal representations of work are an important
research topic that has been hollowed of interest because of the tight coupling between work and
its representation created by the use of computers to both carry out work tasks and formally
represent them. This tight coupling between work and its representation is problematic because it
constitutes a source of tension in employees' everyday experience at work. One the one hand, as
the voluminous research on unprescribed work has shows, employees routinely need to engage in
work other than that prescribed by the organization (e.g., Crozier, 1964; Fletcher, 2001; Heath &
Luff, 2000). Employees need to engage in unprescribed work because of the limitations of their
organizations' prescribed roles, rules and procedures when achieving their organizations'
prescribed goals (cf. Blau & Scott, 1962). Employees also need to engage in unprescribed work
to improvise unprescribed rewards to match their interpreted level of effort at work with their
total inducements from work (March & Simon, 1958; Mars, 1983). On the other hand the tight
coupling between work and formal representations of work makes unprescribed work visible to
upper levels of management, putting its perpetrators at risk and foreclosing any opportunity to
routinely engage in unprescribed work (Bain et al., 2000; Barker & Cheney, 1994).
How do employees address this tension? Do they succumb to the awareness of ever-
present managers' visibility and forfeit anything but the most canonical of practices? Or do they
try to sabotage any attempt to computerize their work, seeking to keep some space for
unprescribed work?
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Formal representations of work and the problem of visibility in social theory
Addressing this tension sheds light on the dynamics of visibility of work in organizations
and on the consequences of the use of computer-mediated representations of work. More
importantly perhaps, addressing this tension promises to expand social theory's view on the
relationship between the practices of multiple agents by addressing the problem of the visibility
of action.
The dominant view among practice theorists (e.g., Bourdieu, 1990; Giddens, 1986;
Goffman, 1967; Hagerstrand, 1967; Schatzki, 2001) is that the visibility of an agent's action
shapes the extent to which that agent's practices will shape the practices of other agents. These
theorists argue that the relationship among the practices of multiple agents is not decided
exclusively by those reacting to an agent's practices, but also by the agent enacting that practice.
As Goffman (1967) showed, agents are acutely aware that other agents are monitoring their
action. That awareness leads agents to shape the extent to which others have access to their
behaviors and discourse. The goal, as Giddens (1986) and Goffman (1959) have suggested, is to
]keep a consistent narrative of one's experience. To this end, agents manage the visibility of their
action to keep to themselves specific actions that are incompatible with the narrative of their
experience that they present to others. That way, agents exempt themselves from the work of
having to either bracket those actions as exceptions or even exempt themselves from the more
exerting work of having to incorporate those actions into the public narrative of their experience.
The dominant view among practice theorists defines space as one of the major resources
available to manage the visibility of action (Hagerstrand, 1967).According to Giddens (1986),
the presence availability of an agent and the visibility of that agent's actions depend on how that
agent uses the features of the different settings where action is enacted. As they recursively enact
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the same practices in the same spatial settings, agents "regionalize" that setting - they produce a
set of norms about the material elements of that setting which rule, among other things, the type
and the amount of interaction available in it. The dominant view among practice theorists
distinguishes two types of settings: "front regions" and "back regions". Front regions are
produced and reproduced when agents draw on the features of a place to make the practices
enacted in it visible to other agents. Front regions allow agents to display their practices to others
so that they can have a role in the practices that their audience enacts. Back regions are produced
and reproduced when agents draw on the material features of a place to keep the practices
enacted in those places invisible to other agents. Back regions allow agents to circumscribe their
practices in whole or in part, thus limiting their impact on the practices of other agents.
Research in organizations where work and its supervision are computer-mediated has
shown that back stages are very difficult to enact in these contexts (Orlikowski, 1991). The
experience of computer-mediated work is described as one of acting in two different spaces: the
on-line space and the off-line space (Garson, 1988; Townsend, 2005; see also Turkle, 1984).
'The off-line space is where employees enact the non-task related aspects of their experience at
work (Zuboff, 1988). This space is still regionalizable into front and back stages. The on-line
space of computer-mediated work where employees carry out their tasks is always a front stage.
According to the dominant view on computer-mediated work, managers use information systems
to exert close supervision over employees (Ball & Wilson, 2000). Employees interpret these
supervision practices as giving managers extensive visibility of their own work practices
(Townsend, 2005). Under these conditions, information systems are regionalized into front
stages without a corresponding backstage where employees can retreat to enact unprescribed
work practices. In contexts of computer mediated work, the dominant view on the use of
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information technology for supervision gives only two choices to employees: to either forego
unprescribed work and only engage in work practices that can withstand the scrutiny of a front
stage or to attempt to escape that scrutiny by resisting and sabotaging the use of information
technology to supervise their work. The tension between these two alternatives suggests that
studying how employees and managers shape the visibility of their work in on-line front stages
can push social theory further by uncovering a pattern of regionalization of space that constitutes
a viable alternative to front stages and back stages.
AGENCY AND COMPUTER-GENERATED FORMAL REPRESENTATIONS OF
WORK
Having established that the practices with and around computer-generated formal
representations of work may advance social theory by adding to the current approach to
managing the visibility of practices, the task now is to formalize a research question to guide the
presentation of my ethnography at DeskSales in a way that makes a contribution to this topic.
To formalize this study's research question, I review the literature on the design of formal
representations of work and the literature on the use of these representations very briefly, to
highlight the importance of studying the production of computer-generated formal
representations of work. I then review the literature on information technology and organizations
to articulate the focus of this study's research question: the production of formal representations
of compliance with prescribed goals and practices without doing the work that would underlie
such a representation.
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Designing formal representations of work
The literature on the politics of IT choice and implementation (e.g., Markus, 1983;
Thomas, 1994) and the literature on the formal classification of work (Bowker, 1994; Starr,
1995), have documented the design of formal representations of work for multiple of purposes
including the supervision. According to both lines of research, formal representations of work
embed the interests of their designers, not the interests of their users (see Noble, 1977, 1984).
Research on the political process of information technology adoption and implementation has
shown that formal representations of work are a contested outcome of a process which can
unfold within or across organizational boundaries (Findlay et al., 2003). This process, however,
seldom transpires to the lower rungs of the organization. Employees can be consulted when these
formal representations of their work are being designed (e.g., Zweig & Webster, 2002).
However, employees' agency in this and other elements of their organizations' information
systems is enacted after these systems are implemented - in their everyday use (Bitner &
Garfinkel, 1967; Orlikowski, 1996). This suggests that the production of computer-generated
formal representations of work is an important part of the design of these information
technologies because it is then that the process of design-in-use unfolds. It is this process of
shaping information technology at it is used that has the power to change or reproduce the
features put in place by the technology's designers (cf. DeSanctis & Poole, 1994).
Using formal representations of work
The literature on managers' supervision practices shows how managers use formal
representations to make sense of their organizations (Simons, 1990). Upper-level managers can
only exert direct supervision over their organizations' operations with much difficulty. The size
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and geographical dispersion of modem corporations make face-to-face, direct supervision very
costly, if not physically impossible. Lower-level managers have the necessary conditions to exert
direct supervision. Nonetheless, the institutionalization of measurement suggests that even first-
line managers will use formal representations of their employees' work as part of their
interpretive process to make sense of that work (see Rosenthal, 2004; Winiecki, 2004). The
formal representations of work that upper-level and lower-level managers use are finished
products. Managers can improvise on those representations to support a favorable interpretation
of their employees work. Such a favorable interpretation allows managers to sustain a positive
sense of identity at work and to preserve their face vis-A-vis their employees. However, the
formal representation of their employees' work is a material resource for this improvisation. This
representation remains unchanged by its use to make sense of employees' work.
Organizational research has only recently begun to look at the material resources to
which power is accumulated and exercised (e.g., Carlile, 2002). Most accounts of the material
elements of political action in computer mediated contexts explain how managers use electronic
communication media to enact political ploys in organizations (e.g., Romm & Pliskin, 1998).
The ethnographic accounts of organizational politics have been conspicuously silent about other
material aspects of power and influence in organizations. However, a close reading of such
accounts suggests that managers use the contents of formal representations of work as resources
in their attempts to exert political influence. Jackall (1989) and Watson (2001) show that
managers use performance statistics of their units to gain access to upper-level managers and
persuade them of their competence. In spite of the absence of any reference to the sources of
these statistics in these studies, the broader literature on the production of work statistics suggest
that there are few if any alternative sources for measures of performance beyond formal
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representation of work. A unit's performance can be de facto changed by the rhetorical tactics
that managers build around the performance statistics in these representations. Nonetheless, the
representation themselves remains unchanged. Taken together, research on the design and use of
formal representations of work shows that the production of such representations is a
phenomenon with much to offer to the understanding of visibility of work in organizations and
of how the use of formal representations of work shapes managers' and employees' work
practices.
Patterns ofproduction offormal representations of work
The dominant view of the use of information technology in organizations suggests that
the production of formal representations of work has little if anything to offer to social scientists
as a research topic. The production of formal representations of work seems to be a more fruitful
topic for students of computer science. The literature on information technology and
organizations has portrayed the computerized information systems that ground formal
representations of work as providing a very tight coupling between work and its representation.
This literature has attempted to demonstrate that this tight coupling is possible because computer
generated formal representations of work are created as employees use the tools and resources
that they need to carry out their everyday work. Qualitative studies of IT and supervision in
organizations have shown that this is not only how researchers interpret computer-generated
formal representations of work but also how employees interpret these representations.
According to these studies, the difficulty of escaping the gaze of computer-generated formal
representations of work is enough to ensure compliance (Brown, 2000; Zuboff, 1988). There is
little if any need for managers to use these formal representations of work to actually supervise
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employees work. Employees' compliance is ensured through a process of anticipatory
conformity. The mere awareness that any deviation from prescribed roles, rules and procedures
can be detected is enough to preempt any attempt at non-compliance. A few studies, however,
provides accounts of employees' use of information systems in ways other than those suggested
by anticipatory conformity. These accounts many not be conclusive, but they are certainly
suggestive that employees can react to the awareness of full visibility of their work through
patterns other than anticipatory conformity. Zuboff's (1988) research on the use of computer-
generated formal representations of work tells of a lower-level manager who attempted to
sabotage upper-level managers' access to formal representations of his unit's work. Orlikowski's
(1 991) research on consultants' use of computer-based work tools tells of a number of
consultants who attempted to resist their computerized work tools with the ultimate purpose of
resisting the formal representation of their work. These two practices around computer-generated
formal representation of work differ in one important way from anticipatory conformity. In the
anticipatory conformity' pattern, employees neither resist not do they attempt to manipulate
computer-generated formal representations of their work. In both the 'sabotaging access' pattern
described by Zuboff and in the 'resistance' pattern described by Orlikowski and in resisting
information systems, employees resist these representations. There is also a suggestive difference
between sabotaging access and resisting information systems. When sabotaging access,
employees and lower-level managers interpret computer-generated formal representations of
work as resilient to any attempt at manipulation. However, when resisting information systems,
employees interpret those formal representations as vulnerable to attempts at manipulation.
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Factors shaping the production of computer-generatedformal representations of work
The argument above suggests that the practices around computerized formal
representations of work can be placed in a four-cell matrix.
The two axes that constitute this matrix are the motivation to resist computer-generated
formal representations of work and employees' ability to do manipulate those representations.
These two axes define four such practices (see table 2.1. below): resistance, sabotage,
anticipatory conformity and representation work. The current research on information
technology and organizations has documented the first three practices but it is still difficult to
find research which documents and explains representation work. It is this last practice around
the production of computer-generated formal representations of work that grounds my analysis
of managers' and employees' experience at DeskSales.
Table 2.1. - Employees practices around the production of computer-generated formal
representations of work.
'Employees want to resist
computer-based formal
representations of their work
Yes
No
Employees are able to manipulate computer-
based formal representations of their work
Yes No
Resist information Sabotage upwards
systems visibility
9 Anticipatory
(Representation work) conformity
Motivation to resist formal representations of work
One of the axes of this matrix is the extent to which employees resist formal
representations of their work. This level of resistance, according to the literature on supervision
and control in organizations depends on managers' use of formal representations of work in their
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relationship with employees. When managers use formal representation of work to reward
performance and promote employees, then employees can benefit from managers' use of formal
representations of their work. Orlikowski (1996) has documented such a case. In her study of the
use of an incident reporting software in a service unit, Orlikowski showed that customer service
representatives had no reason to resist their unit's information system. Instead they improvised
on it to adapt it to the specific features of their everyday work. This was because managers used
the formal representations of work produced by this information system to assess service
:representatives' performance. Therefore, service representatives not only did not resist this
information system, they also willingly shared formal representations of their work with
colleagues and managers to enhance learning and cooperation. Their goal was to display an
image of competence and compliance that would be rewarded by their managers.
There are other studies, however, where managers use formal representations of work to
supervise and discipline employees. In those cases, employees received little benefit form their
managers' use of formal representations of their work. Ball and Wilson (2000) have documented
such a case in their study of the use of a call monitoring system in a call center. These authors
showed that first-line managers closely supervised service representatives' interactions with their
customers and were quick to exert disciplinary measures once service representatives strayed
away from their prescribed targets. Ball and Wilson showed that the service representatives
working at this call center resisted the call monitoring system their supervisors used by
complaining about its impact on the quality of their customer service. Service representatives
developed multiple tactics to keep their calls invisible to this information system to escape their
managers' gaze. Employees' plight under conditions of high visibility is especially serious when
employees need to deviate from prescribed rules, roles and procedures to achieve their
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organization's goals. Under these conditions, employees' deviation from what the organization
prescribed will be detected and disciplined. However, sticking to prescribed roles, rules and
procedures jeopardizes employees' ability to achieve their organization's goals. This will also be
visible in computer-generated formal representations of their work and disciplined by their
managers. It is difficult to find research that documents such practices around computer-
generated formal representation of work. Nonetheless, Blau's (1955; 1962) research on
government bureaucracies shows how these practices unfold with human-generated formal
representations of work. Blau showed that first-line managers only provided very limited formal
activity reports to upper-level managers. These reports only showed the results of employees'
work. First-line managers did not report on employees' work process and whether it adhered to
the organization's prescribed roles, rules and procedures. By doing so, first-line managers were
able to shield their employees' everyday practices at work from the supervision of upper-level
managers and thus avoid sanctions for failing to meet prescribed work procedures, even if only
to meet the organization's prescribed goals.
Ability to manipulate formal representations of work
The other axis of the matrix is the extent to which employees are able to manipulate
formal representations of work. By 'able' I mean not only being skilled enough to manipulate
formal representations of work but also having the will to engage in such manipulations.
Employees and lower-level managers may interpret their prescribed information systems
as difficult if not impossible to manipulate. This interpretation is not the inevitable outcome of
any technology features. Instead it results from employees' skills and from the meaning they
produce and reproduce surrounding their formal information systems (cf. Townsend, 2005).
'When employees have low skill and will to manipulate the formal representation of their work,
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their only alternatives, according to the literature, are complying or sabotaging access (e.g., Bain
et al., 2000; Garson, 1988; Zuboff, 1988). If employees value the rewards resulting from
favorable formal representations of their work and see no possibility of manipulating those
representations, research shows that they will fall into an anticipatory conformity pattern. If
employees want to avoid the sanctions resulting from deviant behavior and if they interpret the
formal representation of their work as beyond manipulation, they will fall into a sabotaging
access pattern. However, if employees and first-line managers want to avoid punishment and see
their information systems as manipulable, they will fall into a resistance pattern.
When employees resist formal representation of work, they are able to manipulate formal
information systems. These manipulations consist of using alternative tools to engage in their
everyday work. By doing so, employees bypass the information systems that create formal
representations of employees work. This practice exempts employees from having to sabotage
upper-level managers' access to information systems while allowing them to limit upper-level
managers' visibility of their work. Orlikowski's (1991) research on consultants' attempts to
resist monitoring through formal representations of their tools is a case in point. Consultants
'were required to use a set of computer-based work tools in their everyday work. These tools
produced formal representations of work that upper-level managers used to enforce compliance
with prescribed rules, roles and procedures. A number of consultants, however, were able to use
improvised electronic work tools which did not produce a formal representations of consultant's
work accessible to upper-level managers. These consultants were thus able to resist, in part,
attempts at disciplining their work practices through formal representations of their work.
The condition in which employees do not resist formal representations of work and see
these as manipulable us difficult to find in the literature on IT and organizations. Under such
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conditions, employees would want to get the rewards form upper-level managers' use of formal
representations of employees work. However, employees would produce those representations
by manipulating the production of computer-based formal representations of their work.
According to the literature on IT and organizations, however, the tight coupling between work
and its representation that the computerization of work entails would make such a manipulation
very difficult, if not impossible to achieve. The popular business press is, nonetheless, more
optimistic. In a recent critical view of life in the computerized workplace, Adams (2002)
caricatured formal employees' production of formal representations of work as follows:
"A company [...] keeps its field service people on their toes by making them track how long it
takes to fix customer problems. A particular customer made a complaint and waited two years
before anyone was even assigned to work on the problem. [...] How do you think the service
department tracked their performance for that customer?
Option 1: Did they report each week to their bosses - for two years - that they were incompetent?
Option 2: Did they log the customer's problem on the tracking system on the same day someone
was finally assigned to fix it - two years after the original complaint - thus showing an excellent
response record?"
The tactic represented by the second option allows employees to benefit form the rewards
resulting from positive formal representations of work without doing the work such
representations entail. This alternative is suggestive in two ways. First, this vignette suggests that
there is still plenty of room for agency in producing formal representations of work, even when
they are computer-generated and are used for everyday supervision. This vignette thus suggests
that it is possible to reconcile two opposite dynamics in organizations. One is upper-level
managers' efforts to use formal representation of work to make sense of their organization and to
attempt to shape the practices of employees and lower-level managers. The other is the need that
lower-level managers and employees have to deviate from formal rules, roles and procedures to
reach the organization's goals or to advance their own personal interests in the organization.
These two dynamics can be reconciled, as Adams suggests, through practices of representation
similar to those in Goffman's (1959) explanation of face-work. Invoking Goffman highlights the
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second reason why Adam's vignette is suggestive. As Giddens (1986) demonstrated in his
discussion of the interjection "oops", facework entails not only acting out a line of action but
also engaging in micro-level tasks that protect that line from any deviation of behavior and
discourse. Adams's vignette suggests that employees' everyday experience at work creates a
similar need for representation work - the work involved in producing and sustaining formal
representation of work. Reading Adams's vignette from the vantage point of the ethnographic
literature on work uncovers a set of challenges in addition to that of creating a representation of
compliance in an organization's information system: How does Adams's engineer deal with her
supervisor's ability to see her everyday work? How does she keep track of her outstanding work
'without using her unprescribed tracking system? Does she need the help of others in her
representation work? How does she enlist that cooperation?
Thus, the formal research question that drives this study is as follows: How do employees
produce formal representations of compliance without doing the work that such formal
representations require? To put it simply, what this research seeks to uncover is the hidden
labors of producing formal representations of compliance. To this end, I conducted an
ethnography of a desk-based sales unit in a large European telecommunications company. This
research setting and my data collection and analysis procedures are documented in the next
chapter. This is followed by three empirical cuts at this data which are woven together in a
discussion of a theory of production of formal representations of work and a theory of visibility
in computerized work.
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CHAPTER 3: ON DESKSALES AS A RESEARCH SETTING AND
ETHNOGRAPHY AS A RESEARCH METHOD
My goal in this chapter is to provide the background for the presentation of my analysis
in the next three chapters. To this end, I explain the genesis of DeskSales, the unit where I
carried out the 15-month ethnography that grounds this research and describe some of the main
features of the unit and the prescribed role for its employees. I then justify my use of
ethnography as a research method and provide details of my data analysis and data collection
procedures.
ON E-TEL, DESKSALES AND DESK SALESPEOPLE
DeskSales, the unit where I conducted the research that grounds this study, was an
outcome of the Multiple Channels to Market Program, a large planned change process unfolding
at Europe Telecom, the unit's parent company. DeskSales was created to take on the low and
medium complexity sales and saleswork away from Europe Telecom's field sales force. The
prescribed role for DeskSales employees was thus sales-related. Desk Salespeople were the desk-
based version of field salespeople.
Europe Telecom and the Multiple Channels to Market Program
The setting for this research is Europe Telecom's DeskSales' unit. Europe Telecom is a
large European company in the information and telecommunications sector. E-Tel was founded
in the 19th century as a state-owned company, becoming privatized in the early 80s, and
subjected since to a considerable amount of pro-competition regulation. It now holds 73% of the
1 All names are pseudonyms (unless indicated otherwise) to protect this study's informants. To help the reader,
formal roles at DeskSales (e.g., General Manager, Desk Sales Manager, Desk Salesperson) are always capitalized to
distinguish them from formal roles outside DeskSales (e.g., field salesperson, specialist service representative).
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fixed-line phone market in its home country with over 20 million customers and close to 30
million phone lines. In the financial year ending on March 31st 2003, its revenue was close to 35
billion dollars, generating around 6.5 billion dollars in profit. E-Tel employs about 100,000
people, 92% of whom work in the company's domestic market. Three quarters of these
employees are affiliated to the national union that represents postal and telecommunications
workers.
E-Tel has four major operating divisions: E-Tel Retail, E-Tel Solutions, E-Tel
International Services, and E-Tel Web. E-Tel Retail sells communication services such as voice,
data and multimedia to residential and business customers. E-Tel Solutions provides
communication products and services to communication companies, network infrastructure
providers and to other parts of E-Tel. E-Tel International Services provides managed network
solutions for corporate customers with multiple sites across Europe. E-Tel Web is the company's
Internet Service Provider. The DeskSales sales unit is part of E-Tel Corporate Customers, which
is part of E-Tel Retail. (See Exhibit 3.1. for an organizational chart).
E-Tel Retail generated about 20 billion dollars in revenue in 2003 with about 1.8 billion
in profits. This division is home to half of E-Tel's employees. E-Tel Corporate Customers is the
part of E-Tel Retail that serves the company's 4000 largest customers.
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Exhibit 3.1. - E-Tel's organizational chart.
I Europe Telecom I
E-Tel Solutions E-Tel Retail E-Tel International
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E-Tel Residential
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E-Tel Corporate
Customers
E-Tel Corp. Cust.
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...........................................................................
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service units
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E-Tel Corp. Cust.
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Ever since the company was privatized, the E-Tel Corporate Customers Division has been the
site of numerous change initiatives, mostly aimed at reducing costs and increasing efficiency. In
early 2002, one such initiative - the Multiple Channels to Market Program (MCMP) - was
launched. Its stated goal at the time, according to an internal E-Tel presentation, WAS "to
provide the right information to the right customers through the right channels at the right time"
[emphasis in the original]. Specifically:
Rather than the field sales force covering just about every customer with just about every
E-Tel product, we can be a lot more efficient by making sure that the amount of each channel sued
by each customer maps directly onto the size of account and the various products he buys. No
single channel will be used for a single customer. Each account will have a blend of channel
available and it will depend on what the customer wants each time he communicates with E-Tel as
to which channels he uses.
MCMP's goal was to provide alternative channels to field salespeople (i.e., salespeople
who spend most of their time meeting customers in person), who were at the time the single
point of contact between E-Tel Corporate Customers and its clients. The intention was not to
diversify the customer's experience, but to reduce costs and improve efficiency. According to a
study that E-Tel Corporate Customers commissioned from a consulting firm, field salespeople
cost about $325 an hour, whereas cost estimates for Desk Salespeople and a self-service website,
the two channels that MCMP was to add, were $32 and $1.5 an hour, respectively. To E-Tel's
managers this meant that if customers used the Desk Salespeople and the self-service website to
do the low-complexity transactions that tied much of field salespeople's time, they could
dramatically reduce the cost of these transactions and, at the same time, free up time for higher-
complexity, higher value added activities.
To this end, the E-Tel Corporate Customers Division ran a series of pilot projects with a
number of its more loyal customers to test their reaction to shifting part of their relationship with
E-Tel to desk-based and web-based support. At the end of the six weeks of pilot test, the team
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managing MCMP provided E-Tel's Corporate Customers Division's top management with
figures that showed a reduction in transaction costs of around $45,000, an increase of $10,000 in
sales for each account and a one-point increase in customer satisfaction (measured on a 5 point
scale). This led to the decision to start developing a self-service website and to build the
DeskSales sales unit to house the E-Tel Corporate Customers' Desk Salespeople.
DeskSales and Desk Salespeople
DeskSales's role in the larger Corporate Customers organization was to complement
field-based sales teams with a desk-based sales organization by performing low and medium
complexity sales. For the MCMP team, the desk-based nature of Desk Salespeople meant that
DeskSales had to distinguish itself from two types of units within E-Tel Corporate Customers:
sales oriented call-centers and the desk-based service (see below for an explanation of the role of
each of these units). According to the presentation that DeskSales management used to explain
their role to field salespeople, DeskSales was not a sales or customer assistance call center
because:
A Desk Salesperson who is doing their job properly will not be available for
approximately half the time. This is not a call centre operation where they're waiting, inactive, for
the 'phone to ring, but are proactively developing the relationship, making new contacts and
ultimately selling into their accounts and generating leads for the field sales teams to do the same.
This same presentation distinguished the role played by DeskSales from the role played
by the desk-based service units by defining the former as an "order making" unit and the latter as
an "order taking units". DeskSales was thus responsible for "quotes, up-selling, [finding]
customer requirements, [and] revenue forecasting". Service units were responsible for "order
placement, order tracking, order delivery, [and] faults". DeskSales took the lead when E-Tel was
selling, when "the customer doesn't know what they want". Service units took the lead when the
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customer was buying, when "the customer does know what they want". Once it was fully
developed, DeskSales was serving the three market-based directorates that hosted E-Tel
Corporate Customer's salesforce: Retail, Finance, and Technology and Media. Retail was the
biggest line of business in E-Tel's Corporate Customers Division and the source of DeskSales's
first set of accounts. Indeed, when the DeskSales was officially launched in late July 2002, it
only had four teams, all of them working on Retail accounts. In October they were joined by two
more teams working for Finance and in December two new teams took on the Technology and
Media accounts.
Independently of the team they were working for, Desk Salespeople shared the same job
description, which prescribed their role as follows:
Key purpose of job:
* As part of E-Tel Corporate Customers' Multiple Channels to Market Program, to account manage
nominated accounts from the desk [...]. The Desk Salespeople usually focus on medium to large
companies and work in conjunction with field-based sales teams.
* The role of the Desk Salesperson is twofold:
1. Tele-Coverage through a desk-based telephone channel - Managing customer relationships, lead
generation and qualification, and driving the channels to close the leads.
2. Selling low-medium complexity products and generating sales leads for other channels to close.
* Through this approach the Desk Salesperson will:
Assist the Account Team to meet and exceed revenue targets and
Build and develop strong customer relationships
* Deputize as necessary for Desk Sales Manager.
Given this description, the qualifications and skills required for a Desk Salesperson were
stated formally as follows:
Essential:
* 'Can Do' attitude, with a track record of achieving targets and objectives.
* Good communicator with the ability to build relationships at all levels
* Creative, proactive and a problem solver
* Able to plan and organize own workload with minimum supervision and be a team player
* Motivated, adaptable and flexible
* A Good level of business acumen and industry awareness
* An in-depth appreciation of E-Tel's products and services portfolio
* PC literacy
* A minimum of 1 years experience within a Desk Salesperson, or sales/sales support environment
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Desirable:
* 2 years experience in Sales, Sales Support, Consultancy or Project Management.
Desk Salespeople worked from 9 in the morning to 5 in the afternoon (5:30 on Mondays
and Tuesdays) in the DeskSales open-space office (see Exhibit 3.2. for a view of DeskSales).
Exhibit 3.2. - A view of DeskSales.
Desk Salespeople had three breaks during the day: one 15-minute break in the morning
and one in the afternoon, and an hour-long lunch break. Most Desk Salespeople spent these
breaks on the cafeteria in the building's ground floor, often sitting around with fellow team-
members. Because DeskSales offered continuous phone support during regular business hours,
Desk Salespeople were paired in a "buddy system". This meant that a Desk Salesperson and his
or her "buddy" were never allowed to take breaks or even vacation at the same time so that when
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a Desk Salesperson was away, there would be someone who would have some level of
familiarity with the accounts to be able to take orders and respond to queries from customers.
ON ETHNOGRAPHY AS METHOD OF CHOICE
The analysis that I present in the next chapters can only be interpreted by understanding
the procedures that I used to collect and analyze the ethnographical data that grounds this study.
Before going into the details of my data collection and data analysis procedures, I want to justify
my use of ethnography as a method and link it to this study's research question.
Research question and research design
The choice of research question for any study is partly determined by its author's
methodological commitments. Studying the production of formal representations of work is
compatible with my commitment to ethnography as a research method, a method that relies on
(1) close and (2) prolonged observation (3) of a bounded group in an organization. There are two
reasons that make the question of how are formal representations of work produced particularly
amenable to ethnographic research.
The first reason is that the literature on unprescribed practices in organizations suggests
that the production of formal representations of work has a number of local triggers instead of a
few major causal factors (Ezzamel, Willmott, & Frank, 2001; Jensen, 2003; Van Maanen et al.,
1994). Moreover, that same literature also suggests that practices survive and propagate through
people's everyday interactions (Bitner et al., 1967). This means that only part of the data needed
to document and explain the production of formal representations of work can be obtained by
collecting information in organizations' records and by conducting surveys. Organizational
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records are useful to provide some evidence of this process, especially of its outcomes. However,
such evidence requires an intimate knowledge of unprescribed practices because people are often
skilled in using formal records to cover up their unprescribed action (Lombard, 1955; Zuboff,
1988).
Surveys can be a useful way to assess the relative importance of each practice to shape
formal representations of work and assess the diffusion of each of those practices. However, this
presupposes a familiarity with those practices and with their causes (cf. Lee, Barua, & Whinston,
1997). Research on the design and use of formal representations of work in organizations
suggests that these causes and these practices vary enough from organization to organization for
the literature on this topic to be a reliable source to build questionnaires and surveys (e.g., Ball et
al., 2000; Starr, 1995). This means that such research instruments are only viable after an
intimate knowledge of the organization and the specific unprescribed practices performed within
it.
Second, it is also more practical to study unprescribed activity in organizations (e.g.,
attempts to shape formal representations of work) through close observation instead of relying on
research instruments that put the researcher more at a distance from participants (cf. Burawoy,
1979; Jackall, 1989; Van Maanen, 1988). In fact, most research on unprescribed uses of
information technology shows how their perpetrators go to great lengths to keep them hidden
from other members in the organization, including subordinates, peers and supervisors
(Orlikowski, 1991; Townsend, 2005). Consequently, it is likely that they will do the same to a
researcher with whom they have little familiarity and no incentives for disclosing their practices.
This means that anything less than a close involvement with the unit being researched will result
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in, at best, limited information about the tactics used to shape the production of formal
representations of work.
In a similar vein, previous research on unprescribed work practices in organizations
suggests that data on such practices requires not only close but also prolonged observation (e.g.,
Blau, 1955; Zuboff, 1988). This is in order to generate the trust necessary for people to be
willing to make their practices visible to the researcher and because of the complexity of the
process of creation and diffusion of such tactics. Previous research on unprescribed work
practices in organizations shows that these are made visible to researchers after they have spent
enough time in the setting to earn the trust of participants (Barley, 1990), and on some occasions
only after going through some sort of test or rite of passage that reassures participants about the
researcher's trustworthiness (Burawoy, 1979). In addition, research on the production of formal
representations of work (Van Maanen et al., 1994) shows that these unprescribed tactics are often
the result of multiple factors and events and that these emerge over time, changing as the
organization evolves (cf. Orlikowski, 1996). This suggests that an adequate description and
explanation of unprescribed practices requires a prolonged enough period of observation to
understand the process through which these practices emerge and to understand how they
develop through time.
Studying unprescribed practices in organizations such as those involved in shaping
formal representations of work has historically been a single-group research project. This is
largely related to trust (see data collection appendix in Kunda, 1992). Most published research on
unprescribed practices in organizations describes the multiple ways in which different groups in
an organization hide their unprescribed practices from other groups (Mann et al., 1960; Watson,
2001). This means that researchers who are affiliated with multiple groups may be eyed
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suspiciously and be kept from observing all but the most trivial of such practices. Furthermore,
the need to focus on a single group is related to the limited amount of time in the field available
for many research projects (including this one), coupled with the diversity and complexity of the
factors and events from which unprescribed tactics work emerge. Many research projects are
limited in time and scope not only because of the researcher's own constraints but also because
of the extent to which an organization is willing to accommodate intense observation (e.g.,
Rosen, 2000). Under such conditions, interpreting the agents' practices and documenting the
most relevant factors that shape such practices for a single group may take a large share of the
time that a researcher is able to commit to fieldwork. This means that studying multiple groups
would require a longer presence in the field than researchers are willing, able or even allowed to
put in.
Taken together, these requirements to design a study to explain the role of agency in the
production of formal representations of work point to prolonged fieldwork to collect
observations and interviews from a single group.
Methodological considerations and research design
There are multiple research designs available to access people's everyday practices and
meanings, and to use these to explain organizational phenomena. The four major ones are
phenomenology (Moustakas, 1994), grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin,
1990), case studies (Yin, 1994), and ethnography (Agar, 1980).
To summarize, in phenomenology the goal is to find the essential and invariant meanings
of the experience of a phenomenon (e.g., Riemen, 1986). Those that approach the study of social
experience from a phenomenological stance are interested in exploring how people account for
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their everyday experience and often draw on the study of conversations as a source of data. In
grounded theory the goal is to induce a general theory of a phenomenon by organizing
observations and interviews into a model that includes that phenomenon's antecedents, its
process and its consequences. To achieve this goal, grounded theory subjects data from
documents, interviews and observations to three separate coding stages whose outcome is a
formal model often stated as a set of propositions (e.g., Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). In case
studies, the goal is to explain the inner workings of one or a small set of bounded social settings.
The focus is more on explaining the case itself and less on using it to build or test theory.
Consequently, case studies include not only detailed descriptions of the target social units but
also rich descriptions of their environment built from a wider variety of sources than the one
often used in other research designs (Asmussen & Creswell, 1995). In ethnography, the goal has
traditionally been to interpret the culture of a social group. To achieve this goal, researchers
engaged in prolonged observation of their target group often by participating in the everyday life
of the people they are studying. These observations are transformed into an account of a group's
culture by inferring patterns from the record of people's everyday behavior and discourse
(Kunda, 1992). Recently, the genre of analytical ethnography (cf. Lofland, 1995) has grown in
popularity. In this type of ethnography, the goal is to understand a specific phenomenon instead
of interpreting the culture of a group.
Although all of these research designs allow for explanations based on observed practices
and meanings, not all are equally effective in providing analytical tools required to understand a
specific social phenomenon by drawing both on the interpretive and performative aspects of
practices and their process of production and reproduction.
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Of the four main research designs outlined above, ethnography is the one that strives the
most towards an analytical integration of practices and meanings. In this type of research, most
of the data collection effort consists in observing and recording what people do and say as they
go along their everyday life. Case studies and grounded theory are ambiguous in the type of data
they rely on. There are grounded theory studies and case studies which focus on practices (e.g.,
Dougherty, 1992; and Lightfoot, 1983 respectively) but there are also studies in both case study
research and grounded theory that rely on interviews to access people's meanings (e.g., Drago-
Severson, 2004; Morrow & Smith, 1995, respectively). Phenomenology focuses on
understanding how people experience a specific phenomenon and therefore it is less interested in
everyday practices by themselves and more on how people account for them (e.g., Paper, Tingey,
& Mok, 2003).
In this study I wanted to be able draw on data that include agents' practices and
interpretations. To privilege either would provide only a partial explanation of the production of
formal representations of work. All of the four research designs under consideration - in their
canonical version- privilege either practice or interpretations as a source for analysis and
explanation. Case studies and grounded theory are ambiguous in their prescription of which data
to collect and analyze but the main canonical texts in both designs prescribe either a focus on
meaning or a focus on practice depending on whether they prescribe interviews or observations
as the main source of data (cf. Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser et al., 1967; Strauss et al., 1990;
Weinshall, 1970; Yin, 1994). Phenomenology, with its focus on people's experience does use
people's account of their practices as data, but it is mostly talk and meaning which provide the
data for this type of research (cf. Husserl, 1967). Ethnography is the only research design among
the four that collects data on both meanings and practices. However, in its canonical version,
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ethnography is an interpretive exercise and its goal is not to explain what people do. Instead it is
to map the meanings held by the social unit being studied and therefore it is more interested in
describing and explaining meanings than in describing and explaining practices (Agar, 1986;
Clifford & Markus, 1986). Nonetheless, the use of ethnography in fields other than anthropology
and sociology has led to the emergence of a different genre of this method - analytical
ethnography - which focuses on a specific phenomenon instead of attempting to describe a
specific culture (e.g., Jackall, 1989; and chapters in Rosen, 2000).
Analytical ethnography is thus, in my interpretation, the research method best suited to
this study's phenomenon for substantive and methodological reasons.
Data collection procedures
Data collection procedures are influenced by the entry process and by the researcher's
position in the field. In this case, after a year of negotiating access, including three separate visits
to E-Tel, I met one of the members of the MCMP steering team who granted me access to that
team and also access to the DeskSales. On the MCMP team, I observed six of the team's eight
monthly meetings (from June 2002 to December 2002), taking extensive handwritten notes and
interviewing the team members after the team was disbanded in December 2002.
I spent 15 months (from July 2002 to the end of September 2003) conducting
ethnographic observation at DeskSales. I was initially assigned to a Desk Salesperson (one each
day) by the Desk Sales Manager who was overseeing my research. After the first week, I started
to take the initiative and asked individual Desk Salespeople if I could spend a day with them the
following week. I spent most of my two first weeks in the field looking for and starting to
develop what the literature on ethnography names privileged informants (cf. Spradley, 1980). I
- 50 -
eventually came to establish such a relationship with two Desk Salespeople. I was careful to
focus on people with different attitudes towards their role: one of them described himself as
career oriented and committed to E-Tel. My other privileged informant had a parallel career as
an artist outside E-Tel and was only at DeskSales to generate a stable source of income. Both of
these Desk Salespeople gave me copies of electronic mail messages and documents that they
thought might be interesting for my research, negotiated my access to training and meetings,
both formal and informal, and vouched for me to other Desk Salespeople. I spent a significant
amount of informal time with them (7 to 10 hours a week), which I used to ask questions and
check my interpretations. I was welcomed by all 79 Desk Salespeople in the unit, except for
seven of them, which also had very little interaction with others.
Because of my close relationship with Desk Salespeople, Desk Sales Managers had a
difficult relationship with me because they saw my fieldnotes as a record of their deviant
practices, which often meant that they politely ignored my presence. A few, however, were
happy with my observing their team and often invited me to team nights-out. The DeskSales'
General Manager and the managers in the two hierarchical levels above her also welcomed my
presence and asked me on occasion for help with menial tasks.
My role on the site was that of an observer participant (cf. Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw,
1995). My participation fell into three categories. First, I frequently joined informal
conversations, especially during morning, lunch and afternoon breaks. Second, I earned the
reputation of having an advanced knowledge of Microsoft Office, and Desk Salespeople
sometimes asked me for help to find their way around more obscure features of this software.
Finally, I was part of the DeskSales Culture Survey team. This was a team headed by the
DeskSales General Manager, who asked me to join her and two Desk Salespeople in running and
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analyzing a quarterly culture survey. As I was assigned to this team by the DeskSales General
Manager and I had very little choice in the process. I was, however, successful in limiting my
role in the team to the more menial tasks of doing charts in Microsoft Excel and making a
PowerPoint presentation with them.
As a whole, this position in the field helped me define a set of research procedures that
followed a daily, a bi-weekly and a bimonthly schedule.
Daily. I spent each workday shadowing one of the 79 Desk Salespeople on the unit I was
researching. I usually arrived in the office between 8:15am and 8:30am and spent the 30 to 45
minutes before the start of the workday sitting with a group of three to six Desk Salespeople
while they had their breakfast. When possible, I sat with the Desk Salesperson I would shadow
for the day, but often Desk Salespeople would only come in at 9:00am. At that time, I went over
to the desk of the I)esk Salesperson I was shadowing and asked if she or he still agreed to have
me shadowing her or him for that day. The answer was always affirmative. I then brought a chair
from one of the four unoccupied desks in the unit, sat in it and turned on my laptop computer.
While my laptop computer was booting up, I made the following statement:
"There's something that I need to tell you before we start. As you know, I'm studying
how Desk Salespeople work together with other people and how they use technology. I'll try to
write as much as I can about what you'll do today. I will also note all the people you speak to and
record snippets of conversations and emails. I'd also be grateful if I could listen into the calls you
make and receive, provided that you feel comfortable with me doing so and allow me to ask
permission of the people on the other end. Please let me know if you want me to stop taking notes
or leave at anytime and feel free to look at my notes and tell me if you want me to change
anything. You will notice that there will be brief notes written in Portuguese [my native language].
These are notes that I take about conversations that I may have with other people during the day. I
write them down in Portuguese to protect those people's privacy. My notes will be used for my
doctoral dissertation and in academic articles. They will never be disclosed to anyone within [E-
Tel] under any circumstances. Are you still happy with me spending the day with you?"
After this, I joined the team's morning audio-call. At the beginning of the call I
introduced myself and asked the team if I could join the call and take notes. During the call, I
took copious handwritten notes on a small 3"x8" notepad that I transcribed later in the day, after
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leaving DeskSales. During the day, I kept two types of records: a communication matrix and
detailed fieldnotes. The communication matrix was a Microsoft Excel Spreadsheet with the
names of all the Desk Salespeople and Desk Sales Managers in the first column and the name of
the Desk Salesperson I was shadowing that day on the top of the first blank column. Each time
the I)esk Salesperson I was shadowing had a voice exchange with another Desk Salesperson or
Desk Sales Manager, I added one to the cell corresponding to that interaction. Following
standard communication analysis practice, I defined a voice exchange as an uninterrupted phone
or face-to-face communication (see Heath et al., 2000). Table 3.1. shows a section of the matrix.
In this example, David Robinson communicated seven times with Michelle Bligh, once with
Patrick Murray, and did not communicate with Ken Moffitt. The details of each communication,
including verbatim quotes were noted in the day's fieldnotes.
Table 3.1. - A section of the communication matrix.
David Robinson
Michelle Bligh 7
Ken Moffitt
Patrick Murray 1
I kept detailed notes of all of the Desk Salespeople activities and conversations during the
d(Jay. I also asked clarification questions and often got unsolicited explanations of the day's
activities. Fieldnotes were kept in separate Microsoft Word files, one for each day of fieldwork.
Each of these files was structured in five major sections, as shown in Exhibit 3.3. Each fieldnote
file started with the day's date and then a description of the activities I conducted during the day.
This was followed by a list of the documents I obtained during the day and by the fieldnotes
proper. At the end there was a list of the documents I obtained with a small abstract of what they
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were. I typed fieldnotes directly into my laptop computer, with the exception of the notes that I
made when I came up from morning break, lunch break and afternoon break, which I jotted
down by hand on a 3" x 8" notepad. I took, on average, seven single spaced pages of notes each
day. Towards the middle of the afternoon, I asked the Desk Salesperson I was shadowing if I
could take a picture of him or her working. This picture was taken as to show the Desk
Salesperson work area. It was normally taken from behind so as not to show the Desk
Salesperson's face. Those Desk Salespeople who preferred not to have their picture taken were
asked to take a picture of me pretending to be them and asked them to indicate what I should be
doing.
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Exhibit 3.3. - Sample fieldnotes.
Date: Thursday, February 27, 2003
Activities:
08:35am-04:00pm: Observation of Desk Salesperson Marie Robinson
04:00pm-04:30pm: DeskSales Culture Survey meeting
04:30pm-05:00pm: Observation of Desk Salesperson Marie Robinson
05:00pm-05:30pm: Informal time with Desk Salesperson Mike Wilson
07:00pm-02:00am: Informal time with Desk Salesperson John Smith
Documents:
Master Account List
P 10 spreadsheet
Email and word document sent by Fred Butler + Word file
Email on Siebel usage from Major Business Senior Management
Siebel Query hints (paper and scan)
Fieldnotes:
When I sat down with Marie, she was turning on her computer. Siebel launched automatically
and she launched Outlook immediately after that. She had 7 emails. One of them was from
Sonali. It had the dial-in details for their morning audio call.
Marie dials win, as does everyone else on the team and says: "good morning everyone! How are
you?!"
Everyone says "fine", "not too bad".
Sonali goes on: "any issues with Service, VNS, account managers?"
No one speaks up. Finally James asked if Simon was on the call. Sonali said that he wasn't. He
was on another conference call.
[.. .1
Marie brought up Siebel and while she was waiting, she went through the items that she has on
the page of her notepad with today's date on top. She realized that she had to do one of the things
jotted there.
[. ]
Documents:
1) Master Account List
An updated list of who owns what accounts together with team composition
2) P 10 spreadsheet
The figures for January, only a few teams got to see this.
[. .]
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At the end of the day, I went through my typed notes and completed them with the ones
that I jotted down on my notepad and from memory, which on average added three to four pages
to the day's fieldnotes. I then scanned all the paper documents I obtained during the day and
went through my email to get all the electronic documents and electronic messages the Desk
Salesperson I shadowed had sent me. I saved all these files according to the following naming
structure: ET YYMMDD TT X, where ET stood for E-Tel, YYMMDD represent the date, TT
was the file type (e.g., EM stands for email) and X was a counter (e.g., if I got two emails on
03/02/03, these will be named "ET 030203 EM A" and "ET 030203 EM B". After this, I went
through all the files and abstracted them in the day's fieldnotes file. During my time in the field,
I collected 4598 files, including 764 emails, 93 Word files, 53 PowerPoint presentations, 101
Excel files, 348 photographs and 2069 pages of scanned documents. Finally, I went through the
day's fieldnotes once more and made a note of questions that I wanted to ask my main
informants during the informal time that I spent with them. I spent every working day at
DeskSales, except if there was a special event or meeting that I was attending. I kept the Desk
Salespeople's schedule: I arrived at DeskSales at around 8:30am and left at 5:30pm on Mondays
and Tuesdays and at 5:00pm on Wednesdays, Thursdays and Fridays. I often walked home with
one of my two main informants, normally on alternating days, which allowed me around half an
hour of added informal research time every day. On Thursdays, I spent 5 to 7 hours (starting at
7:00pm and often ending at 2:00am) playing cards with one of my main informants and a group
of his non-work friends. My weekly presence at the DeskSales and my informal time with
informants totaled an average of 50 hours of fieldwork a week.
Bi-weekly. interviewed each of the Desk Salespeople I shadowed one week after I had
sat with them. The reason for this is that they were not allowed to be away from their desks
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except for official breaks, so the one-hour lunch break was the only opportunity available to
conduct an interview. I did not feel that the three hours before that break would be enough to
build the necessary trust and rapport to conduct an interview. Moreover, interviewing people
over lunch would not allow me to observe and participate in the informal conversations that
happen during lunchtime. To address this problem, I established a bi-weekly interview and
observation schedule. Exhibit 3.4. represents this schedule: on week 1, I shadowed three people
that I interviewed the next week, when I was only observing two people. I interviewed these two
people on week three, which allowed me to observe three people that week, and so on. On the
days that I was conducting interviews, I observed Desk Salespeople who I had observed and
interviewed in the past or I just sat in an empty desk and observed the whole DeskSales area.
Also, the night before the interview, I went through the fieldnotes for the day I sat with the
person I was interviewing and composed a set of customized questions. All interviews were tape-
recorded and lasted around 45 minutes on average.
Bi-Monthly. Because some of the Desk Salespeople's activities were not contained
within a day, once every two months I spent a full week with one of the Desk Salespeople, to be
able to observe activities that lasted for more than one working day. Also, every two months, I
did a full inventory of the physical space, which involved taking pictures of every desk,
including pictures of some of the artifacts on it, and made detailed notes of what objects were on
the desks and how these were arranged. I also took pictures and wrote full descriptions of notice
boards and whiteboards. Finally, because of the changes in the DeskSales population, I sent a
one-page description of my research to everyone in the unit every two months, so that everyone
was able to give their informed consent to my observation and interviews.
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Exhibit 3.4. - Observation and interview diagram.
Week 1
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Data Analysis
The analytical strategy I followed in this study is based on three empirical cuts of the data
to match the three major challenges that I identified as being faced by first-line managers and
employees in the production of formal representations of work at DeskSales.
Analysis began by articulating the major challenges that Desk Salespeople and Desk
Sales Managers faced when attempting to shape the formal representations of their work and by
documenting the practices they enacted to address these challenges. This was accomplished in
three stages. The first consisted of performing open coding on fieldnotes, interviews and
documents, following the techniques articulated in Emerson (1995) and Spradley (1980). The
second stage grouped the results of this first coding into challenges and the tactic enacted to
address them. This was done by sorting the interpretations and practices articulated during open
coding. In the second stage of the analysis, these challenges and tactics were sorted into distinct
groups in two steps. The first classified the challenges and practices based on whether they were
part of Desk Sales Managers or Desk Salespeople's experience at DeskSales. The second
mapped the challenges that each group faced to each group's tactics. The goal was to articulate
the relationships between each of the tactics enacted by Desk Salespeople and Desk Sales
Managers and the challenges they faced when attempting to shape the production of their formal
representations of work. In the third stage of analysis these challenges and tactics were arranged
into narratives to articulate the processes by which Desk Sales Managers and Desk Salespeople
were able to participate in the production of the formal representation of their work. In addition, I
conducted two separate analyses on datasets that provided increased interpretive traction on two
of the three challenges that Desk Sales Managers and Desk Salespeople faced. To understand
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how Desk Salespeople dealt with their experience of the first-line manager's dilemma, I
conducted an analysis of a set of 51 phone-based Desk Sales Team meetings to infer the
practices that Desk Sales Managers enacted in those meetings to address that challenge. To
understand how Desk Salespeople were able to coordinate their unprescribed work without a
prescribed information system, I conducted an analysis of the material artifacts that Desk
Salespeople used in their everyday work to identify the types of artifacts that scaffolded the
temporal coordination of their unprescribed service work
To keep with this analytic flow, I organized the presentation of my analysis in three
chapters corresponding to the three challenges that Desk Sales Managers and Desk Salespeople
faced when attempting to shape the formal representations of their work. Before going into this
analysis, I discuss the limitations of this research.
Limitations of the research
This study has two major sets of limitations, those related to the characteristics of its
method of choice and those related to the characteristics of its research setting.
Because it is an ethnography, this research may be seen as (1) not generalizable beyond
its research setting, (2) not having enough degrees of freedom to test the researcher's
interpretations, and (3) being vulnerable to the researcher's influence on the study's setting.
To be sure, it is difficult to claim that a study of a single social unit is generalizable to
other units in the same organization, let alone other units in other organizations. This, however,
is true only if generalization means sampling-based generalization. In this type of generalization,
the point is to use a sample from a population to discover the distribution of its members along a
set of dimensions. For this process to give accurate results, the sample needs not only to be large
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enough to be statistically powerful, it also has to be chosen carefully so that no section of the
population is more likely to be represented in the sample than others.
The research setting that grounds this study was the outcome of a negotiation process
with the larger organization to which this unit belongs. Consequently, this research makes no
claims to statistical generalization. It does, however, claim replication-based generalization (cf.
Campbell, 1975). In this type of generalization, the point is to describe and explain a specific set
of practices as richly as possible. The goal is to have a rich enough case so that this set of
practices can be observed in multiple circumstances and variations. The centrality of the
production of formal representations of work for the people working at DeskSales and the
improvisational nature of the tactics they enacted to attempt to shape those formal
representations underscores the richness of the DeskSales as an empirical setting to study this
process.
Another related limitation is ethnography's lack of degrees of freedom. Even the more
canonical prescriptions for conducting ethnography suggest that interpretations should be tested
in the course of analysis (e.g., Spradley, 1980). If there are not enough different observations to
provide the necessary degrees of freedom to test interpretations, then it is difficult to asses if an
ethnography has any value. This view, however, is grounded in a narrow sense of degrees of
freedom. First, although this is study of a single social unit, there are 79 people in it,
corresponding to, at least, to that same number of observations. Second, these people are
observed performing a variety of practices in a variety of conditions, thus multiplying those
observations manifold.
The approach followed in this research is close to that suggested by Campbell (1975),
which distinguishes empirical degrees of freedom from theoretical degrees of freedom. Single
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unit studies, such as this ethnography, cannot claim empirical degrees of freedom, that is having
many observations of the same variable, because even with 79 participants, it is very difficult to
reach the number of degrees of freedom needed to support the rich explanations characteristic of
this type of research. The solution suggested by Campbell is to substitute theoretical degrees of
freedom for empirical degrees of freedom. The point is to use many theories to test an
observation, instead of using many observations to test a theory. In this research, the decision to
focus on the production of formal representations of work was only taken after two months of
observation during which I thought through the literatures to which this research could
contribute. The three major literatures considered included change, control, and formal
representations of work in organizations. The latter was the one that seemed to explain the most
salient events and challenges in the research setting.
A final major limitation that results from choosing ethnography as the method to perform
this research is the potential impact that the researcher has on the research setting. Although my
role in the research setting leaned more to the observation side of observant participation, I
acknowledge that I did influence what happened in my research setting. However, I used that
influence as data by keeping track not only of my interventions but also of how people reacted to
them and their consequences. My participation in the Culture Survey Team was a case in point.
Although, by choice, my role in this team was limited to producing the Microsoft Excel graphics
and the Microsoft PowerPoint slides that showed the survey results, I chose to use a template that
made problems more visible than successes. When these graphics were made public, I paid close
attention and took extensive notes on how they were used by both managers and Desk
Salespeople. I believe is that it is more dangerous to ignore the influence that any research
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instrument, be it a survey or an ethnographer, has in the research setting than recognizing and
documenting that influence.
Because each research setting has its own idiosyncrasies, these can also limit the value of
a study's results. DeskSales has three major characteristics as a research setting that impact this
study's results. First, Desk Salespeople' work and its representation were, at best, loosely
coupled. This is an important feature of this setting for the purposes of this research because it
allows me to study the production of formal representations of work outside one of the most
pervasive assumptions in the literature on information technology and organizations: that work
and its representation are tightly coupled. However, this means that the tactics that Desk Sales
Managers and Desk Salespeople enacted to shape the formal representations of their work may
be very different from those that constitute the production of formal representations of work in
settings where work is tightly coupled with its representation. Although this limitation is hard to
dispel and should be taken into account when interpreting the results of this research, one should
also bear in mind the points made above regarding generalization. Moreover, the purpose of
focusing on a setting where work is loosely coupled with its representation is to make these
practices more visible and thus potentially more informing. There are also many clues in the
ethnographic research in organizations that point to the possibility that people's everyday work
practices produce and reproduce a looser coupling between work and its representation than the
one that this research has portrayed (see e.g., Kunda, 1992; Mars, 1983; Thompson & Ackroyd,
1995). Second, work in this setting is mostly computer-assisted. The point here is not to espouse
views that follow the assumptions of the technological imperative (cf. Markus & Robey, 1988).
instead, the goal is to acknowledge that people have a different set of resources to enact their
everyday work practices than they would have if their work was not computer assisted (cf.
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Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001). Again, it is necessary to take into account the point about
generalization made above. In addition, it is always dangerous to dismiss or underestimate
people's ability to improvise. There are more ways than one to enact the possibilities of action
allowed by computer-assisted work. Moreover, this is perhaps the less idiosyncratic
characteristic of this research setting as computer-assisted work spreads through organizations
(Garson, 1988; Poster, 1990).
Finally, there are a number of characteristics of the setting that may systematically affect
its results. The most often mentioned of these in the literature are those related to national
culture. Both Hofstede (1980) and Trompenaars (1994) suggest that there are variations in
national cultures which can make the results of the soundest research design invalid in any
country other than the one where the research was conducted. This, in my view, overestimates
the strength of a country's culture and underestimates the extent to which culture is produced and
reproduced in everyday practice. However, even if we take the national culture argument at face
value, a strong national culture would get embedded in people's everyday practices and would
thus be an integral part of the description and explanation of the processes observed at the
research setting. Moreover, Desk Salespeople come from very different national backgrounds,
ranging from Jamaica to India, and including England, France, Germany, Lebanon and Brazil.
This means that the differences in national cultures, if any, are likely to be visible in the
differences in work practices among people from these different cultures.
Taken as a whole this set of limitations does not seem to threaten the value of this study,
but it provides the context for the interpretation of its findings, which are presented in the next
three chapters.
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CHAPTER 4:
FA(CADE-CREATION AS A STRATEGY TO ADDRESS THE FIRST-LINE
MANAGERS' DILEMMA
INTRODUCTION
First line supervisors occupy a crucial juncture in the production of formal
representations of work. They are at the center of a tension between the push to enforce
prescribed roles, rules, resources and goals and the pull to adapt to their employees local
contingencies. This chapter looks at how Desk Sales Managers, DeskSales' first-line managers
addressed this tension.
On the one hand, first-line managers are the only level of management that is close
enough to employees to be able to face directly the inadequacy of prescribed rules, roles and
procedures. They are the only level of management which is close enough to employees to be
able to directly observe the everyday contingencies that employees need to adapt to as they carry
on their everyday job. These contingencies can be of two types. One type of contingency results
from the idiosyncrasy of employees' tasks. Differences between ideal and actual customers
(Lipsky, 1980; Prottas, 1976) and differences between ideal and actual work processes (Orr,
1990) require employees to improvise their own rules and procedures. These improvisations are
functional in the sense that they allow employees to keep the organization's work going when
formal processes fail. The other type of contingency is the result of the idiosyncrasy of
employees' competence and interests. Differences between a job's required skills and employees
actual skills challenge employees to improvise ways to reduce their skill gap. Differences
- 65 -
between ideal employees' interests and employees' actual interests challenge employees to
improvise ways of meeting their own interests while at least maintaining the appearance of
caring for the organization's interests. These improvisations are dysfunctional for the
organization. When matching their job's prescribed skill set to their own skills, employees
improvise ways to engage in their work tasks without having the full set of skills they need to do
so (see Doolin, 2004; Gasser, 1986).When pursuing their own interests, employees engage in
petty workplace crime (Mars, 1983) or, at least, use their organization's resources for their own
purposes. First-line managers' direct access to these improvisations puts makes them acutely
aware of the inadequacy of formal representations of work to represent the effort that employees
put into unprescribed action that benefits the organization. First-line managers' proximity to
employees' unprescribed action also makes them aware of the need to hide petty deviance from
those formal representations of work, to secure employees' effort to carry out the improvisations
needed to keep the organization functioning (Gouldner, 1954)2.
On the other hand, first-line managers have a stake in enforcing compliance with
prescribed roles, rules, procedures and goals, and in having that compliance shown in formal
representations of work.
The prescriptive literature on supervision argues for, and the descriptive literature on this
topic shows that supervisors' evaluation and rewards are indexed to their employees' compliance
with prescribed goals, roles, rules and procedures (Drucker, 1993; Ivancevich, 1974; Kamoche,
2000). First-line managers are the level of management with closest access to employees'
activities and thus they are best positioned to enforce employees' compliance with prescribed
2 See especially Gouldner's (1954: 105-136) description of the high degree of tolerance that supervisors in the mine
had towards their employees, including frequent disregard for prescribed procedures, frequent absenteeism, and a
recalcitrant attitude. Supervisors enacted this high degree of tolerance because they interpreted these practices as
legitimate for employees working in the conditions offered by the mine and because they wanted to secure miners'
willingness to come to work and put as much effort as they could into their tasks.
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elements of their organization (cf. Webb et al., 1998). Consequently, first-line managers'
performance is best assessed by their ability to enforce such compliance (Downs, 1966).
The ethnographic literature on managers' work (e.g., Watson, 2001) has shown that
managers use their employees' compliance with prescribed goals and prescribed roles, rules and
procedures to create and maintain an image of competence. The argument is similar to
Goffman's (1959) approach to social identity. If peers and upper-level managers are aware that a
supervisor's employees are falling short of prescribed goals, that supervisor has to engage in
considerable effort to maintain an image of competent leadership and professional competence
(for a number of graphic examples, see Berg, 1979; Pettigrew, 1985).
Finally, first-line managers also have a stake in their employees' compliance with
prescribed goals and prescribed roles, rules and procedures because first-line managers can use
that compliance as a resource for political ploys in their organization. Research on the political
nature of decisions in organizations (cf. Buchanan, 1999; Markus, 1983; Pfeffer, 1992) and
research on the political nature of managers' careers (e.g., Jackall, 1989) have both shown how
first-line managers use their employees compliance with formal elements of their organization to
advance their own agendas and their own careers in the organization.
As Yates (1989) has shown, managerial practices, institutional pressures and the use of
information technology (writ large) in organizations, have given formal representations of work
the central role in showing compliance with prescribed goals and with prescribe roles, rules and
procedures. For this reason, first-line managers' stake in their employees' compliance with the
prescribed elements of their organization includes a stake in the visibility of their employees'
activity in formal representations of work.
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First-line managers are thus subjected to two opposing forces which together constitute
what may be labeled the 'First-line manager Dilemma'. One is the improvisational pull - the
need to sanction improvisations to keep the organization going and to keep those improvisations
invisible from formal representations of work. The other is the bureaucratic push - the top down
pressure to enforce compliance with prescribed goals and prescribed roles, rules and procedures,
and to make that compliance visible in formal representations of work. First-line managers at
DeskSales, or Desk Sales Managers, as they were called in the unit, faced these two opposing
forces3. They felt a top-bottom push to achieve their sales and saleswork targets4 and display that
achievement in Siebel - E-Tel's formal management information system. They also felt a
bottom-up pull created by Desk Salespeople's limited ability and willingness to reach those
targets which had to be kept hidden from Siebel. To which of these forces did Desk Sales
Managers yield?
During its first 18 months of activity, DeskSales was led by two successive General
Managers: Carmen and Mariah. The two leaders of the unit differed sharply in their management
style. The bureaucratic push created by Carmen was significantly different from the bureaucratic
push created by Mariah. Both General Managers delegated to Desk Sales Managers the day-to-
day leadership and supervision of their Desk Salespeople. However, both Carmen and Mariah
implemented a bonus and a set of rewards with the intention of shaping Desk Salespeople's
3 The term "improvisational pull" is used in cinema to refer to actors' tendency to improvise on their roles (see
Naper, 2003). The term "bureaucratic push" is used in democratic theory and in foreign policy studies (see Hymans,
2006) to refer to the central government's enforcing rules and decisions over private citizens and the military. Notice
that democratic theory uses the term "citizen pull" to refer to pressures of a country's population over its
government. However, citizenship has some important differences from employment which make the term "citizen
pull" more of a metaphor than a descriptive label (see Stohl & Cheney, 2001).
4 The distinction between sales and saleswork is my own. By sales targets, I mean targets related to outcomes, such
the revenue of products and services sold by Desk Salespeople. By saleswork targets, I mean targets related to the
sales process, such as the number of calls made to customers and the time spent making those calls.
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actions. The difference between each General Manager's bonus and rewards led to two different
consecutive types of bureaucratic push over Desk Sales Managers.
THE DESK SALES MANAGER DILEMMA UNDER CARMEN
The tension between the bureaucratic push to enforce sales and saleswork targets and the
pull to adapt to employees lack of will and skill to sell was not a strong one during Carmen's
tenure as DeskSales' General Manager. Carmen committed to stretch targets but she only needed
a plausible account of Desk Salespeople's involvement in a sale to accept it as an outcome of
Desk Salespeople's saleswork. Her ad-hoc bonus which paid a lump sum for Desk Salespeople's
involvement in sales of one million dollars or more was enough to motivate Desk Salespeople to
persuade their field sales teams to allow them to claim involvement in part of their sales. Desk
Sales Managers had thus little more to do than to concoct plausible stories of Desk Salespeople's
roles in these sales to tell Carmen. The specific practices that produced and reproduced the
bureaucratic push and improvisational pull under Carmen's leadership, and Desk Sales
Managers' tactics to have their Desk Salespeople engage in representation work to create a
facade of compliance with Carmen's targets, as explained next, highlight some of the core
features of Desk Sales Managers' tactics to address the first-line manager's dilemma at Desk
Sales.
Bureaucratic push
Carmen was the first General Manager to head DeskSales. For Carmen, DeskSales' chief
challenge was to prove its value to E-Tel as a whole. In a meeting with the whole unit, Carmen
described her role as "running a PR [i.e. public relations] campaign" for DeskSales. She told
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Desk Salespeople, "you are all internal champions" to emphasize that DeskSales needed to
convince the rest of E-Tel of its merits as part of the company's sales organization. She urged
Desk Salespeople to send her their "success stories," promising that "David Purkiss [E-Tel's
CEO] will want to shake hands with those of you who have success stories." For Carmen,
DeskSales was under probation during its first few months of existence. She saw herself as the
one charged with, in her own words, "selling" the unit to the rest of the company. Looking back
on her experience as a Desk Sales Manager, Carmen explained how she treated the rest of E-Tel
as DeskSales' customers:
My customer relationship management skills are my core strengths. People management
and relationship management is what I do really well and what I really enjoy. You know, I really
promoted [Desk Sales] within the General Management community and by doing that they really
bought into the model of the Desk Salesperson. [...] That's the result of being tough with other
managers and help them visualize the value of the Desk [... ] In terms of outside DeskSales, I
[used] a defined contact strategy by understanding each GM's personal characteristics to create an
individual approach to each sector.
Carmen's view of her role as that of promoting DeskSales shaped her management
practices. Carmen used the unit's sales target to showcase DeskSales' value to the rest of E-Tel.
DeskSales's goal as a unit was to achieve a yearly sales target. The formal process to determine
Desk Salespeople's target was a simple one. First, E-Tel's senior managers decided the unit's
yearly sales target. This sales target was handed down to DeskSales' General Manager.
DeskSales General Manager then divided that target by the number of Desk Salespeople in the
unit to calculate each Desk Salesperson's individual target. Desk Sales Managers' targets were
the sum of the targets for their Desk Salespeople. These targets were announced at the beginning
of each sales year, in a face-to-face meeting between DeskSales' General Manager and the rest
of the unit.
Carmen did not follow this process. Instead of taking the target that was handed down by
E-Tel's senior managers, she gave each Desk Salesperson a target of one million dollars in sales
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of "low to medium complexity products." When she announced this target, Carmen conceded
that it was "a signpost on the ground" that would "allow us to show the value added by Desk
Salespeople." Her approach was thus to have a stretch target for each Desk Salesperson. The
goal was to over-achieve the unit's sales target to prove its worth and success. Mariah also
created a set of saleswork targets. Desk Salespeople had to make 30 calls a day to their
customers and spend a total of 3 hours on the phone everyday. This allowed Carmen to show that
Desk Salespeople were not only getting good results, as shown by their sales figures, but also
putting a significant amount of effort into selling to their accounts.
Carmen supervised and rewarded Desk Salespeople's progress towards reaching their
sales target and Desk Sales Managers for having the highest number of Desk Salespeople in their
team which were on their sales target or above it. Andrew, one of the first Desk Sales Managers
to join DeskSales described Carmen as a "motivator" because she set ambitious targets for the
unit but did not enforce the process of achieving these targets. In practice, Carmen supervised
Desk Salespeople's sales and saleswork using two separate systems: Siebel and Eyetel. Siebel is
a sales automation system that is designed to help salespeople throughout the sales process.
Siebel allows salespeople to store and access information about their customer contacts; keep
track of their present and past saleswork and store and access information about their open sales.
In addition to helping salespeople engage in sales and saleswork, Siebel is also a management
tool. It allows managers to scrutinize and supervise their salespeople's sales and saleswork.
Carmen's skills with computers and software were, however, very limited. She did not know
how to use Siebel to monitor Desk Sales Teams' sales performance. She had Desk Sales
Managers report to her all the large sales in which Desk Salespeople were involved. Desk
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Salespeople were considered to be involved in a sale when their name was recorded in the sale's
record on Siebel.
Carmen used Eyetel to measure Desk Salespeople's saleswork. Eyetel was an information
system that kept track of Desk Salespeople's use of their phone. Eyetel was capable of reporting
at a very fine level of detail. Nonetheless, Carmen only asked to receive reports that tracked
Desk Salespeople's total call time, the number of calls they received and the number of calls they
made. These reports also included the time that Desk Salespeople spent at their desk and the time
they had spent away from their desk during the workday. Exhibit 4.1. shows a sample page from
one of these reports.
In summary, Carmen did not directly supervise Desk Salespeople's sales and saleswork.
Instead, Carmen supervised Desk Salespeople's reporting work on Siebel. If a Desk Saleswoman
did a lot of work for a sale, but her name was not on that sale's Siebel record, that sale would not
count towards her target. However, if a Desk Salesman did not do any work for a sale but his
name was on that sale's record in Siebel, it would count towards his target. Carmen paid little if
any attention to Desk Salespeople's saleswork as measured by their use of the phone because
Desk Salespeople reported sales were keeping the unit well above its target.
Carmen designed Desk Salespeople's bonus to motivate them and reward them for selling
to their customers. Desk Salespeople could earn as much as 30% of their yearly salary in bonus.
During Carmen's tenure as DeskSales' General Manager, Desk Salespeople's bonus had two
elements. One was meant to align their actions with the interest of the account team. This
element, which amounted to 70% of Desk Salespeople's bonus, was paid on the revenue
generated by the account as a whole. Specifically, this part of the bonus was paid if the total sales
to each of Desk Salespeople's accounts matched the revenue target that E-Tel's top management
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Exhibit 4.1. - A page from a phone-usage report during Carmen's tenure showing phone
usage for two Desk Sales Teams (times in hours:minutes).
DeskSales Daily Stats Report - 07-29-03
Andrew Barton s Team
Calls Time away Total
Name Ext Time at desk Answered Calls Made from desk Talktime
George Beatty 2020 8:18 1 21 0:04 2:43
Thomas Dean 2021
Jeffrey Hornsby 2022 6:26 0 27 0:00 2:12
Judy Houghton 2023
'Thomas Lenar 2024 16:14 2 14 2:33 0:56
Tara Radin 2025
Joe Taylor 2026 4:51 0 58 0:00 3:27
Larry Howard 2027 7:51 3 81 0:06 3:43
John Mohr 2028 8:02 0 39 1:04 3:22
Michael Putnam 2029
Total 51:42 6 240 3:47 16:23
Linda Tegarden's Team
Time Logged Calls Time in Not Total
Name Ext On Answered Calls Made Ready Talktime
David Thompson 2030 8:14 2 34 0:00 1:21
David Robinson 2031 7:05 0 28 0:00 1:25
Ruth Blatt 2032 6:54 2 45 0:02 2:54
Chris Boone 2033
Sherry Finney 2034 7:11 0 116 0:52 2:35
Susan Sher 2035 7:12 0 5 0:00 0:56
Joseph Simons 2036 17:04 2 15 0:36 1:13
Cynthia Thacker 2037 7:07 0 35 0:11 1:15
Jerome Thagter 2038
Donald Troth 2039 7:26 5 22 0:17 1:23
Robert Schendel 2040 7:01 3 35 0:07 2:00
Mark Gaulding 2041 7:26 1 32 0:32 1:42
Patrick Murray 2042 8:17 1 14 1:15 1:17
Total 90:57 16 381 3:52 18:01
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had set for those accounts. The other element of Desk Salespeople's bonus was meant to
motivate Desk Salespeople to sell directly to their customers. This element, which amounted to
30% of Desk Salespeople's total bonus, was paid on the revenue generated exclusively by Desk
Salespeople. Specifically, this part of the bonus was paid if the total sales Desk Salespeople
reported on Siebel as an outcome of their own work met the one million dollars target she had set
for each Desk Salesperson. Desk Sales Managers and the DeskSales General Manager could
make as much as 50% of their salary in bonus. Desk Sales Managers only earned their bonus,
however, if every single Desk Salesperson on their Desk Sales Team hit their targets. DeskSales'
General Manger only earned her bonus if every Desk Sales Team hit its targets.
Carmen's bonus plan was consistent with Desk Sales Managers' and Desk Salespeople's
targets. If this plan was implemented as designed, Desk Salespeople's bonus would help Desk
Sales Managers achieve their teams' targets. Carmen's implementation and use of her own bonus
plan, however, was more of a hindrance than a help to Desk Sales Managers' attempts to achieve
their targets. Carmen never used her bonus plan. Instead she had a set of ad-hoc incentives that
she used to reward the unit's top performers. In the unit's weekly meeting she instituted, Carmen
awarded bottles of wine and champagne to the Desk Salespeople that had reported the most sales
for that week. Carmen also created an ad-hoc incentive she labeled "who wants to be a
millionaire." Through this incentive, Desk Salespeople who made sales of a million dollars or
more earned 250 dollars in shopping vouchers5. Moreover, during Carmen's tenure, Desk
Salespeople's bonuses seemed not to be linked to performance at all. Between July 2002 and
September 2002, only a small number of Desk Salespeople had been assigned to account teams.
To put it simply, to achieve their target Desk Salespeople had to be involved in sales totaling one million dollars.
However, they would only be financially rewarded when they were involved in an individual sale of one million
dollars or more. If a Desk Saleswoman was involved in two sales worth 500 000 dollars each, she would hit her
target but not earn any reward. If that same Desk Saleswoman was involved in a sale worth 1.2 million dollars, she
would hit her target and earn a reward.
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Carmen decided to pay 100% bonus to everyone for those months. In October, the unit faced
cash flow problems and Carmen paid only 50% of the total bonus to all of the Desk Salespeople
in the unit. In November everyone got 150% bonus, to compensate for the smaller payment in
the previous month.
The bureaucratic push under Carmen's leadership was driven by her "stretch" sales and
saleswork targets. This bureaucratic push was strengthened by an incentive that only rewarded
large sales, but it was relaxed by Carmen's failure to use the bonus system and her exclusive
reliance on computer-mediated supervision.
Improvisational pull
Desk Sales Managers had to rely on their Desk Salespeople to hit the sales and saleswork
targets set by Carmen. Desk Salespeople, however, had to hit their sales and saleswork targets
under challenging conditions. Desk Salespeople did not have sales skills and they were not
trained to sell. With the exception of the 17 Desk Salespeople that joined DeskSales at its start,
all the other Desk Salespeople were hired from temporary staffing agencies or from E-Tel
residential call centers. Those Desk Salespeople that joined the unit at its start had experience in
telesales to small and medium sized companies. Those Desk Salespeople who joined DeskSales
from temporary staffing agencies had little if any work experience. Those who did have work
experience had worked in customer service call centers such as directory inquiries or emergency
response. They had no sales experience with either residential or business customers.
The training that Desk Salespeople received upon joining the unit was meant to address
Desk Salespeople's inexperience with sales. The management team responsible for designing
and implementing DeskSales created a 6-week training program for new Desk Salespeople. This
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"induction training," as it was called at DeskSales, was designed by one of the members of the
management team and by Christine, a senior E-Tel trainer. This trainer took the responsibility for
all of Desk Salespeople's training, including administering it herself. As it was designed, the
induction training program was divided into four modules. In the first week, the incoming Desk
Salespeople would be introduced to E-Tel. They would be briefed on the story of the company,
its recent changes in the process of creating DeskSales. During that first week, Desk Salespeople
were to take seven different computer-based training courses on legal compliance 6 and a
personality questionnaire. During the second and third week, Desk Salespeople were to attend
twelve presentations given by the product managers responsible for the products that Desk
Salespeople were to sell to their customers. In the next two weeks, Desk Salespeople would be
trained in the use of the three information systems they would need to be able to do and report
sales and saleswork. The final week consisted of a telesales training program outsourced to a
consulting company.
The reality of Desk Salespeople's training was quite different. Christine, their trainer,
consistently arrived one to two hours late for training. She took two hours for lunch and allowed
Desk Salespeople to leave one hour before their official end of the workday, at 5 pm. The batch
of Desk Salespeople with whom I attended training spent two to three days a week sitting with
other Desk Salespeople rather than in formal classroom training. They only spent a total of
fourteen days in the classroom. In the first week they had two days of training. One introduced
the incoming Desk Salespeople to DeskSales and to their role. On the second day, the trainer
explained the bonus plan. In the second week there were six hours of classroom training spread
evenly across three days. These three days were spent learning about all the information systems
6 In Europe, telecommunication companies such as E-Tel have to obey stringent regulatory laws, especially
regarding the use of customer information.
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that Desk Salespeople had available, except for Siebel, which they learned during their third and
fourth weeks of training. Desk Salespeople spent a total of five days learning Siebel by watching
in-class demonstration and doing a number of practice exercises. In their third week of training,
this group of Desk Salespeople had a day of product training. This training lasted a whole day
and focused on the five types of products that E-Tel's senior managers defined as priorities for
the field sales force. The last week of training was spent discussing the results of the personality
questionnaire Desk Salespeople completed in their first week. This batch of new Desk
Salespeople waited 10 weeks for their telesales training, which they took together with two other
groups of Desk Salespeople that were hired after them. Desk Salespeople were not assigned to
any accounts until their formal six weeks of training were over. When they were not in the
classroom, newly hired Desk Salespeople spent their time loafing, socializing and complaining
about the inadequacy of their training. Desk Salespeople were concerned with the way training
was delivered because they felt they could not handle even the simplest of requests. The week
after the training ended, Ted, one of the Desk Salespeople in my training batch, complained to
the other Desk Salespeople in his cohort that he got an email from his field account manager
asking Ted to price a product. Ted confessed, "I couldn't understand a word of what was written
in it [his field account manager's email]." Ted and his cohort went to speak with their trainer,
Christine. Ted told Christine about his field account manager's email and Christine told him to
send it to a product specialist for pricing. She said that Ted should have been trained on these
products. Simon, one of the Desk Salespeople in Ted's cohort complained, "we don't know what
we don't know." Ted asked Christine to show them a list of what they should know and check
what they were missing. Christine went through the list item by item. On many of the items, she
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said, "we briefly touched this," "we roughly saw that," "we didn't have time for this." The feeling
was that everything was treated very superficially and a lot of topics were not covered.
The way training was implemented at DeskSales did not address the lack of sales skills that new
Desk Salespeople suffered from. Instead, they only added to Desk Salespeople's interpretation of
themselves as lacking the experience and the knowledge to sell.
This lack of sales skills and sales training was amplified by difficult relationships with
field salespeople. During Carmen's tenure Desk Salespeople were in the early stages of their
relationship with their field sales teams. During these first few months, Desk Salespeople had to
face resistance from field sales people. Field salespeople considered their accounts as their own
territory which they often had to defend against other E-Tel units. Roger, a field salesman in one
of E-Tel's largest accounts, explained how he had to keep managing forays into his account by
other E-Tel units:
[W]hen you are responsible for an account, you have to make sure that anyone that is
going into the account is going there to do good rather than bad. And you really have to make
sure that they're really going there with a reason and they're adding value and not because
they've been told to do it. And that happens a lot within E-Tel. You have a lot of people suddenly
going into your account and saying, 'I'm your new sales person and I'm responsible for
payphones' and then you get the customer saying, 'hang on, I have an account team and you're
not my sales person, these are my sales people'. So you have to educate people that yes they are
open to everybody but it has to be done in a controlled manner and not having people just going
in there with their own agenda.
Donald, a Desk Salesman in one of the two Finance Desk Sales Teams, voiced a common
complaint:
[My job] is quite frustrating, at the moment. I find it quite difficult to get into the account.
Quite difficult to sell. Because there is no sort of broad scope. There are no IT teams you need to
sell to, so as it's quite it's a large account team, they're involved in sort of building the networks
and the relationship with the customer, it's quite hard to actually define, it's quite hard for me to
get into the account and find a specific role in it. So I find myselfjust getting on, getting on with
[service issues such as] backup for the systems engineers and that sort of stuff so it's quite
frustrating at the moment actually. [...]There are so many things that restrict you from doing your
job on a daily basis which I think sort of hinder the chances and the possibilities of moving on. For
example Siebel and stats and everything else. You just get so caught up in doing these things. And
I know why they're there. But we get so caught up in all of these things that we actually lose focus
in trying to get into the customer. Actually talking to them and building that friendship.
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Meeting saleswork targets was as difficult as meeting sales targets during the first few
months of DeskSales existence. There were only a limited number of people that Desk
Salespeople could call on each of their accounts. Desk Salespeople dealt with E-Tel's largest 100
customers, most of which were Fortune 500 companies. These organizations typically had a
central purchasing unit for information and communication technology, which was the
prescribed focus for Desk Salespeople's sales efforts. Consequently, 3 hours worth of 30 phone
calls a day was a very difficult target to achieve.
In one of her first meetings with all the Desk Salespeople Carmen suggested a tactic to
win over field salespeople's resistance. She told Desk Salespeople that "we need to make sure
that Siebel is accurate [i.e., no errors on records and up to date] ... 70% of your target comes
from your account teams getting their [sales] targets." She continued "if you update Siebel [for
your field salespeople], you'll be allowing your field salespeople to do multi-million dollar
deals." She said that people didn't have to do it forever but that they could play an important role
by doing it now, and that would help to establish them as full members of their accounts.
Desk Salespeople followed this suggestion. However, instead of doing field salespeople's
Siebel to earn their trust, Desk Salespeople took over a plethora of menial tasks that field
salespeople had to engage in. Desk Salespeople did these tasks for field salespeople in exchange
for being able to represent themselves as being involved in sales. Because Carmen relied on
Siebel to supervise Desk Salespeople's involvement in sales, Desk Salespeople only needed field
salespeople's permission to put their names in Siebel's sales records. Desk Salespeople had to
develop tactics to earn their field sales team's permission to put their name on their team's sales
records on Siebel. One was to take on all the tasks that had to be completed after the customer
signed an order form. These tasks including filling service requisition forms, reporting the sale in
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Siebel, and arranging for the delivery and installation of equipment at the customer's premises.
The other way in which Desk Salespeople were able to report sales on Siebel without actually
making any sales was by reporting themselves as responsible for unclaimed revenue, such as a
company's phone bills. Desk Salespeople's needed the approval of their field sales teams to do
this. To win that approval, Desk Salespeople took over the more menial aspects of field
salespeople's job. These tasks mostly consisted of handling customer service issues, such as
equipment faults and billing errors. On occasion, Desk Salespeople acted as their field sales
managers' personal assistant, booking hotels and parking places, filling expense reports and
correcting errors in Siebel.
These two tactics ensured that Desk Salespeople not only met their targets but also earned
Carmen's "who wants to be a millionaire" award multiple times. All but four Desk Salespeople
hit their one million sales target for the quarter. Table 4.1. highlights the extent to which Desk
Salespeople were able to report sales in Siebel well above their targets. This table shows that,
with the exception of Desk Sales Team Retail 4, every team had an average revenue per sale
higher than their 100,000-dollar target for the whole quarter.
Table 4.1. - Average revenue per sale Desk Salespeople reported in Siebel during
Carmen's tenure as a General Manager, in thousands of dollars (target for the quarter was 100
000 dollars).
Desk Sales Team Aug. 02 Sep. 02 Oct. 02 Nov. 02
Finance 1 241.95 192.45 530.69 1921.73
Finance 2 N/A 55.73 263.61 236.91
Retail 1 278.17 385.01 74.94 645.16
Retail 2 N/A 163.61 105.84 473.18
Retail 3 156.96 297.63 163.51 333.32
Retail 4 N/A 61.18 97.35 88.85
Technology and Media 1 306.22 357.84 215.05 366.89
Technology and Media 2 N/A 101.50 395.39 824.50
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Desk Salespeople paid much less attention to the saleswork targets. Their daily talk time
and number of calls did not enter their bonus and were not enforced by their General Manager.
As Tables 4.2. and 4.3. below show, every Desk Sales Team consistently lagged behind their
targets for talk time and for number of calls during the whole time of Carmen's tenure as
DeskSales General Manager.
Table 4.2. -- Difference between the number of calls Desk Salespeople had to make per
month and their actual calls per month, aggregated by Desk Sales Team, in number of calls.
Desk Sales Team Aug. 02 Oct. 02 Nov. 02
Finance 1 -4640 -6649 -654
Finance 2 N/A -6157 -993
Retail 1 -4850 -2770 1970
Retail 2 N/A -4269 988
Retail 3 -3457 -1632 2704
Retail 4 N/A -3793 575
Technology and Media 1 -5501 -3284 -476
Technology and Media 2 N/A -4084 -680
Table 4.3. - Difference between the time of
per month and their actual time spend on the
in hours.
calls Desk
phone per
Salespeople had to spend on the
month, aggregated by Desk Sales
Desk Sales Team Aug. 02 Oct. 02 Nov. 02
Finance 1 -635 -794 -409
Finance 2 N/A -689 -353
Retail 1 -540 -486 -174
Retail 2 N/A -549 -163
Retail 3 -457 -391 -88
Retail 4 N/A -497 -187
Technology and Media 1 -650 -447 -222
Technology and Media 2 N/A -457 -240
The improvisational pull under Carmen's leadership was driven by Desk Salespeople's
lack of sales skill and lack of sales training. This improvisational pull was strengthened by the
difficult relationships between Desk Salespeople and field salespeople, but it was relaxed by
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phone
Team,
Desk Salespeople's ability to use Siebel create a representation of engaging in sales without
actually doing so.
Addressing the first-line manager dilemma under Carmen's leadership
Carmen's management practices seemed to provide Desk Sales Managers with an easy
experience of the first-line manager's dilemma. Carmen pushed "stretch" targets for sales and
saleswork, but she only supervised the reported achievement of those targets in Siebel. She did
not enforce them. Carmen did reward good performance in sales but did not punish poor
performance. Desk Salespeople overachieved their sales targets. They lagged behind their
saleswork targets, but these were not used to reward or evaluate either Desk Salespeople or Desk
Sales Managers. This easy experience of the first-line manager's dilemma for Desk Sales
Managers was, however, only apparent. Desk Salespeople had no real role in the sales in which
they reported to be involved. Carmen however, wanted to use Desk Salespeople's sales to prove
DeskSales value to E-Tel's sales organization. Carmen wanted to know the details of Desk
Salespeople's role in these sales. She wanted to post vignettes of Desk Salespeople sales and
saleswork on DeskSales' website to promote the unit to the rest of E-Tel. This created a
challenge for Desk Sales Managers. When reporting large sales to Carmen, Desk Sales Managers
needed to explain the role that each Desk Salesperson played in each reported sale. A
conversation between two Desk Salespeople highlights the prevalence of trading involvement in
sales for menial work and the challenge that this created for Desk Sales Managers. Larry and
Michael, two Desk Salespeople on one of the retail teams discussed their team's top sales over
breakfast. Larry said that Joe, another Desk Salesman on their team, had a 15-million dollar sale
under his name in Siebel with 95% probability. "Do you want to know what he did for it?" Larry
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asked. Michael nodded and Larry made a zero with his fingers, grinning. Larry told Michael that
"Joe is trying to see what he can do for his field [salesperson], he is thinking of saying that he'll
be tracking the revenue on ARTS [E-Tel's automatic revenue tracking system]." Michael asked
Larry how much of the revenue he brought in was actually closed by him. Larry said that he had
around 5.8 million dollars under his name and that he had probably closed, at the most six
hundred thousand in orders passed to him by his field sales team. We laughed a lot about that.
Larry concluded the conversation by saying that "Andrew [his Desk Sales Manager] makes up a
bullshit story to Carmen every time! He came around yesterday and asked me to make sure that I
called [my field salesman] to find out what it [the sale] was about and make sure that I put
myself in the notes [in Siebel explaining what Larry did to be involved in the sale]." Desk Sales
Managers thus had to help Desk Salespeople come up with narratives that represented their
involvement in sales as resulting from valuable work.
Desk Sales Managers, however, did not prevent their Desk Salespeople from reporting
involvement in large sales. Instead, they improvised their own symbolic rewards for Desk
Salespeople's reporting work. If their Desk Salespeople were the ones reporting being involved
in the largest sales in the unit, Desk Sales Managers would be invited to attend corporate
functions at E-Tel's headquarters where Desk Sales Managers had the opportunity to interact
with the company's senior managers and further their own career prospects. Andrew, one of the
Desk Sales Managers that first joined DeskSales, rewarded the Desk Salesperson that was
involved in the largest sale any of his team members reported in Siebel with a plastic Oscar
figurine he named the "Golden Salesman." The Desk Salesperson who was awarded the "Golden
Salesman" for that week placed it on the top of the drawer box in her or his desk, so that it was
visible from the whole unit (see Exhibit 4.2.).
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Exhibit 4.2. - The "Golden Salesman" on a Desk Salesperson's drawer box.
Desk Salespeople expressed less enthusiasm when they received the "Golden Salesman"
than when they received the five hundred dollars in shopping vouchers that Carmen used to
reward sales of one million dollars in revenue or more. However, some Desk Salespeople on the
team did report receiving this award on their rsumes. Larry, a Desk Salesman in Andrew's
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team, included a picture of himself with the "Golden Salesman" on his desk when applying for a
field salesperson position.
Desk Sales Managers also drew on verbal recognition to reward Desk Salespeople's
accomplishments towards meeting their sales target. The way Josh, the Desk Sales Manager in
one of the Technology and Media teams, praised his Desk Salespeople in a team meeting
highlights how verbal recognition was used to reward Desk Salespeople. After allowing his Desk
Salespeople to share with each other their reported sales in the previous week, Josh held a
printout of a slide with a bar graph. It was a graph of the ten highest sales in Siebel. He said that
seven of the top ten sales in Siebel were owned by his team. He said that "Christian [one of E-
Tel's top managers] recognizes that it is from you guys that the next crop of team leaders and
sales managers is going to come." Josh added, "Christian is asking about everybody individually
and that he's not doing that for the other teams." He continued, "you're always in the spotlight
and that's good." Josh finished: "he also talks about you to the top team," "so well done."
Desk Sales Managers, much like their Desk Salespeople, paid less attention to saleswork
targets than they did to sales targets. Desk sales managers had to meet two types of saleswork
targets. One type of saleswork target was their own responsibility. Desk Sales Managers had to
keep a demanding training schedule. Their target was to have twenty five training sessions a
week with their Desk Salespeople. Desk Sales Managers rarely engaged in training. Instead they
either had their Desk Salespeople sign blank training forms that Desk Sales Managers would
then fill out in bulk or they had Desk Salespeople fill and sign the training forms themselves. On
occasion, the same Desk Salesperson would fill training forms for more than one Desk Sales
Manager. After filling thirty-one training forms for two Desk Sales Managers, Frank, a Desk
Salesperson in one of the Finance Desk Sales Teams, complained that Desk Sales Managers did
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not like to do training forms and that they filled them out just because they had to. He showed
the forms he was completing and highlighted how vague the information he was putting in the
forms was. "Sales training" and "Siebel training" were two examples. When asked what the
purpose of these forms was, Frank replied, "I ask myself that same question." He laughed and
went back to fill out more training forms.
The other saleswork target that Desk Sales Managers had to meet was their Desk Sales
Team's phone usage target. Each Desk Salesperson on each team had to talk to 30 people a day
for a total of 3 hours of talk-time. Desk Sales Managers helped Desk Salespeople to find ways of
meeting their talk-time target but did not systematically supervise if Desk Salespeople did so.
Desk Sales Managers told Desk Salespeople about recorded conferences given by E-Tel's top
managers that Desk Salespeople could listen to with the purpose of increasing their time on the
phone. Only a few Desk Salespeople bothered to listen to these calls and consequently sales
teams were consistently below their saleswork targets. However, this was of no practical
consequence because Desk Sales' General Manager did not enforce saleswork targets and Desk
Salespeople's bonus was not contingent on meeting these targets.
In a nutshell, Desk Sales Managers addressed their experience of the first-line manager's
dilemma under Carmen's leadership by managing their Desk Salespeople's representation work
instead of managing their sales and saleswork. Desk Sales Managers rewarded the use of Siebel
to represent involvement in large sales. Desk Sales Managers created narratives that proved the
value of their Desk Salespeople's involvement in these sales to create an image of competence
and success. All the menial tasks that Desk Salespeople had to do to earn the right to list
themselves as involved in the large sales made by their field sales teams was invisible and
unimportant to their Desk Sales Managers.
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THE DESK SALES MANAGER DILEMMA UNDER MARIAH
Mariah enforced a more demanding set of sales and saleswork targets than Carmen,
strengthening the bureaucratic push over Desk Sales Managers to much more challenging levels.
Nonetheless, Mariah followed Carmen in relying on information technology to supervise
compliance with these targets. The incentives that Mariah attached to sales and saleswork targets
had a much narrower appeal than Carmen's lump sum incentive. Because of this, Desk
Salespeople's motivational profiles played a much more central role in determining the amount
of representation work they were willing to engage in, strengthening the improvisational pull
over Desk Sales Managers. Desk Sales Managers improvised a set of practices to actively
manage their Desk Salespeople's representation work which they enacted during their team's
audio-call meetings. The specific details - explained below - of these strengthened forms of the
bureaucratic push and the improvisational pull and the practices that Desk Sales Managers
enacted to deal with the tension these two forces created over them point to the core dynamics
behind the fagade-creation pattern that emerged in the analysis of the first-line manager's
dilemma under Carmen.
Bureaucratic push
While Carmen was leading DeskSales through its first few months of activity, E-Tel
Retail was buzzing with backstage political ploys. The meetings of the MCMP team responsible
for implementing DeskSales, whose purpose now was to advise Carmen as DeskSales General
Manager were spent not reviewing the unit's performance, but discussing the impeding changes
in E-Tel Retail's management ranks. In late November 2002, Desk Salespeople received an
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email message from the newly appointed head of E-Tel Retail introducing himself and
announcing that a number of changes in the division's management ranks. One of those changes
was the naming on Mariah as the General Manager of DeskSales.
Mariah joined the unit in December 2002 after Carmen stepped down, on the fifth month
of the unit's life. DeskSales was not yet half way through its first year, the unit had yet to prove
its value as a member of E-Tel's sales organization. Consequently, and much like Carmen,
Mariah saw her role as that of promoting DeskSales to the rest of the company. Reflecting on her
first year at DeskSales, Mariah explained her role by saying: "I am the one who sells their [Desk
Salespeople's] effort. I am the salesperson for the desk role." Mariah followed Carmen's tactic to
showcase the unit's value to E-Tel's sales organization. Like Carmen, she also took on a
"stretch" sales target for the unit. However, Mariah went beyond Carmen's ambitions. She not
only took on a larger revenue target than the one originally handed down by E-Tel's senior
managers, but she also committed to achieve it in eight months instead of the normal 12-month
sales year.
Mariah's stretch target far exceeded the initial sales target that E-Tel's senior managers
assigned to the unit. In an all-hands call with all the Desk Salespeople and Desk Sales Managers
at Desk Sales at the end of Mariah's first year at DeskSales, George, the senior E-Tel manager
who answered to the company's CEO for DeskSales' performance, explained how Mariah had
successfully taken on this "stretch" target. George started by saying that he wanted to thank
Mariah for "The great leadership that [she] has performed so far" and added that she "would be a
very tough act to follow." He mentioned that the target for the year he gave to Mariah was 330
million dollars of new revenue. George then went onto to say that Mariah and he had a meeting
where she agreed to a super-stretch target. George said that he wrote the figure down and put it
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into a sealed envelope and gave it to one of his aides to keep until the end of the sales year.
George then said that he had been told that everybody had made a great effort to deliver on these
targets. Then came the drum roll as they announced the figure that DeskSales hit for the year.
The figure was 363.8 million dollars, which was far in excess of the "super-stretch target" of 350
million dollars that had been sealed in the envelope. This came at a time when the rest of E-Tel
was contending with low or flat revenues due to competition and product substitution. During
her first year at DeskSales, Mariah had not only promised but also delivered a very ambitious
sales target.
Mariah's sales target for DeskSales was also a "stretch" target because Mariah ordered
Desk Sales Managers to hit their yearly target in eight not twelve months, increasing pressure on
Desk Sales Managers. After a conversation with Ferdinand, her Desk Sales Manager, Nancy, a
Deputy Desk Sales Manager, reported that Ferdinand complained that Mariah had told Desk
Sales Managers that "if they needed twelve months to hit their target, they would be out of a
job." In a meeting with his whole team, Ferdinand explained that the reason the unit needed to
hit its sales target in eight months was related to customers' paying practices. Ferdinand said that
DeskSales' performance was only measured by the revenue received during a sales year.
Because E-Tel's products are billed through quarterly fees, there was a step-down loss in
revenue throughout the sales year. This meant that a product sold in the first quarter of the
2002/2003 sales year would only generate three quarters of its revenue that year and one quarter
in the 2003/2004 sales year. A product sold in the last quarter of the 2002/2003 sales year would
only generate revenue in the 2003/2004 sales year. Consequently, all sales made in the last
quarter of a sales year would not count towards that year's target.
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These two ways of stretching Desk Salespeople's targets - increasing their value and
reducing the time available to reach them - strengthened the bureaucratic push over Desk Sales
Managers. This push was also strengthened by qualitative challenges in Desk Salespeople's sales
targets. Instead of having an overall sales target, Desk Salespeople now had to reach two
different types of sales targets. One was a target for "created and owned" sales. "Created and
owned sales" were sales initiated and closed by a Desk Salesperson. Mariah defined these as
sales opportunities that were discovered by Desk Salespeople in the course of their everyday
interaction with customers and whose value and product complexity were low enough for Desk
Salespeople to handle. Desk Salespeople's target for "created and owned" sales was 350,000
dollars a year. The other sales target that Desk Salespeople had to reach was a target for involved
sales. Involved sales were sales either initiated or closed by Desk Salespeople, but not both.
Sales created but not closed by Desk Salespeople were labeled 'lead-generation'. Mariah defined
these as sales opportunities that Desk Salespeople discovered in the course of their everyday
interaction with customers but that Desk Salespeople were not qualified to handle, either because
of the volume of the sale or because of the complexity of the products involved. Sales closed but
not created by Desk Salespeople were labeled 'channel-driving'. Mariah defined these as sales
opportunities that field account managers had discovered in the course of their everyday
relationship with customers but that field account managers did not close because of their low
value. Desk Salespeople had much smaller targets than field account managers and thus they
were more motivated to close these smaller sales. If Desk Salespeople met their 200,000 dollars
target for involved sales, Mariah could show that the unit's value to E-Tel rested not only on
DeskSales ability to sell independently, but also on its ability to assist field account teams in
selling.
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Mariah's target and bonus plan also strengthened the bureaucratic push over Desk Sales
Managers because of the strain they placed on Desk Salespeople's relationship with their field
salespeople. With Carmen, Desk Salespeople only had to persuade their field sales teams to let
them put their names in the sale's record in Siebel. Now Desk Salespeople had to persuade field
sales teams to let them claim sole responsibility for a total of 350,000 dollars of new revenue
from sales reported in Siebel. Also, Desk Salespeople had to persuade field sales teams to let
them claim responsibility for either finding or closing 200,000 dollars of new revenue from sales
reported in Siebel. Even those Desk Salespeople who had good relationships with their field
sales teams were disenchanted with the changes that Mariah made to their performance
measurement and to their bonus plan. The way Nigel, a Desk Salesman in one of the Retail
teams, reacted to the news of Mariah's changes to his bonus plan, highlights the difficulty that
Desk Salespeople felt in meeting their new targets for reported sales in Siebel. Nigel got a
phonecall from a field specialist regarding a couple of open sales worth 700,000 dollars in
revenue. After he hung up, he told Dennis [another Desk Salesman on Nigel's Desk Sales Team]
that this was a call with the field specialist who was going to be involved in the deal but Nigel
would 'create and own it'. Dennis told Nigel that this did not count as a "created and owned"
sale because the field specialist who had his name in the sale's record was external to DeskSales.
Nigel did not know this rule. This was announced by Mariah in the unit's start-of-the-year
meeting, and Nigel had not been there. Nina, Nigel's Desk Sales Manager actually emphasized
this on this morning's audio-call but Nigel did not hear it because he was attending Siebel
training. Nigel was "flabbergasted," "I don't know how I'm going to hit my targets now, I'll have
to explain [to my field account team] that on top of all the requirements, 'created and owned'
sales cannot involve anyone outside DeskSales." Nigel complained, "I am really depressed. I'd
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rather not have received the email allowing me to report this sale [as my own] in the first place -
now, the only thing I'm doing is putting the opportunity [i.e., entering it in Siebel, without it
counting towards Nigel's sales targets] instead of [my field sales team], that's it."
In addition to these two sales targets, there were also three saleswork targets that each
Desk Sales Team had to meet. All of the team's Desk Salespeople had to report making seven
calls to customers each day; all of the sales that Desk Salespeople reported in Siebel had to have
a complete salesplan; and no Desk Salesperson could have errors in their sales records in Siebel.
These saleswork targets allowed DeskSales' General Manager to showcase the unit's efforts in
addition to its results. These two additional set of targets for sales and saleswork added pressure
to Desk Sales Managers. They not only had to ensure that their Desk Salespeople met stretch
sales targets, they also had to make sure that their Desk Salespeople reached both their "created
and owned" and their "involved" sales targets and to make sure that Desk Salespeople reported
the types and amounts of saleswork prescribed by Mariah, their General Manager.
Mariah supervised, rewarded and enforced Desk Salespeople's progress towards reaching
their sales and saleswork targets. Anthony, one of the Desk Sales Managers in one of the retail
teams, described Mariah as the "Demonic Mistress of Siebel" because of her focus on enforcing
reported sales and reported saleswork in Siebel. Mariah relied exclusively on Siebel to supervise
Desk Salespeople's sales and saleswork. Mariah reported that Siebel made her job "much
easier," not only because she could use it to see Desk Salespeople's progress towards their
targets but also because it allowed her to make DeskSales performance "transparent" to upper-
level management and to E-Tel's field sales force: "if you don't have a shared system, people
will just think that you're making up the numbers - with a shared system it's totally transparent."
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Mariah used Siebel to de-personalize her supervision of Desk Sales Teams. Whereas
Carmen relied on Desk Sales Managers' justifications as proof of involvement, Mariah set
Siebel-level criteria to classify sales as "created and owned" and "involved." During Carmen's
tenure, Desk Salespeople could achieve their sales target just by reporting their involvement in
field salespeople's sales. For Carmen, a plausible account of Desk Salespeople's role in a sale
was sufficient proof of involvement. During Mariah's tenure as General Manager, Desk
Salespeople had targets for sales that they carried out on their own and targets for sales that they
carried out with the help of their field sales team. The definition of which sales counted towards
each of these targets was very precise. For a sale to count as "created and owned" - a sale carried
out by Desk Salespeople on their own - Desk Salespeople had to both create and close the sale's
record in Siebel. For a sale to count as "involved" - a sale carried out by Desk Salespeople in
cooperation with their field sales team - Desk Salespeople had to either create or close the sale's
record in Siebel. Creating a sales record in Siebel was thus a proxy for the act of finding an
opportunity to sell to a customer. When created, a sale's record was a representation of a
customer's initial interest in addressing a technology-related need. Closing a sale's record in
Siebel represented successfully persuading the customer to buy a product or service from E-Tel
to meet that need.
Mariah not only supervised Desk Salespeople's progress towards their sales targets but
also their progress towards their saleswork targets. Mariah implemented a set of fine-grained
measures of saleswork based on Siebel. Desk Salespeople now had to use Siebel to log calls to
their customers. In addition, Mariah supervised Desk Salespeople's use of Siebel's sales plans
and Desk Salespeople's thoroughness in reporting sales in Siebel. Mariah frequently emailed
"sinners' lists" to Desk Salespeople and Desk Sales Managers. "Sinners' lists" were outputs from
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Siebel which showed records with missing and erroneous information that had to be corrected by
the Desk Salesperson who was assigned the accounts to which those records belonged. These
lists were attached to email messages with instructions to fill in or correct these data.
Mariah did not use Siebel to report automatically the sales and saleswork that Desk
Salespeople logged in the system. Instead she had her Desk Sales Managers prepare these reports
- a task that occupied most of Desk Sales Managers' time at work. There were two reasons for
this. The first is that creating these reports was an opportunity for compliance. Desk Salespeople
rarely reported enough calls to customers to meet their saleswork targets for each week. When
Desk Sales Mangers were creating their team's weekly report, they had the opportunity to ask
their Desk Salespeople to report enough calls to customers to hit those saleswork targets. The
second reason to have Desk Sales Managers do these reports themselves was that there were just
too many possible exceptions on reported sales for these to be able to be automatically reported
by Siebel. Field salespeople occasionally included their name in their Desk Salespeople reported
sales in Siebel. This classified these sales as "involved," instead of as "created and owned,"
crippling DeskSales ability to demonstrate its role as a revenue-generating addition to E-Tel's
sales force (and reducing Desk Salespeople's and Desk Sales Managers' bonus). Additionally,
creating these reports manually allowed Desk Sales Managers to have their Desk Salespeople
change the close date of sales records in Siebel so that, for example, if a Desk Saleswoman had
hit her sales target for any given week, she could report sales in excess of that target in the next
week so as to also meet her targets then. All of this effort to use Siebel's weekly reports to create
a representation of compliance for every Desk Salesperson in their team occupied the majority of
Desk Sales Managers time at work. This was not only because these reports took a long time to
prepare but also because Mariah often asked for ad-hoc reports on specific activities (such as the
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sales of a specific product) and because Desk Sales Managers had to present and justify their
reported sales and saleswork figures in a number of scheduled weekly calls with multiple upper-
level managers. When asked to reflect on the negative elements of her job as a Desk Sales
Manager, Linda complained:
One of the major problems we have had at DeskSales is that we need to keep proving
ourselves and one of the main problems is that we have to keep producing statistics and
spreadsheets and things like that and for me personally as a Desk Sales Manager, having to
produce these things to feed them up so that [our General Manager] can justify what we're doing
and when we're doing it, so that [top managers] and especially [senior managers] are happy. So it
takes a lot of time and it's unproductive work as well because it doesn't help you make more sales,
it's just looking back, so that justification process is quite frustrating.
Even Desk Sales Managers and Deputy Desk Sales Managers who were very proficient
with Siebel had to invest most of their time preparing reports. A conversation between David, a
Desk Sales Manager, and Ronald, his Deputy Desk Sales Manager, highlights the burden that
reporting was for Desk Sales Managers and their deputies. David and Ronald, both of whom
were very proficient with Siebel, often complained about the amount of time they had to dedicate
to producing reports. When having breakfast together, on the first week of the second sales
quarter of 2003 (a time when there was little if any pressure to report sales figures), David asked
Ronald if Ronald could still stay later on Wednesday, and Ronald said that he could but
complained that the "operations team should be the one doing this!"7 David said that he had
gotten an email from Mariah, their General Manager, sent to all Desk Sales Managers saying that
she appreciated that they had been putting a lot of extra hours in because of reporting and that
going forward the operations team would take a much more active role in helping them on that8 .
Ronald said that all the reporting he has to do did not really leave him time for anything else. He
said, "I really should be spending my time doing coaching, that's really what the job is." David
7 DeskSales had a 10-person operations team whose members did most of the IT-related work in the unit, such as
setting up email accounts, managing Siebel software upgrades and processing requests for clearance to access
customer information systems.
8 In spite of this promise, Desk Sales Managers and Deputy Desk Sales Managers were responsible for monthly
reporting until I left DeskSales four months after this conversation.
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said that doing coaching full time "is something you should strive for, not something you need to
be doing." He added, "if you did it people would think that you had too much time on your hands
and they would give you some more work to do." Ronald agreed but retorted that "in our
interviews for Deputy Desk Sales Managers they emphasized the coaching part, it was like 50%
of the interview, but on the job you don't even do 1% of it!"
Mariah's use of reporting shaped Desk Sales Managers' experience of the First-line
manager's Dilemma in three ways. First it added a set of reporting tasks to Desk Sales
Managers' everyday work, reducing the amount of time they had available to manage and
supervise their Desk Salespeople. Second it added to the bureaucratic push: Desk Sales
Managers not only had to make sure that their Desk Salespeople engaged in the sales and
saleswork need to meet their targets, but also that their Desk Salespeople reported those sales and
that saleswork on Siebel. Finally, it sharpened the challenge created by the bureaucratic push:
strictly speaking, Desk Sales Managers had to enforce the representation of sales and saleswork
on Siebel, rather than the actual execution of sales and saleswork.
Mariah designed Desk Salespeople's bonus plan to motivate Desk Salespeople to report
sales and saleswork and reward them for doing so. Her four-element bonus plan attempted to
shape Desk Salespeople's sales and saleswork at a more fine-grained level. The first element of
Mariah's bonus plan was meant to create a sense of shared fate with the account team. As with
Carmen's bonus plan, this element of Desk Salespeople's bonus was paid if the total sales for
their accounts matched a revenue target set by E-Tel's senior management. Under Mariah's
bonus plan, however, this element was only worth 20% of Desk Salespeople's bonus.
The second element of Mariah's bonus plan rewarded Desk Salespeople's individual
sales. This part of Desk Salespeople's bonus was paid if the sales that Desk Salespeople reported
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on Siebel as the exclusive outcome of their own saleswork matched a sales target set by
DeskSales' General Manager. Specifically, achievement towards this target was measured by
adding the revenue from sales records in Siebel opened and closed by Desk Salespeople. This
element was worth 40% of Desk Salespeople's total bonus.
The third element of Mariah's bonus plan meant to reward joint sales with the account
team. This part of the bonus was awarded if the sales that Desk Salespeople reported on Siebel as
an outcome of joint saleswork with field account managers matched a target set by DeskSales'
General Manager. Specifically, achievement towards this target was measured by adding the
revenue from sales records in Siebel either opened or closed by Desk Salespeople. This was
worth 20% of Desk Salespeople's total bonus.
The fourth element of Mariah's bonus scheme was meant to reward, at the same time,
customer satisfaction and Siebel use. Desk Salespeople earned this part of their bonus if two
conditions were met. First, E-Tel's customer satisfaction index had to meet a customer
satisfaction target set by E-Tel's CEO. Secondly, Desk Salespeople had to meet weekly targets
for Siebel usage. Desk Salespeople had to log 35 customer calls a week, have a sales plan for
every single open sales record in Siebel and have no errors in their closed sales records. This was
worth 20% of Desk Salespeople's total bonus.
Mariah did not make any changes to the bonus plan that Carmen had designed for Desk
Sales Managers. Desk Sales Mangers could earn as much as 50% of their salary in bonus, as long
as each of their Desk Salespeople met their sales and saleswork targets.
Mariah actively used her bonus plan to manage Desk Salespeople. When DeskSales as a
whole or a specific team consistently underperformed on their reported sales and saleswork,
Mariah promptly warned them of their lagging performance, highlighting its consequences on
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their bonus. The first time that the unit as a whole lagged behind their saleswork reporting
targets, Mariah sent an email to all the Desk Salespeople, Desk Sales Managers and Senior Desk
Sales Managers warning everyone of the consequences for their bonus of a failure to hit their
reporting targets and demanding action from Senior Desk Sales Managers:
- Original Message-----
> From: Johnson,T,Mariah,ETDS
>Sent: 13 March 2003 14:17
> To: DESKSALES - ALL
> Subject: Reporting
>All,
> I am far from impressed with the stats attached below. We are meant to do
> 35 customer calls per week per Desk Salesperson. That is a mere 7 a day per
> person. This
> is hardly tough going, and this is a serious issue for us as a unit. We
> can only sell when we are talking to customers, it does not happen by
> accident.
> Simon - please resolve for Retail
> Ryan - please resolve for Finance
> Marie / Tom - although you guys have done better than the average,
> this is still NOT good enough - please resolve and report back to me.
> I do not want to hear any moans about not logged - that is your issue in
> terms of sales mgt discipline - this will AFFECT your bonus
> have no fear.
> Mariah
> Figures for April to date for outbound customer calls on Siebel
> are (average per week per Desk Salesperson):
> Retail: 9.9
> Technology and Media: 16.7
> Finance: 8.3
Mariah also enforced a strict use of the bonus plan to calculate Desk Salespeople's bonus.
Ferdinand, a Desk Sales Manager on one of the finance teams explained why Mariah had to rely
on Desk Sales Managers to calculate bonus:
Because [of] the way the [bonus] is worked out, there is really no one kind of query that
you can run [on Siebel] to pull it off [i.e., calculate Desk Salespeople's bonus]. You need a local
level of knowledge to pull it off. So Siebel is not ideal and at the same time there are problems
with Siebel itself because [Carmen and Senior Desk Sales Managers] are worried about missing
sales or missing sales that haven't been claimed correctly, so the whole problem is about Siebel
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This complex, non automated process to calculate bonuses led to frequent mistakes.
Kevin, a Desk Sales Manager on one of the Retail teams complained, "the guy who is the best
salesperson [in Kevin's team] knows how he is doing on all the statistics by heart and he
calculates his bonus every month and he has never, not even once, got the bonus he's entitled to;
when he gets 80% of it, it's a victory, and that's sad."
Desk Salespeople put pressure on their Desk Sales Manager to address these errors by
submitting "exception reports." This reduced the time that Desk Sales Managers had available to
supervise their team's sales and saleswork. Michelle's reaction to a lower-than-expected bonus
illustrates the pressure that Desk Salespeople could put on their Desk Sales Manager. Michelle, a
Desk Saleswoman on one of the Finance teams, complained to Tara, the Desk Saleswoman that
sat across from her, that she was not happy at all with her bonus. Michelle said that she had used
the "bonus calculator" spreadsheet that their Deputy Desk Sales Manager had sent around and
that she found out that she had got 600 dollars less than what she should have gotten. She said
that she was supposed to have closed a sale but that, because she was away on holiday, it was her
field account manager who closed it and so it didn't count towards her target. This lost
opportunity, worth 200,000 dollars, caused Michelle to lose so much money. She said that the
situation was easy to solve. Her Desk Sales Manager just had to submit an exception report. She
said that she started actually working on that report herself but that her Desk Sales Manager had
told her that it was not adequately done. Michelle said that she asked him how she could do it
better, but her Desk Sales Manager said that he had no time to help her. Michelle was not happy
about this and said that she would keep complaining until she got her missing 600 dollars.
Mariah not only made changes in the way the bonus was calculated but also in the way it
was reported to Desk Salespeople. This change diluted the bonus plan's effectiveness in
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motivating Desk Salespeople to hit their targets. Desk Salespeople such as Roy and Todd found
this new bonus report confusing and hard to understand. Upon seeing his first bonus statement
after Mariah took on Desk Sales General Manager role, Roy complained that "you need a PhD to
understand this." Todd, who sat across from Roy, compared this bonus statement with the one he
received when Carmen was the DeskSales General Manager:
Remember what we used to get [before], [a] page with what you sold and the bonus you
earned. You need a degree in rocket science to be able to understand this - [it's] far more
complicated than I expected.
The way their bonus was presented together with the complex way in which it was
calculated left Desk Salespeople confused about what to do to maximize their bonus. This led
Desk Salespeople to develop their own interpretations of the bonus plan. Desk Salespeople held
to these interpretations even when their Desk Sales Managers told them they were wrong. That
was the situation that Tony, a Desk Sales Manager on one of the Technology and Media teams
faced when trying to address a conflict between Marcia and Patricia - two of the Desk
Salespeople on his team. Marcia and Patricia were having a mild argument because Patricia had
logged a sale on Siebel but she was taking a long time to complete the order forms for it. Marcia
offered to do the order forms but she wanted Patricia to hand over the sale to her (Marcia) so that
she also got credit for it. Patricia said that if she did so she would loose the credit for the sale.
Marcia replied that if Patricia created the sale's record and Marcia closed it, then they would
both get credit for it on their "involved" target. Patricia said that even if she closed the sale
herself, it would only count towards her "involved" target because there was already a specialist
on the sale's record in Siebel. She was just not sure that she would get credit for it if she handed
the sale to Marcia. Marcia called Tony, their Desk Sales Manager. Tony came by and after
Marcia explained the situation to him, Tony told Patricia that if she passed the sale to Marcia,
they would both get credit for an "involved" sale. Patricia replied, "I don't believe that." Tony
-100-
explained that he was the one running the report to calculate the bonus and that he knew that it
was like that. Patricia said that, "that may work for reports, but I don't believe it's like that for the
actual bonus." Tony replied that he was sure it was and Patricia retorted, "I want to see that
before we do it." Tony said that it was not possible to see it before and Patricia said that she had
handed off an opportunity before and that it had disappeared from her Siebel records. Tony
explained that it disappeared from her created and owned sales but not from her involved sales.
"I don't believe it works like that [for the bonus]," she quickly added "it's not because of you
Marcia, it's because of how the system works." Tony said that if Patricia wanted to do the order
forms herself, she could keep the opportunity to herself and Patricia said that she preferred doing
that.
In addition to the bonus plan, Mariah introduced what she called an "incentive system."
The "incentive system" was meant to reward reported sales and saleswork in Siebel with prizes.
Desk Salespeople earned points in the "incentive system" for each sale they reported in Siebel.
The higher the revenue of the sale the higher the number of points Desk Salespeople made. Desk
Salespeople could also loose points by failing to hit each of their saleswork targets, namely their
target for reported calls to customers, their target to have a salesplan for every sale's record and
their target to have no errors in their Siebel sales records. The two Desk Salespeople with the
highest number of points would earn a prize. The Desk Salesperson with the highest number of
points could get prizes such as a car or travel vouchers to exotic destinations. The Desk
Salesperson with the second highest number of points could get a number of home appliances
and high-end consumer electronics. The Desk Sales Manager whose team achieved the highest
number of points at the end of the year earned a safari to Kenya and the whole team would get an
all-expenses paid trip to Paris for a weekend.
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Mariah also made an adjustment to the bonus plan after it was implemented. Instead of
changing any of its elements - which was forbidden by E-Tel's agreement with the union that
represented Desk Salespeople - she changed the way some of these elements were calculated.
Mariah promised that Desk Salespeople would not have to share their revenue with field account
teams. Instead, she promised to adopt a "double-bubble" policy. Under this policy, Desk
Salespeople and field salespeople would both earn the total bonus for sales that Desk Salespeople
"created and owned" and sales in which Desk Salespeople were "involved." However, Mariah
kept the specific details of her "double-bubble" policy ambiguous to Desk Salespeople's chagrin.
In one of their team's morning audio calls, Jeffrey, a Desk Salesman on one of the Retail teams,
asked Anthony, his sales manager, to explain the "double-bubble" policy. Anthony said that he
had his own understanding of "double-bubble," but that there were other views from
management, which could include their bonus being capped and other changes that would save
DeskSales money. People became very upset. Jeffrey spat, "this is all a pile of crap! Now
[management is] measuring the number of times [we] go to the toilet each day!"
It is thus not surprising to find that Desk Sales Managers saw the unit's bonus plan as a
barrier to achieving their targets. Linda, a Desk Sales Manager on one of the Customer Products
teams explained:
The [bonus plan] is not driving the right behaviors. [...] We get penalized on so many
things so you have to keep looking at stuff for nothing. And if someone else creates it and you
work on it you get nothing for that, so there's a lot of conflict internally so we're not actually
using the right behaviors on the bonus plan.
Thus the bonus plan not only did not help Desk Sales Managers to hit their targets, it also
increased the improvisational pull that Desk Sales Managers were subjected to. The way Mariah
designed and used her bonus plan detached it from Desk Salespeople's sales and saleswork
performance, tying it only to their reporting. Desk Sales Managers also had to adapt this bonus
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plan to the local conditions of their teams to ensure that their Desk Salespeople's efforts were
rewarded.
To summarize, the bureaucratic push under Mariah was driven by a "stretch" sales target
that had Desk Salespeople achieve more revenue than E-Tel upper-level managers required, and
in less time. This push was strengthened by the increased amount of reporting work that Desk
Sales Managers and Desk Salespeople had to do and by the confusing and changing nature of
Mariah's bonus plan. The bureaucratic push over Desk Sales Managers was partially alleviated
because Mariah's targets were focused on the act of reporting sales and saleswork, not on that of
carrying these out.
Improvisational pull
Mariah's policies and the way they were interpreted and used by Desk Salespeople
strengthened the improvisational pull over Desk Sales Managers. Mariah's recruitment policy
kept DeskSales staffed with Desk Salespeople with little, if any sales experience. Mariah hired
exclusively from temporary staffing agencies, which supplied DeskSales with people who had
limited work experience and that had, at best, a high-school education.
Mariah's efforts to enforce sales and saleswork targets deteriorated the quality of
incoming Desk Salespeople's training, thus strengthening the improvisational pull over Desk
Sales Managers. Mariah enforced saleswork targets based on the number of people allocated to
the team, independently of whether they were on training, on sickness leave or on holidays. Desk
Salespeople had to report seven calls to customers a day from their first day at DeskSales, even if
they were assigned to training for their first whole week at the unit. To address this, Desk Sales
Managers did not allow incoming Desk Salespeople to attend all the training sessions planned for
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them. Instead, Desk Sales Managers had Desk Salespeople spend as much time as possible at
their desk, reporting saleswork in Siebel.
Desk Sales Managers also wanted new Desk Salespeople to spend as much time as
possible at their desk to be sure that their Desk Sales Team reached its sales targets. Mariah hired
new Desk Salespeople when E-Tel's senior managers decided to allocate more accounts to
DeskSales. However, these new accounts were not given to newly-recruited Desk Salespeople.
Instead they were allocated to experienced Desk Salespeople. Incoming Desk Salespeople took
over the existing accounts that were left vacant when experienced Desk Salespeople moved to
new accounts. The field salespeople on these existing accounts depended on their Desk
Salesperson to carry a number of menial tasks that field salespeople were neither willing nor able
to put on hold until their new Desk Salesperson came out of training. Desk Sales Managers thus
demanded that their newly-hired Desk Salespeople spent as much time as possible at their desk
working for their field salespeople and thus adding sales revenue to their Desk Sales Team's
bottom line.
The improvisational pull over Desk Sales Managers was also strengthened by the way
Desk Salespeople drew on their career aspirations and motivations when interpreting and using
Mariah's policies to enforce sales and saleswork targets. During Carmen's tenure, Desk
Salespeople's career aspirations and motivations only shaped the extent to which Desk
Salespeople overachieved their targets. Carmen supervised and rewarded involvement in sales
and required only verbal proof to recognize it. It was easier to persuade field salespeople to allow
Desk Salespeople to put their name on an existing sale's record in Siebel than to allow a Desk
Salesperson to take full or half the credit for a sale in Siebel. Desk Salespeople had to put much
more effort into reaching their sales targets under Mariah's target and bonus plan. The tactics
-104-
that Desk Salespeople drew on to achieve their sales and saleswork targets depended on their
career aspirations and motivations. Desk Salespeople could be classified in four broad types
based on these career aspirations and motivations. The Desk Salespeople in each of these types
engaged in different levels of sales and saleswork, as summarized in Exhibit 4.3. (percentages
are for the proportion of Desk Salespeople in each category).
Ladder-hoppers wanted to join E-Tel's corporate ranks. Their career aspirations were
centered on roles such as business development and change management. Ladder-hoppers tried
to maximize their interaction with E-Tel's senior managers at the expense of their interaction
with customers and field account teams. They were thus consistently behind their targets for
sales and saleswork. Ladder-hoppers increased the improvisational pull over Desk Sales
Managers because they were less concerned with their sales and saleswork targets than with
taking advantage of opportunities to gain the favor of E-Tel's senior managers. Desk Sales
Managers could not rely on ladder-hoppers to contribute towards their team's sales and
saleswork targets.
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Exhibit 4.3. - Distribution of the four types of Desk Salespeople by their level of sales
and saleswork (N=75).9
Saleswork
L
Ladder-hoppers
"move to corporate"
1%
Wage-earners
"make a living"
56%
Below target
Sales target
Money-grabbers
(Prize-oriented)
"make money and
win prizes"
3%
Money-grabbers
(Not prize-oriented)
"just make money"
20%
Above target
Ladder-climbers' goal was to go up the hierarchy one step at a time. There were two
paths that ladder-climbers could take. One was to go up DeskSales hierarchy, the other was to
use DeskSales as a stepping stone to get a field sales role and then advance within the field sales
force. Ladder-climbers consistently hit their sales and saleswork targets, but only just so. They
strove to have good relationships with their accounts and they were scrupulous in meeting their
reporting targets. Ladder-climbers alleviated the improvisational pull over Desk Sales Managers.
9 The classification that grounds this table was based on data from interviews, observations and Desk Salespeople's
reported sales and saleswork for the period of January 2003 to July 2003.
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They met their sales and saleswork targets and helped other Desk Salespeople on the team to
move closer to meeting their own targets. However, ladder-climbers did not over-achieve their
targets. In consequence, they did little to allow Desk Sales Managers to showcase their team's
performance. Moreover, ladder-climbers stayed in the Desk Salesperson's role for as little as
they could. They only alleviated the improvisational pull over their Desk Sales Managers
temporarily.
Money-grabbers became Desk Salespeople because of the amount of money that they
could make in bonus and because, in some cases, of the prizes they could win with Mariah's
"incentive system." Unlike ladder-climbers, money-grabbers were not content with just meeting
their targets Money-grabbers were among the unit's top performers - their reported sales
dwarfed those of other Desk Salespeople by a factor of 10. Unlike ladder-climbers, money-
grabbers shunned away from reporting saleswork and avoided managerial tasks that took time
away from reporting sales on Siebel. Money-grabbers were the Desk Salespeople who
contributed the most to alleviate the improvisational pull over their Desk Sales Managers. Not
only did they meet their sales targets, but their over-achievement in sales compensated for the
lack of achievement of the other types of Desk Salespeople on their team. If they were not prize-
oriented, however, money-grabbers only alleviated the sales side of the improvisational pull.
They did not report enough saleswork for Desk Sales Managers to hit their team's target.
Wage-earners were at E-Tel to earn a salary and make a living. Wage-earners avoided
customer service work and reporting work. They spent their days loafing on their computer,
playing on-line games or chatting in on-line forums. Wage-earners only engaged in work that
their account managers or Desk Sales Managers enforced. Wage-earners did very little if
anything at all to alleviate the improvisational pull over their Desk Sales Managers. They lagged
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behind their sales and saleswork targets and they were not motivated by financial or career
aspirations. Only continuous supervision ensured that wage-earners reported at least some sales
and saleswork on Siebel.
Desk Sales Managers thus had to contend with a mix of Desk Salespeople, making
meeting targets a challenging task. Ladder-hoppers were absent from their desks and had only
limited relationships with their field account teams. They did not bring the revenue that Desk
Sales Managers needed to hit their targets nor did they care about them. Ladder-climbers did
report the revenue and the saleswork that Desk Sales Managers needed to hit their targets, but
only just enough. Their role as Desk Salespeople was only provisional, as their goal was to climb
up the hierarchy as soon as possible. Money-grabbers were at DeskSales to stay, and they did
report the revenue that Desk Salespeople needed to hit their targets, but only a few of them cared
about saleswork targets or following DeskSales senior managers' orders and requests. Wage-
earners were just at DeskSales to make a salary. They lagged behind in every target and they had
little if any appetite for work.
Money-grabbers and ladder-climbers used their relationship with their field account
teams and their customers to achieve their targets. Mariah's tenure coincided with an increased
enforcement of Siebel use throughout E-Tel. Desk Salespeople took on the increased Siebel work
that field salespeople had to complete in exchange for being able to claim sole credit for part of
field salespeople's sales. Desk Salespeople also extended their service work to customers. The
goal was to increase their interaction with customers to get some of the orders that customers
would place with E-Tel's service units. To this end, Desk Salespeople introduced themselves to
customers as their "single point of contact at E-Tel." Desk Salespeople's goal was to have a
service relationship with their customers unmediated by field salespeople. This gave Desk
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Salespeople visibility of their customers' orders - orders that they could report in Siebel as the
outcome of their own effort.
These two tactics helped ladder-climbers and money-grabbers contribute to their team's
sales targets. Nonetheless, as tables 4.4. and 4.5. below show, reaching sales targets was much
more of a challenge under Mariah's leadership than under Carmen's. The "created and owned"
figures are not only far from the overwhelming over achievement of sales targets during
Carmen's tenure as DeskSales General Manager, they also show a downward trend for all the
Retail teams, especially worrying because the second trimester (April to June) is where most of
the year's sales are made. The "involved" figure are also far from the consistent over-
achievement during Carmen's tenure, with some teams lagging very much behind target, and
most teams displaying a very erratic behavior.
Table 4.4. -- Average new revenue per Desk Salesperson from "created and owned" sales
for the first seven months of 2003, in thousands of dollars (average gap to target in parentheses).
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Desk Sales
Team Jan. 03 Feb. 03 Mar. 03 Apr. 03 May 03 Jun. 03 Jul. 03
Finance 81.38 89.15 107.08 24.62 29.69 52.31 60.54
(37.63) (45.40) (63.33) (-19.13) (-14.06) (8.56) (16.79)
Finance 2 50.20 51.90 56.20 32.10 24.50 41.30 36.20
(6.45) (8.15) (12.45) (-11.65) (-19.25) (-2.45) (-7.55)
Retail 1 106.75 120.00 375.63 45.63 33.88 77.25 20.00
ea(63.00) (76.25) (331.88) (1.88) (-9.88) (33.50) (-23.75)
Retail 2 87.78 116.33 118.89 41.00 45.11 19.33 25.44
(44.03) (72.58) (75.14) (-2.75) (1.36) (-24.42) (-18.31)
Retail3 192.50 228.75 217.25 43.25 28.38 17.38 14.00
(148.75) (185.00) (173.50) (-0.50) (-15.38) (-26.38 (-29.75)
Retail 4 46.40 52.10 52.90 76.80 74.50 40.80 33.60
(2.65) (8.35) (9.15) (33.05) (30.75) (-2.95) (-10.15)
Tech & Media 1 296.71 591.71 594.14 96.29 66.29 93.00 81.29
(252.96) (547.96) (550.39) (52.54) (22.54) (49.25) (37.54)
Tech. & Media 2 48.14 78.00 82.14 50.00 70.00 75.57 48.14(4.39) (34.25) (38.39) (6.25) (26.25) (31.82) (4.39)
Table 4.5. - Average new revenue per Desk Salesperson from "involved" sales for the
first seven months of 2003, in thousands of dollars (average gap to target in parentheses).
Desk Salespeople also fared poorly
meet these targets changed from Carmen's
phone calls. To hit their saleswork targets,
in their saleswork targets. The reasons they failed to
to Mariah's leadership. Carmen equated saleswork to
Desk Salespeople just had to call their customers.
With Mariah, Desk Salespeople would only hit their sales targets if they called their customers
and reported that they did so in Siebel. They also had to enter sales plans for every sale in Siebel
logged under any of their accounts and they had to correct any errors in any Siebel sales record.
Only ladder-climbers and prize-oriented money-grabbers put in the time and effort to hit these
saleswork targets. All the other Desk Salespeople failed to do so. Tables 9 and 10 below show
the average reported customer calls and the percentage of completed sales plans per team.
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Desk Sales Team Jan. 03 Feb. 03 Mar. 03 Apr. 03 May 03 Jun. 03 Jul. 03
Finance 1 319.15 330.31 2353.15 16.54 4.69 17.00 73.00
(294.15) (305.31) (2328.15) (-8.46) (-20.31) (-8.00) (48.00)
Finance 2 148.50 236.30 243.60 4.70 43.10 18.30 106.90
(123.50) (211.30) (218.60) (-20.30) (18.10) (-6.70) (81.90)
Retail 1 277.00 336.00 341.25 8.75 21.25 29.75 168.50
(252.00) (311.00) (316.25) (-16.25) (-3.75) (4.75) (143.50)
13.78 18.11 34.89 3.67 5.78 19.11 18.00
l (-11.22) (-6.89) (9.89) (-21.33) (-19.22) (-5.89) (-7.00)
37.50 47.38 40.88 0.50 32.13 4.25 2.13
(12.50 (22.38) (15.88) (-24.50) (7.13) (-20.75) (-22.88
Retail 4 50.90 49.90 54.10 20.10 20.50 29.00 46.10
(25.90 (24.90) (29.10) (-4.90) (-4.50) (4.00) (21.10)
Tech. & Media 271.14 326.86 326.86 179.57 20.71 69.86 163.00
(246.14) (301.86) (301.86) (154.57) (-4.29) (44.86) (138.00)
Tech. & Media2 41.43 27.71 28.14 9.71 (1.57 83.43 16.86
l] Tec.____ __ (16.43) (2.71) (3.14) (-15.29) (-23.43) (58.43) (-8.14)
Table 4.6. - Average reported customer contacts per Desk Salesperson per day during the
first 8 months of 2003 (target was 7 calls per day).
Desk Sales Team Jan-Feb Mar-Apr May-Jun Jul-Aug
Finance 1 4.6 6.3 7.0 13.3
Finance 2 8.4 8.6 8.0 9.9
Retail 1 5.3 7.8 10.0 11.8
Retail 2 1.9 5.3 5.9 8.2
Retail 3 2.6 6.6 7.8 7.7
Retail 4 7.6 6.9 6.0 9.4
Tech. & Media 1 6.4 11.4 10.4 10.6
Tech. & Media 2 3.8 6.0 7.1 8.6
Table 4.7. - Percentage of Desk Salespeople's 'created
with a completed sales plan during the first 8 months of 2003
and owned'
(target was
and 'involved' sales
100%).
Desk Sales Team Jan-Feb Mar-Apr May-Jun Jul-Aug
Finance 1 0.9% 11.9% 77.8% 93.5%
Finance 2 8.6% 26.2% 83.3% 85.7%
Retail 1 27.9% 37.3% 88.9% 88.2%
Retail 2 54.3% 60.5% 88.5% 80.0%
Retail 3 N/A N/A N/A 80.0%
Retail 4 49.2% 50.0% 66.7% 100.0%
Tech. & Media 1 51.7% 67.1% 93.9% 90.3%
Tech. & Media 2 41.9% 64.7% 42.1% 77.8%
The improvisational pull under Mariah's leadership was driven by Desk Salespeople's
unwillingness and inability to sell. This pull was strengthened by Desk Salespeople's lack of
effort in reaching their sales target, their saleswork target, or both because of their career goals
mand aspirations. The improvisational pull on Desk Sales Managers was nonetheless alleviated by
ladder-climbers' and money grabbers' success in creating a representation of success in sales and
saleswork without necessarily having to engage in either.
Addressing the first-line manager dilemma under Mariah's leadership
Mariah's demands on Desk Sales Managers' reporting work left them with very little
time to spend actively managing their Desk Salespeople. Nonetheless, Desk Sales Managers
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needed to have a high level of visibility and control over Desk Salespeople's sales and saleswork
because Desk Sales Managers' bonus was only paid if every single Desk Salesperson on their
team met their targets. To address this challenge, Desk Salespeople focused their interaction with
their Desk Salespeople on a phone meeting with their team (labeled the "team audio-call" at
DeskSales), which took place about once every week or once every two weeks - depending on
how well the team was doing against its sales and saleswork targets. Although these meetings
were conducted over the phone, they were also face-to-face in the sense that the team's Desk
Sales Manager and its Desk Salespeople were sitting at their Desk in DeskSales' open space.
Desk Sales Managers chose to conduct these meetings over the phone to keep them private and
to avoid disturbing the other Desk Sales Teams. These calls could range from a five-minute
announcement to an hour-long scrutiny of each Desk Salesperson sales targets, but on average
they lasted for about 30 minutes. An analysis of all the audio-calls observed during Mariah's
tenure as the DeskSales General Manager shows that Desk Sales Managers used these calls to
enact five practices to ensure that their Desk Salespeople met their targets for reported sales and
reported saleswork in Siebel. The appendix to this study details how each of these practices was
enacted in each of the audio-calls under analysis. These five practices were: monitor Desk
Salespeople's representation work (reporting sales and saleswork in Siebel); enforce
representation work on Desk Salespeople; reward Desk Salespeople for their representation
work; advise Desk Salespeople in how to hit their targets through representation work; and
interpreting the conditions in which Desk Salespeople carried out their representation work.
These practices are explained below.
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Monitor
Desk Sales Managers could observe very little of Desk Salespeople's everyday work. The
amount of reporting work that Desk Sales Managers had to do prevented them from observing
their Desk Salespeople's work directly. Desk Sales Managers could only see the sales and
saleswork that Desk Salespeople reported in Siebel. Desk Sales Managers could not see two
aspects of Desk Salespeople's work that were crucial to assess their Desk Sales Teams' ability to
reach its sales targets: their progress towards closing their open sales in Siebel or the sales that
they could report as their own in Siebel but had yet to do so. As the analysis in the appendix
shows, Desk Sales Managers used their audio-calls to monitor these two elements of their Desk
Salespeople's work. These audio-calls were also an opportunity to monitor Desk Salespeople's
progress towards their saleswork target.
The analysis of the audio-calls observed during Mariah's tenure reveals that Desk Sales
Managers used these calls to monitor two aspects of their Desk Salespeople's work. One aspect
of Desk Salespeople's work that Desk Sales Managers monitored was in their team's audio-calls
was the progress of open sales reported in Siebel. Anthony's team audio-call of February, 24th
shows how Desk Sales Managers used these calls to monitor what their Desk Salespeople were
doing to close the open sales they reported in Siebel. Anthony called started by calling Gregory:
"what are the scores on the doors for you today?" Gregory said that his open sales were still far
from closing. Anthony then called Kevin, who replied: "I'm just catching up on stuff." Anthony
retorted: "that's very specific Kevin" and laughed. Anthony then called Alexander who said that
he had spoken with one of his field salespeople and that he had gotten permission to report a sale
worth 100 000 dollars under his own name in Siebel. He said that his 15 million-dollar open sale
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was now only due to close in March ("sorry Anthony"). Then it was Mark's turn, who said that
he was "just following up stuff." The audio-call ended here.
As Anthony's audio-call highlights, Desk Sales Managers used these calls to see what
they could not see in Siebel - the full process of their Desk Salespeople's representation work.
Siebel only showed part of this process: the value of the each Desk Salespeople's open sales. It
did not show the progress sales that Desk Salespeople had made towards reporting these sales as
closed in Siebel. Without their audio-calls, Desk Sales Managers were not able to assess which
of their Desk Salespeople's open sales were going to be reported as closed and which would be
reported as lost or cancelled.
Desk Sales Managers also used their audio-calls to monitor Desk Salespeople's use of
Siebel to report sales. Once Desk Salespeople reached their targets for the quarter, they stopped
logging sales in Siebel. Desk Salespeople waited for the next quarter to log the sales they were
allowed to report as their own in excess of what they needed to meet the current quarter's sales
target. This allowed Desk Salespeople to hit their targets every quarter. Joseph, a Desk Salesman
in one of the retail teams explained that people "always keep some [unreported sales] up their
sleeves" so that they can produce them towards the end of the year so that they can make their
numbers. Joseph said that once he discussed logging a sale in Siebel with one of his field
salespeople and that she had told him that she could not stop him from logging the sale in Siebel
but that he should way until there are only a couple of weeks left before the sale gets closed
[which would fall into the next quarter] before putting it up on Siebel. Joseph told me that
"everyone in the sales chain does this" [keeping unreported sales up their sleeve], "from the
senior managers down."
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If their Desk Sales Team as a whole was lagging behind its sales targets, however, it was
in Desk Sales Managers' interest to have these hidden or latent sales logged in Siebel. This
would not help lagging Desk Salespeople hit their targets but it would allow the team as a whole
to do so. In the second quarter of 2003, Roy's team was lagging behind their sales target,
although Karl, one of his Desk Salespeople, had already reached his own sales target. In one of
his team's audio-calls towards the end of the quarter, Roy attempted to have his Desk
Salespeople report all the sales they could in Siebel. During the audio-call, he said, "knowing
that we have a gap of 1 million, we need to have a pipeline of 3 million to make sure that we hit
that." With that in mind, he asked if they had "any sales squirreled away under the blankets."
"Do you have anything that you decided, "let's chuck it away for next month or let's keep this
one off the radar," "do we have any sales records below 30% [probability of closing] that we
could progress over the value chain in the next month??" He asked everyone individually, by
calling their name. Adolph and Barry said that they didn't. Stewart shook his head with a smile,
"that was a very shady no" Roy said "do you have one?" Stewart said that he did. Roy said "let's
not move everything to 90% percent and expose ourselves, [but] if we're 100% sure put it up to
40%, [Mariah] is going to be looking at where we add value and if she only sees Stewart's [sales
numbers] she may wonder what the hell we're doing here."
Desk Sales Managers focused their supervisory role on a very specific part of Desk
Salespeople's work: reporting sales and saleswork in Siebel. The extent to which Desk
Salespeople reported enough saleswork in Siebel to reach their targets could be monitored
directly in this information system. Desk Sales Managers had only to use Siebel to count the
number of reported calls, the number of sales plans and the number of sales records with errors
for each of their Desk Salespeople. Desk Salespeople's reporting of sales was more difficult to
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supervise. Open sales records in Siebel could take anything from a few hours to a few months to
close. While open, sales records on Siebel would not count towards the team's progress towards
their target. Desk Sales Managers thus had to monitor how near each of their Desk Salespeople's
open sales records was to closing. Moreover, ladder-climbers and money-grabbers only reported
the sales they needed to reach their quarterly targets and, in the case of money-grabbers,
maximize their bonus. Ladder-climbers and money-grabbers kept all the other sales they were
allowed to report as their own until the next quarter. Their goal was to consistently hit their
targets and maximize their bonus. Desk Sales Managers needed visibility of these sales for two
reasons: to have a sharper assessment of how close their Desk Salespeople were to reaching their
quarterly and yearly sales targets, and to be able to have Desk Salespeople log these sales to
allow the team as a whole to be able to reach its quarterly reported sales target.
More broadly, what is striking about Desk Sales Managers' use of their audio-calls to
monitor their Desk Salespeople was their choice of target. Desk Sales Managers did not did not
observe, nor did they seek to observe the work that allowed Desk Salespeople to report sales and
saleswork in Siebel. Desk Sales Managers only sought to observe the reporting work Desk
Salespeople engaged in, not their sales or saleswork.
Enforce
Siebel reports and team audio-calls often revealed a somber picture of Desk
Salespeople's ability to reach their monthly reported sales and reported saleswork targets. The
gap between the amount of sales and saleswork that Desk Salespeople had actually reported and
the amount of sales and saleswork they needed to report for their team to hit its targets was often
too wide. Desk Salespeople addressed this gap by enforcing representation work - ordering their
Desk Salespeople to report sales and saleswork in Siebel.
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As the analysis of Desk Sales Teams' audio-calls summarized in the appendix shows,
Desk Sales Managers used their audio-calls to enforce representation work in two ways. One was
by making Desk Salespeople's progress towards their target visible to others. Desk Sales
Managers achieved this in two ways. One was by announcing each Desk Salesperson's sales and
saleswork in audio-calls. In his audio-call of January, 15th, Ferdinand announced the closed sales
reported in Siebel in an effort to get his Desk Salespeople to report more closed sales. Ferdinand
started by announcing the total revenue figures for each Desk Salesperson. Laura has 5 million,
"well done." Oscar "hot on your heels," Ferdinand added to Laura. Kyle got 67,000, "well done."
Nancy, has "lots of quotes" but she needs to "translate them into [closed sales] in Siebel." Nancy
replied that quotes would take 2 to 3 months to be in Siebel because she needs to track them
down with Service. Nancy added that there are 1,500 orders now from one of her customers
alone but they're all going through Service. Ferdinand and Kyle said that she could ask service to
claim it too because they did not have any bonus to lose. Ferdinand said: "let's be as sneaky as
we can." He continued to read through the revenue numbers: Don has 800,000, he added that
"let's not go into that because he's not here." Christine had 1.5 million: "Christine is really
storming up now, well done Christine." Ferdinand said that the team as a whole had brought in
10 million of revenue. "When people from management come down you should now this so that
you can tell management so that we'll look good," Ferdinand added.
The other way in which Desk Sales Managers made Desk Salespeople's numbers visible
to each other was by using their team's whiteboard. Whiteboards were designed in table format.
Desk Sales Managers used these tables to record their Desk Salespeople's achievement towards
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their targets. Exhibit 4.4. shows a team's whiteboard, Table 4.8. maps the evolution of
whiteboards across timel.
Exhibit 4.4. - An example of a team's whiteboard circa September 2003.
IC The Technology and Medial Desk Sales Team 2 did not have a whiteboard during the time of this study. The
team's Desk Sales Manager explained that the whiteboard was "too call-centery" and that the team had voted not to
have one.
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Table 4.8. - Evolution of Desk Sales Teams' whiteboards.
Team Up to April April 2003 May 2003 June 2003 July 2003 August 2003 September
2003 2003
Finance I No whiteboard - Team yearly - Team yearly - Team yearly totals for: sales targets; actual sales
totals for sales totals for sales and gap between sales targets and sales
targets and targets and - Individual yearly totals for: sales targets; actual
actual sales actual sales sales and gap between sales targets and sales
- Top five open -Total yearly - Weekly customer calls for each team member
and closed sales sales for each
________________ for the team team member _
Finance 2 - Largest sale in - Key focus No whiteboard - Total yearly - Team yearly totals for: sales targets; actual sales
the team areas target for the and gap between sales targets and sales
- Total yearly team - Individual yearly totals for: sales targets; actual
sales for the sales and gap between sales targets and sales
team - Weekly customer calls for each team member
- Focus areas
Retail - Total weekly - Total weekly - Total yearly sales for each team member
sales for each sales for each - Total weekly customer calls foreach team member
team member team member
- Total daily
customer calls
for each team
=____ member
Retail 2 No whiteboard - Total yearly No whiteboard - Team and - Team and individual yearly
customer calls individual totals for: sales targets; actual
for each team yearly totals sales and gap between sales
member for: sales targets and sales
- Key focus targets; actual - Daily customer calls for each
areas sales and gap team member
-Total yearly between sales - Focus areas
sales for each targets and
team member sales
- Weekly
customer calls
for each team
member
- Focus areas
Retail 3 No whiteboard - Team and No whiteboard - Team yearly totals for: sales targets and actual sales
individual - Weekly customer call target for the team
yearly totals - Total weekly customer calls for the team
for: sales - Total yearly sales for each team member
targets and
actual sales
- Weekly
target and
actual
customer calls
for each team
member
- Focus areas
Retail 4 - Two largest - Total weekly customer calls for - Total yearly - Individual yearly totals for: sales targets and actual
sales in the the team sales for each sales
team - Total yearly sales for each team team member
member
- Total sales plans for each team
J____ _____ _ member
Technology No whiteboard - Individual yearly totals for: sales targets and actual sales
and Media 
Technology No whiteboard
and Media 2 
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Linda, a Desk Sales Manager in one of the Finance teams explained her rationale for
having a whiteboard:
Those who feel embarrassed because they're not at the top [...] quite often come up [to
talk to me] and say 'I'm not doing well here' and then we'll have a discussion about that.
Whiteboards thus allowed Desk Salespeople to use shame and loss of face to enforce
representation work. Desk Salespeople interpreted their position on their team's whiteboards as
connected with their face at work. Roy, a Desk Sales Manager in one of the retail teams, ranked
his Desk Salespeople according to their reported closed sales in Siebel. The rankings were
published using a hierarchy based on characters from the Star Wars movies (see Exhibit 4.5.).
The first week after Roy started using his "Score Wars" hierarchy, Kathryn, a wage-earner on his
team, occupied the bottom position, she was the team's "Ewok." She said that she thought it was
"a bit childish" and that "how embarrassed you are depends on your place [in the hierarchy]."
She spent the rest of the day posting her resume to job-search websites. John and Ted, two Desk
Salespeople on one of the finance teams, dealt differently with a threat to their face resulting
from their Desk Sales Manager's use of their whiteboard. At the beginning of the 2003/2004
financial year, three of John's four accounts and two of Ted's three accounts were transferred to
E-Tel's small business sales unit, two months after the start of the financial year. John's and
Ted's achievement towards their target dropped significantly. John complained "between me and
Ted we lost 60K when some of our accounts were moved to Small Business Sales. If you look at
our team's board, it seems that Ted and I did fuck all but it's not true." He added that, "we asked
Linda [their Desk Sales Manager] to put a note on the whiteboard to say that our figures did not
include the accounts that went to the Small Business Unit [so that] well, because everyone can
see it and so that everyone doesn't think that we've done fuck all!"
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Exhibit 4.5. - Roy's Star Wars sales hierarchy (names blurred for confidentiality).
0LBs
The Scores On the Doors!
1. Darth Vader - The Dark Lord
566.52k
2. Luke Skvalker
516.9k
3. Hans Solo
143.7k
4. The Emperor
131.8k
5. Yoda
125.5k
6. C3P
109.5k
7. R2D2
91.7k
8. Chewbacca
75k
9. Storm Trooper
47k
10. Ewok
14.5k
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The second way in which Desk Sales Managers enforced representation work was by
directly instructing Desk Salespeople to report sales and saleswork in Siebel. In his audio-call of
May 2 nd, Andrew instructed his Desk Salespeople to report sales following Siebel's sales cycle.
Siebel had a model of the stages that a sale had to go through. After going through his Desk
Salespeople's open sales, Andrew then asked if there were any large sales to be closed that week.
Stella said that she would probably have something next week. Michael said that he had his
"80K one," but she was still unsure when she was going to put it on Siebel. Andrew replied,
"don't keep too much off Siebel, our team doesn't loose any open sales and that's not good."
Larry added, "if you look on Siebel, we have a very high conversion rate, that's not a true
picture." Andrew said that "we don't want open sales to be logged in Siebel at 100% probability,
that looks very reactive." Larry retorted, "yes, but we get a lot of orders" and Michael replied,
"well, we can hold them and log them at a lower probability and close them a few days later."
Andrew said that "we need to follow all steps [stages in the sales cycle] because it puts them
[open sales] on the radar early." According to Siebel, sales started as leads, then changed to
opportunities and ended as contracts. "Lead" was the stage at which a salesperson detected a
customer's need. "Opportunity" was the stage at which a salesperson presented the solution to
the customer. "Contract" was the stage at which the customer purchased the offered solution.
Desk Salespeople did not sell, they only reported doing so with the permission of field
salespeople. Because the sales Desk Salespeople logged in Siebel as their won were already
concluded, Desk Salespeople entered them at the "contract" stage. This revealed that Desk
Salespeople were not engaging in sales but in taking orders. Andrew instructed his Desk
Salespeople to follow Siebel's sales cycle to create the representation of selling when in fact they
only reported sales that field salespeople had already closed.
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Thus, when feelings of loss of face and shame did not assure that Desk Salespeople met
their targets for representing sales and representing saleswork, Desk Sales Managers ordered
them to engage in more reporting work.
As the audio-call analysis summarized in the appendix shows, Desk Sales Managers
instructed their Desk Salespeople to follow specific processes when reporting sales and
saleswork for two reasons. One reason for doing so was to ensure that Desk Salespeople reached
their reporting targets. In his audio-call of April, 14th, David, a Desk Sales Manager in one of
the Finance teams, explained to his Desk Salespeople how to break down their targets to make
sure that Desk Salespeople would reach them. David told them that they needed to divide their
yearly target by the number of weeks in the financial year so that they know how much they
should be doing each week. He also told his Desk Salespeople to split their target in two
portions: one worth 70% of their total target and another worth the remaining thirty percent. The
larger portion corresponded to their target for "information technology products" and the other
half to their target for "communication technology products." David concluded this explanation
by saying, "that sounds easy, doesn't it?" He added that they should get 50% of their target in the
first quarter of the financial year, because companies tend to buy less in the fourth quarter. David
admonished his team, "I can't tell you how important this [reaching the targets] is." He said that
Mariah was putting constant pressure on him. David emphasized that the only way out of it is for
them to hit their targets. If targets are hit, then "we won't be managed so intensely."
Another reason to order Desk Salespeople to follow specific procedures when reporting
sales and saleswork was because the very process of using Siebel was a representation of their
Desk Sales Team's activity. As Andrew's comment during his audio-call suggests, reporting
sales in Siebel at the "contract" stage represented their team as an "order taking" unit. If Desk
- 123-
Salespeople reported a sale following all of Siebel's sale stages, then their Desk Sales Team
would appear to engage in "sales making."
Desk Sales Managers also ordered Desk Salespeople to report specific levels of sales and
saleswork. In her audio-call of July 14th, Nina, a Desk Sales Manager in one of the retail teams
emphasized the need for Desk Salespeople to hit their reporting targets. In the call, Nina said that
she wanted to talk about their targets. She told her Desk Salespeople that they needed to report
seven customer calls a day. Nina told them that they also needed to start to report more sales,
"we need to be on double digits every week." She said that she wanted them to have 10 new open
sales records in Siebel each week. Nina added that, "95% percent accuracy on Siebel is not
enough, other teams are getting 100%. We need to raise the bar. That's why you need to be using
those queries that Lee [the team's Deputy Desk Sales Manager] sent you yesterday at least once
a week." She told them that they should keep focusing on "created and owned" wins, so that
would reach their target before the end of the year, "[then] you can forget about it [the target for
reported "created and owned" sales] and get paid for it, and that'll be a great position to be in."
When Desk Sales Teams had failed to meet their reported saleswork targets, Desk Sales
Managers enforced compliance by ordering Desk Salespeople to report saleswork in Siebel
immediately. In his audio-call of September, 9th, Josh, a Desk Sales Manager in one of the
Technology and Media teams, looked up each of his Desk Salespeople's customer calls in Siebel.
When he got the results, he was very disappointed that no-one had reported their minimum level
of customer calls. Scott had only reported 3 for the week when the target was 7 a day. Josh called
Scott and told him that he was very disappointed. Scott asked how many he was supposed to do
and Josh said 35 (Scott was off sick for 2 days). Scott said that he would do the 28 he had left,
Josh said that they had to be dated for yesterday or before, and he had to do it before 10 am. Josh
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complained that when he saw his figures "I nearly cried, I nearly wept when I saw that!" He then
told the rest of the Desk Salespeople on his team, "make sure that you have 35 customer calls
[logged] in Siebel before 10 am [that's when this week's report is run]." Eric, one of the Desk
Salespeople on Josh's team answered, "make up those [customer calls] ladies and gentlemen,
make up those [customer calls]." He added "I'm going to try to beat those 140, I'm hitting the
copy-paste button right now," referring to another Desk Salesperson logging 140 customer calls
in Siebel the previous week.
The analysis of audio-calls observed during Mariah's tenure summarized in the appendix
shows that Desk Sales Managers enforced reporting work, not sales or saleswork. Desk Sales
Managers did not make their Desk Salespeople's sales or saleswork visible to others, only the
representation of those sales and that saleswork. Similarly, Desk Sales Managers did not order
their Desk Salespeople to sell more or to make more calls to customers. Instead, they ordered
them to log more sales or report more calls to customers in Siebel. Desk Sales Managers
enforced Desk Salespeople's representation work, not their work itself.
Reward
Desk Sales Managers used their team's audio-calls to reward their Desk Salespeople.
Desk Sales Managers used two types of rewards. Material and symbolic (Table 4.9. lists material
and symbolic rewards across teams).
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Table 4.9. - Material and symbolic rewards across teams.
Desk Sales Managers offered good quality and high-priced alcoholic beverages to their
Desk Salespeople as an incentive to achieve specific, short-term reporting goals. In his audio-call
of July 7th, Josh, A Desk Sales Manager in one of the Technology and Media teams, announced
an incentive to reward the Desk Salesperson that reported the largest number of open sales in
Siebel during the upcoming month. Josh announced pompously that he will give a bottle of
champagne to the person that reported the most open sales on Siebel, "I want proper [open sales
records] going on there, not a load of bollocks. I want to see them actually converted into [closed
sales]." Scott, one of the Desk Salespeople on the team, asked "what make of champagne?" Jason
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Desk Sales Team Material rewards Symbolic rewards
Finance I - High priced alcoholic beverages to - Praise of individual Desk
reward ad-hoc individual reporting Salespeople's reporting work in the
work team's audio-call
Finance 2 - High priced alcoholic beverages to - Praise of individual Desk
reward ad-hoc individual reporting Salespeople's reporting work in the
work team's audio-call
Retail I - Dinner for the whole team to reward - "Golden Salesman" statuette to
team sales performance reward individual reporting of sales
in Siebel
- "Team cup" award to reward
individual reporting work
- Praise of individual Desk
Salespeople's reporting work in the
team's audio-call
Retail 2 - Drinks for the whole team to reward - Desk Salesperson of the week
team sales performance award (name highlighted on the
team's on the whiteboard)
- Praise of individual Desk
Salespeople's reporting work in the
_________________~~~~~~~~_ ~team's audio-call
Retail 3 - Drinks for the whole team to reward - Praise of individual Desk
team sales performance Salespeople's reporting work in the
__________________~~~~~~~~_ ~team's audio-call
Retail 4 - Dinner for the whole team to reward - "Team cup" award to reward
team sales performance individual reporting work
Technology and Media I - High priced alcoholic beverages to - Naming of Desk Salespeople for
reward ad-hoc individual reporting company-level awards
work - Desk Salesperson of the week
award (name highlighted on the
team's whiteboard)
- Praise of individual Desk
Salespeople's reporting work in the
team's audio-call
Technology and Media 2 No material rewards - Praise of individual Desk
Salespeople's reporting work in the
team's audio-call
replied "Bollinger." Josh added that "this incentive is just a launch pad. I want this to go along,
it's part and parcel of the role, really."
Desk Sales Managers also used symbolic rewards - plastic Oscar figurines, paper ribbons
and tin cups - to reward reporting sales and saleswork. These rewards were not aimed at
fostering an increase in sales and saleswork. Instead, these rewards aimed at recognizing Desk
Salespeople's achievement towards their reported sales and reported saleswork targets. Andrew
had his "Golden Salesman" award for the Desk Salesperson whose sales totaled the highest
revenue each week. At the start of his audio-call on August 15th, Ferdinand, a Desk Sales
Manager in one of the Retail teams announced that it was time to award "the trophy," "Oscar is
not the best performer anymore, although he might be," Ferdinand proclaimed. He said that "this
week the trophy is going to someone that has been exhibiting the right behaviors, it's Casey!"
Casey raised his arms in sign of victory and the team applauded. Ferdinand handed him the
trophy while saying, "we got some feedback on your sales plans that you actually took them
seriously, while a lot of the others were taking the piss. Also you had a great turnaround in your
[reported sales] in the past two weeks." Mild applause followed. Ferdinand said that it was time
to take the picture and Casey moved next to the window and Ferdinand used a Polaroid camera
to take a picture of him with the trophy" . Casey then put the picture and the tin trophy on top of
his desk.
Desk Sales Managers also used formal E-Tel incentives to reward their own team. In her
audio-call of July 1 th, Linda, a Desk Sales Manager in one of the Retail teams, used her
prerogative to nominate two Desk Sales People in her team to E-Tel's "Beyond the Call of
Duty." Linda announced that she had nominated Ruth and Chris for the award, which aimed to
recognize outstanding contributions to E-Tel and outstanding customer service. She said that she
1 This camera produces a printed picture a few minutes after the picture is taken.
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had nominated two people on the team but that there were only going to be two winners in the
whole of DeskSales and that she was sure that all the other teams were also nominating people.
Linda said that there would be an award ceremony on August 27th and that the award would be
presented by E-Tel's CEO. She said that she was actually going to announce the people she was
nominating because "it will be a flavor of what I see as model behaviors." Linda read from her
nominations saying that she nominated Ruth because "Ruth is completely focused on her
targets." She announced that she also nominated Chris because, "he has achieved his yearly
targets on the first quarter."
In his audio-call of July 24th, Daniel, a Desk Sales Manager in one of the Technology
and Media team used a bottle of champagne he earned at a sector event the previous day to
reward Andy, one of his team's top Desk Salespeople. He said that "Christian [the Technology
and Media Top Manager] loves us," and that "Christian has completely bought into this model
[using Desk Salespeople]" because he was "very pleased" with the work they were doing. Daniel
pulled out a bottle of champagne and said that "I was dragged on stage and Christian gave me
this bottle of champagne and there was a lot of applause." He added, "you're the ones doing the
hard work, so I want to give this bottle of champagne to you." He said that he realized that he
couldn't share the bottle of champagne with everyone, so he was going to give it to the person
with whom senior management was most impressed, Kevin. Everyone applauded and Daniel
handed the bottle of champagne to Kevin.
Desk Sales Managers rewards thus followed their monitoring and enforcing practices.
Desk Sales Managers' rewards focused on Desk Salespeople's representation work, no their
actual sales or saleswork. Material and symbolic rewards recognized the use of Siebel to report
sales and saleswork, not sales and saleswork themselves.
- 128-
Advise
Desk Sales Managers could enforce and reward their Desk Salespeople's representation
work but still see their team lagging behind its reported sales and reported saleswork targets.
Desk Salespeople could have the motivation to report sales and saleswork but not the skills to
sell, the permission to log as their own the sales made by their field salespeople, or the
opportunity to call their customers. To address this, Desk Sales Managers advised their Desk
Salespeople to on how to reach their sales and saleswork targets. The analysis of audio-calls
summarized in the appendix shows that Desk Sales Managers advised their Desk Salespeople in
three ways. First, Desk Sales Managers helped Desk Salespeople reach their revenue targets by
telling them how to use E-Tel's information systems to find revenue. In her audio-call on March,
4th, Nina, a Desk Sales Manager in one of the Retail teams, explained how to use one of E-Tel's
information systems to find revenue that Desk Salespeople could claim as their own. She
explained to her Desk Salespeople that "in E-Tel you'll soon find that things aren't like they
should be: sometimes [some of the product revenue from your accounts] is not visible on ARTS
[E-Tel's automatic revenue tracking system]." Nina added that "If I spend the whole day
[selling] to [one of my accounts] and they're not in the system, I would be wasting all my time
because I wouldn't see the revenue." She continued: "sometimes you get products allocated to
your account on ARTS that the [customer hasn't bought] and they [bring revenue]: those ones
you want to keep, so keep quiet." Nina explained: "basically, the more you look, the more you'll
find and it's a way to get revenue without having to sell anything. Of course, you will eventually
have to sell something, but it's a good way to hit numbers."
Second, Desk Sales Managers also helped their Desk Salespeople meet their targets for
reported sales by giving them specific advice on how to establish relationships with their field
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sales teams. In her audio-call of February, 19th, Nina used a question made by Dennis, a Desk
Salesperson on her team, to explain to her Desk Salespeople how to get field sales people to
allow them to log sales in Siebel. Towards the end of the team's audio-call Dennis raised his
hand and Nina gave him leave to speak. Dennis said that there were a lot of large open sales for
his accounts in Siebel and asked Nina how he could get some of the credit for those sales. Nina
told the story of how Robert, another Desk Salesman on her team, got involved in an 8.6 million
dollar opportunity that was about putting E-Tel Broadband access CDs in a retailer's stores. Nina
explained how Robert's involvement was limited to calling the stores to make sure that they got
the disks. Nina said that "even making a quote [giving the price of a product] is involvement."
She concluded: "what I would do is ask the account team if there's something I can do to help."
Josh created a report of all the open sales worth 75,000 dollars or less in revenue that
field sales people had reported in Siebel. He sent that report via email to his Desk Salespeople
prior to his audio-call of September, 4th. When his audio-call started, Josh said that he sent a
spreadsheet with all opportunities on Siebel under 75,000 dollars in revenue, "so it can help you
focus on some quick wins." He then asked how field sales people reacted when Desk
Salespeople "ask[ed] them to get involved in deals [i.e., report closed sales in Siebel as the result
of their individual saleswork]." Martin said that he had had some trouble with his field
salesperson who was afraid that if it was Martin putting everything on Siebel, his own boss
would asking "how come your Desk Salesperson is doing all these deals and you're not, where's
your contribution?!" Josh explained that his point of view was not correct, "the point is that field
salespeople should not deal with sales lower than 75,000." He added that "they should be doing
the higher complexity stuff and we should do the 'donkey work', which we are excellent at
doing." Referring to the sales on the spreadsheet he had just sent, Josh said "the hard work has
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been done - we only need to convince field sales people that we're better at doing the rest of the
work ourselves." He added that "it's also important to convey the message that they won't be
penalized if they pass this stuff to us because they're paid by the total account revenue."
Thirdly, Desk Sales Managers advised their Desk Salespeople on how to log sales and
saleswork in a way that helped Desk Salespeople reach their targets consistently. Andrew told
his Desk Salespeople to refrain from reporting sales in Siebel after they had reached their
quarterly targets. He advised his Desk Salespeople to report those sales in the following quarter
to make their targets easier to reach. In his January 15th audio-call, Ferdinand advised his Desk
Salespeople on how to go about reporting customer calls in Siebel. Ferdinand told them to report
"any contact with customer" in Siebel. Laura, one of the Desk Salespeople on his team, asked if
the "emails that you get" count. Ferdinand said that they did, but "try to keep it relevant," "I don't
want Siebel clogged" with irrelevant information. "You would want to add on a call from a
customer clarifying what that quote was." He was quick to add: "Don't make your numbers
plummet because of that." Don concluded "it's the [target] thing" and Ferdinand nodded in
agreement. Don said that the point is to "hit 10 and then worry about relevance after [they hit
1[ 0]." Ferdinand said that to reach targets the boundaries can be "stretched" but then they should
"retract."
Desk Sales Managers' actual advice sharpens the case that they were focusing on
reporting work. Desk Sales Managers might need to monitor, enforce and reward representation
work because Desk Salespeople were engaging in sales and saleswork without reporting it in
Siebel. Desk Sales Manager's advice, however, focuses on how to scavenge unclaimed sales and
how to persuade field salespeople to allow Desk Salespeople to take credit for field salespeople's
sales. The tactics that Desk Sales Managers taught to their Desk Salespeople in their team's
- 131 -
audio-calls helped Desk Salespeople hit their reporting targets without actually engaging in any
of the work they reported.
Interpret
A final set of practices encouraging representation work consisted of interpreting orders
and policies. Desk Sales Managers used their team's audio-call to announce, explain and
interpret their General Manager's orders and policies. When she first took on the Desk Sales
Manager role, Nina gave her Desk Salespeople her own interpretation of their role and their
targets. She started by saying that "we have easy targets." She continued "the more money you
make, the more money I make," adding "that's what we're here for at the end of the day." Nina
said that saleswork numbers were good and "showing a positive trend." She emphasized that
they needed to continue to meet these targets. "I don't care how you do it." Nina thus portrayed
the relationship between Desk Salespeople and their role as transactive. She also disclosed her
own ethics as goal-centered and unconcerned about Desk Salespeople's choice of means. Nina
gave her Desk Salespeople the mandate to reach their sales targets by whatever path they were
comfortable with.
Desk Salespeople interpret some of their General Manager's decisions as illegitimate,
without any grounds other than their General Manager's whims. On such occasions Desk Sales
Managers used their audio-calls to attempt to shape their Desk Salespeople's interpretation of
their General Manager's actions. The way Linda, a Desk Sales Manager in one of the Finance
teams, announced the implementation of a Siebel-based call monitoring system to her team
highlights the challenges in shaping Desk Salespeople's interpretation of their General
Manager's decisions. After announcing a visit from an E-Tel senior manager, Linda announced
that "we're trialing Contact Central starting in October, which will record everything for you."
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She added, "it saves you all that crap you have to do of recording inbound calls and outbound
calls, it'll do all that admin work for you." Linda said that for it to work, Desk Salespeople
needed to start using their 800 numbers instead of their direct dialing numbers. Sherry replied,
referring to Contact Central, "that's a call center thing isn't it?" Linda retorted, "it depends how
you use it, it's the same applications you use now but they're all on a central box" - "it eliminates
all that bureaucracy." Roberta said, "our [customer calls] numbers will go through the roof with
this because everything will be logged. Jerome agreed, "that's why [another team who had been
trying Contact Central for a while] is always on top [of saleswork stats]." Linda also told them
that, "it's a trial, so we can tailor it to how we want to use it." Sherry said that "the culture is
turning into a call center kind of culture, with the headset on all the time." Patrick replied, "you
don't need to have your headset all the time, you can log off, as you can do with your own
phone." He added, "It will just make it more efficient, you have everything together." Sherry
asked about how much the other team was liking it. Linda said that they were not using that
much because they did not have 800 numbers so the automatic records for customer calls did not
pop up. The main feature of Contact Central was not that useful. She added, "it is a trial, so your
feedback is essential, so you don't have to do all this double accounting and all that."
Desk Sales Managers did more than just attempt to shape Desk Salespeople's
interpretations of specific events in their experience at DeskSales. Desk Sales Managers also
used audio-calls to attempt to shape Desk Salespeople's interpretations of the durie of their
experience at DeskSales. In his December 12th audio-call, Ferdinand, a Desk Sales Manager in
one of the Retail teams, interpreted the performance measurement systems that Mariah put in
place. He said that the daily target achievement information was for their own orientation. He
warned that the weekly information on target achievement went to E-Tel's senior managers and
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there was a weekly call where each of the Desk Sales Managers had to explain why they did not
reach their targets. Ferdinand said that sales and saleswork numbers were fed back to senior
managers. He also stressed that not only were poor performers mentioned, but also are over-
achievers. He said that "Siebel measures the way we do business and how successful we are" and
that the records were "completely transparent," and that was one of its major advantages.
Ferdinand concluded that "everything we do is highly visible, it's fully on the radar."
Audio-calls allowed Desk Sales Managers to attempt to shape Desk Salespeople's
interpretations of their role and of their experience at DeskSales. Audio-calls were the stage for
announcing Mariah's policies and orders. When making these announcements, Desk Sales
Managers had the opportunity to observe Desk Salespeople's reactions and the opportunity to
shape these reactions to match their own interests and goals.
DISCUSSION
This chapter started with a simple but important question: when faced with both a strong
bureaucratic push and a strong improvisational pull, to which pressure do first-line managers
yield? Desk Sales Managers' experience of the first-line manager's dilemma and the tactics they
used to address it are summarized in table 4.10.
The way Desk Sales Managers addressed their experience of the first-line manager's
dilemma shows how information technology can be used to address these opposing forces by
creating a fagade of compliance with the bureaucratic push, reducing the improvisational pull to
employees' ability and willingness to participate in the production and reproduction of that
fagade.
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Table
DeskSales 12
4.10. - Experiencing and coping with the first-line manager's dilemma at
The literature on bureaucracy has documented two patterns of first-line managers'
response to the dilemma created by the bureaucratic push and the improvisational pull -
adaptation and imposition (cf. Adler & Borys, 1996). When enacting the adaptation pattern (e.g.,
Blau, 1955), first line managers attempt to adapt prescribed roles, rules and procedures to the
contingencies of their employees' everyday work. When enacting the imposition pattern (see
GCouldner, 1954, chapter 11) first-line managers attempt to have their employees comply with
12 For brevity, this table uses DSPs to abbreviate Desk Salespeople and FSPs to abbreviate field salespeople.
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Carmen's leadership Mariah's leadership
- "Stretch" sales target - "Stretch" sales target
- Bonus and ad-hoc incentives only . public commitment to "stretch"
rewarded very large sales sales target
. 2/3 of time to achieve sales target
+ - Multiple sales and saleswork targets
Bureaucratic - Siebel-based criteria for achieving
push sales and saleswork targets
- Competing with field salespeople for
credit in sales
- Computer-mediated supervision of - Siebel-mediated supervision of sales
saleswork and saleswork
- Narrative-based supervision of sales
- Lack of sales skill and sales training - Less DSPs with sales background
+ - No relationships with customers - Poorer sales training
- Visible effect of different
Improvisational_______motivational profilesImprovisational_.provsaioa - - DSPs used Siebel to represent - Some DSPs used Siebel to represent
pu involvement in sales sales and saleswork
- DSPs did menial work for FSPs in - Some DSPs were able to do menial
return for involvement in sales work for FSPs in return for
involvement in sales
- Create narratives of DSPs' - Monitor, enforce and reward the
involvement in sales representation of sales and saleswork
- Reward DSPS fro reporting in Siebel
. tactis involvement in large sales - Advise DSPs on how to create
Coping tactics with symbolic rewards representations of successful sales and
. with verbal recognition saleswork in Siebel without engaging
- Fake and help DSPs fake saleswork in either
prescribed roles, rules, procedures and goals, irrespectively of the contingencies that employees
face in their everyday work.
The literature on IT and organizations argues that the added visibility that computer-
mediated supervision allows, forecloses the possibility of enacting the adaptation pattern (cf.
Ball, 2003; Coombs et al., 1992; Sewell, 1998). Upper-level managers' use of information
technology to supervise the work of their first-line managers and their employees makes any
deviation from prescribed roles, rules, procedures and goals visible to upper-level managers.
This visibility allows upper-level managers to discipline such deviations into compliance. Desk
Sales Managers' tactics to deal with the first-line manager's dilemma at DeskSales suggests that
there is another possible response to the first-line manager's dilemma in contexts of computer-
based supervision -- the fagade-creation pattern. This pattern consists of creating using
information technology to create a representation of compliance with the bureaucratic push while
circumscribing the improvisational pull to employees' will and skill to create that representation
of compliance. If Desk Sales Managers had followed an imposition pattern, they would have
enforced sales and saleswork and train their Desk Salespeople to become increasingly proficient
at both types of tasks.
Desk Sales Managers drew on a quite different set of tactics. They interpreted the
bureaucratic push enforced by their General Manager as a push for a formal representation of
sales and saleswork, rather than as a push for sales and saleswork. The way upper-level
managers used information technology (especially Siebel) supported this interpretation.
DeskSales' General Manager and upper level managers at E-Tel used the formal representation
of Desk Salespeople's work in Siebel to monitor and supervise Desk Sales Teams' performance.
During Carmen's tenure as DeskSales General Manager, Desk Salespeople were supervised
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through Desk Sales Management's account of Desk Salespeople's involvement in sales reported
in Siebel. Desk Salespeople's saleswork was supervised by measuring and monitoring a set of
phone-usage statistics reported by a software package implemented for that purpose. During
Mariah's tenure as DeskSales General Manager, saleswork was supervised through Desk
Salespeople's reporting of calls to customers in Siebel. Sales were supervised by Desk
Salespeople's use of Siebel to report selling directly to customers, finding sales opportunities and
close sales opportunities initiated by field salespeople. DeskSales' General Manager and upper-
level managers at E-Tel supervised representation of work, not work itself. The specific
representation used at DeskSales had two important features. The first was that each of these
representations allowed Desk Sales Managers and Desk Salespeople to cerate a representation of
sales and saleswork without having to carry out either set of tasks. During Carmen's tenure,
Desk Salespeople could call service units, their customers, friends, family or each other to reach
their saleswork targets. Carmen only supervised how much time each Desk Salesperson had
spent on the phone and how many calls each had made. She cared not to whom those calls were
made. Carmen also required nothing but Desk Salespeople's name in Siebel sales records and a
plausible account of Desk Salespeople's involvement in a sale to credit it towards their sales
target. This allowed Desk Salespeople to hit their sales targets by taking on field salespeople's
menial tasks and their customer service work without making a single sale. During Mariah's
tenure, Desk Salespeople did not even have to reach for their phone to reach their saleswork
targets. They had only to use Siebel report that they had called their customers. Desk Salespeople
reached their saleswork targets by pressing the "copy-paste" keyboard shortcut in their
computers, not by pressing the digits in their phone keypads. Mariah had stricter criteria to
accept Desk Salespeople's representation of their ownership of, or their involvement in sales.
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This, however, only meant that Desk Salespeople had to take on more of their field salespeople's
menial tasks, more of their customer service work, and be more adept at scavenging E-Tel's
information systems for customer orders that Desk Salespeople could represent as their own
sales.
The locus of creation of these representations also contributed to Desk Sales Managers
having the opportunity to interpret the bureaucratic push as a pressure to represent compliance,
instead of interpreting as a push to comply with prescribed roles, rules and procedures. Siebel -
by the very nature of sales and saleswork - is a self-reporting information system. Siebel could
not automatically track Desk Salespeople's involvement in sales. It relied on Desk Salespeople's
reporting sales under the surveillance of Desk Sales Managers and field sales people. The
assumption was that Desk Sales Managers were close enough to Desk Salespeople to be aware of
their actual involvement in sales. Field salespeople were close enough and had enough of a stake
in their accounts to ensure that Desk Salespeople would not claim credit for sales that they did
not make, even with the connivance of their Desk Sales Managers.
Desk Sales Managers had financial, career and identity-related reasons to allow their
I)esk Salespeople to report ownership and involvement in sales when they in fact did not. Desk
Sales Managers' bonus was contingent on every Desk Salesperson on their Desk Sales Team
reaching their sales target. Desk Sales Managers that headed Desk Sales Teams with higher
levels of performance were invited to E-Tel's headquarters. Their teams' sales performance
afforded them an occasion to exercise influence with managers in the company's upper echelons
- managers that could do much for Desk Sales Managers' careers at E-Tel. There was also pride
to be had from leading DeskSales' top Desk Sales Team and shame in leading those Desk
Salespeople that lagged behind. It was to Desk Sales Managers' advantage that Desk Salespeople
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used Siebel to report ownership of, or involvement in sales for which they had done little, if any
work.
Field salespeople had sales targets of 20 million dollars and above. Desk Salespeople's
sales targets of 350,000 dollars were little more than 1% of this figure. Field salespeople had thus
very little to lose for allowing Desk Salespeople to take credit for the part of field salespeople's
sales that Desk Salespeople needed to reach their sales targets. Moreover, field salespeople had
much to gain for doing so. In return for being allowed to take credit for field salespeople's sales,
Desk Salespeople took on a number of field salespeople's menial tasks, including keeping Siebel
sales' records updated and doing the bulk of field salespeople's customer service. Desk
Salespeople were thus not only allowed but encouraged to use Siebel to report ownership and
involvement in sales for which they did little or no work. Also, under Mariah's tenure, Desk
Sales Managers had the responsibility of preparing reports on their Desk Sales Team's progress
in reaching their sales and saleswork targets. This turned reporting into an occasion for
compliance. As Josh's audio-call shows, when preparing their weekly reports, Desk Sales
Managers had their Desk Salespeople log the number of customer calls they needed to reach
their weekly saleswork target. At DeskSales, Desk Sales Managers were evaluated based on the
reports they themselves prepared. Desk Sales Managers thus had the opportunity to focus on
using Siebel to represent compliance with bureaucratic rules, roles and processes instead of
enforcing these on their Desk Salespeople.
Opportunity and motive explain why Desk Sales Managers addressed their experience of
the bureaucratic push as by interpreting as a pressure to represent compliance with prescribed
rules, roles and processes without extending these to their Desk Salespeople. We still need an
explanation of how Desk Sales Managers were able to create and maintain this representation.
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The two different experiences of the first-line manager's dilemma created by the two General
Managers that headed DeskSales generated two different sets of tactics to use information
technology to create a representation of compliance with prescribed rules, roles and processes.
Carmen offered a weak experience of the first-line manager's dilemma. Her sales targets
were demanding but easy to achieve because she only required a plausible account of Desk
Salespeople's involvement in a sale as proof of their contribution to that sale. Desk Salespeople
were motivated to achieve those targets because of Carmen's "who wants to be a millionaire"
incentive. Desk Salespeople were able to reach their sales targets because of their trading
arrangements with field salespeople. Saleswork targets were demanding but not enforced and
thus Desk Salespeople's consistent failure in reaching them was of no practical consequence.
Desk Sales Managers drew on two types of tactics during Carmen's tenure. First they
legitimized their Desk Salespeople's representations of sales in Siebel. Desk Sales Managers
,created narratives of their Desk Salespeople's involvement in large sales. Those narratives gave
credence to the representation of that involvement in Siebel. This tactic is, to an extent, the
opposite of what would be expected from first-line managers helping their employees to deviate
from their prescribed rules, roles and processes. On such occasions, first-line managers' role is
typically to hide their employees' actions from the scrutiny of upper-level managers. At
DeskSales, under Carmen's leadership, Desk Sales Managers role was different. They narrated
deviations as compliance with bureaucratic rules, roles and processes.
Second, Desk Sales Managers helped their Desk Salespeople with representing
compliance with saleswork targets without engaging in saleswork. Contrary to much of the
literature on workplace deviance, at Desk Sales, Desk Sales Managers not only tolerated deviant
behavior but also encouraged and enforced it. Under Carmen's tenure, none of the documented
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practices of first-line managers' behavior were visible at DeskSales. First-line managers were
seldom in the unit. They did not supervise or enforce sales, saleswork or their representation.
Instead they participated in the creation of a thin facade of compliance. That allowed their Desk
Salespeople to earn Carmen's ad-hoc rewards without engaging in the sales or saleswork that
incentives and bonuses were intended to motivate.
Mariah's policies and decisions created a stronger version of the first-line manager's
dilemma. Mariah's targets were difficult to achieve and had to be reached in a shorter amount of
time. Desk Salespeople no longer had a single broad sales target, but two different targets for
"created and owned" and "involved" sales measured by Siebel-level criteria. Siebel was also
used to measure Desk Salespeople's saleswork performance. This increased bureaucratic push
affected the improvisational pull directly. Desk Salespeople had to exert more effort to reach
their sales and saleswork targets. Desk Salespeople varied on the motivation to exert such an
effort. Moreover, Mariah's measurement for ownership and involvement in sales created a
conflict between field salespeople's and Desk Salespeople's interests, reducing Desk
Salespeople's ability to draw on trading arrangements with field salespeople to reach their sales
targets.
Under Mariah's leadership, Desk Sales Managers took on some of the supervisory
practices that are documented in the literature on information technology and organizations. A
closer inspection of Desk Sales Managers' practices reveals important distinctions. Much like
first-line managers in other studies on the use of information technology to supervise work (e.g.,
Orlikowski, 1991), Desk Sales Managers monitored their Desk Salespeople's work and enforced
sales and saleswork targets. However, instead of monitoring Desk Salespeople's sales and
saleswork, Desk Sales Managers monitored Desk Salespeople's use of Siebel to represent sales
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and saleswork. Instead of enforcing saleswork and sales, Desk Sales Managers enforced the use
of Siebel to represent work in both areas, even if that meant telling their Desk Salespeople to
report sales and saleswork that they had not engaged in.
Mariah's bonus and incentives rewarded the use of Siebel to represent sales and
saleswork, but both bonus and incentives were only paid quarterly, were difficult to understand
and were often miscalculated. Desk Sales Managers improvised a set of rewards to have a more
direct effect on their Desk Salespeople's reporting work. When the ability to report sales and
saleswork targets was at stake, Desk Sales Managers advised their Desk Salespeople on how to
find revenue to report as the outcome of their own saleswork, instead of helping them improve
their ability to sell and their ability to talk to their customers.
During Mariah's tenure, Desk Sales Managers thus created a parallel set of prescribed
roles, rules, procedures and rewards that allowed them to manage their Desk Salespeople's
representation work. Desk Sales Managers did not manage the customer service and field
salespeople service tasks that constituted their Desk Salespeople's everyday work.
Desk Sales Managers' practices suggest that first-line managers can address their
experience of the first-line manager's dilemma in two ways. One is the adaptation or
"substantive" pattern described in existing studies of information technology and organizations.
In this pattern, first-line managers interpret their role as enforcing their unit's formal goals and
its formal roles, rules and procedures. They attempt to impose the bureaucratic push on their
employees to avoid the sanctions resulting from the immediate visibility of any deviant action to
upper-level managers.
The other is the facade-creation or "representational" pattern described in this study. At
DeskSales first-line managers interpreted their role as that of creating a representation of
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compliance with their team's sales and saleswork targets. Desk Sales Managers also ignored any
elements of the improvisational pull that did not directly shape their Desk Salespeople's
representation work. Desk Sales Managers only monitored, enforced and rewarded their Desk
Salespeople's representation work. When Desk Salespeople lagged behind their targets, Desk
Sales Managers did not help them increase their proficiency in sales or saleswork. Instead, Desk
Sales Managers helped Desk Salespeople find ways of reporting more sales and saleswork in
Siebel without having to engage in either type of task. In a nutshell, in the "representation"
pattern, first-line managers enact the disconnect between work and its formal representation in
prescribed information systems by focusing their efforts in managing the representation of
compliance with prescribed roles, rules, procedures and goals, instead of managing their
employees compliance with those prescribed elements of their organization.
CONCLUSION
The first-line manager's dilemma is a common theme in both empirical and theoretical
accounts of bureaucracy. These accounts show that first-line managers can address this dilemma
by enacting tactics that can range from an imposition pattern - thus yielding to the bureaucratic
push - to an adaptation pattern, yielding to the improvisational pull. The literature on IT and
organizations has argued that in context of computer-mediated supervision only an imposition
pattern is sustainable.
Desk Sales Managers' experience shows that in contexts of computer-mediated
supervision there is still plenty of room to yield, even if only partially, to the improvisational
pull. The way E-Tel's upper-level managers used Siebel to supervise Desk Salespeople's work
suggests that the assumption of tight coupling between employees' action and its representation
in formal information systems is not empirically universal. The disconnect between Desk
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Salespeople's work and its representation in Siebel allowed Desk Sales Managers to interpret the
bureaucratic push as a push to create a representation of compliance. Desk Sales Managers
limited their imposition of prescribed roles, rules, procedures and goal on their Desk Salespeople
to the creation of a representation of compliance with DeskSales prescribed goals. Desk Sales
Managers interpreted the first-line manager's dilemma at DeskSales as a problem of managing
their employees' representation work, instead of their sales and saleswork. To this end, Desk
Sales Managers created a parallel set of prescribed rules, roles and processes to manage their
Desk Salespeople's representation work.
Desk Sales Managers' experience with the first-line manager's dilemma underscores the
need to take research on information technology and organizations one strep back. The facade-
creation pattern at DeskSales is but one of the possible sets of practices with information
technology that can be enacted by first-line managers. It is but a first step towards a theory of the
use of information technology in relationships of authority. It is, however, an important first step.
Desk Sales Managers' facade-creation tactics show how first-line managers can use the very
resources that their own upper-level managers put at their disposal with the purpose of quenching
employee deviance, to engage in deviant behavior themselves. First-line managers are able to
successfully reach their targets and be rewarded and promoted for doing so by managing their
employees' representation work while ignoring the tasks that constitute the bulk of their
everyday work.
What are the consequences of the facade-creation pattern for this everyday work? How
do employees accomplish their everyday work without being helped and coordinated by their
managers or by formal processes, rules and roles? The next two chapters address the temporal
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coordination challenges and the unprescribed cooperation challenges that this pattern created for
Desk Salespeople's everyday service work.
- 145 -
CHAPTER 5:
SHOUTING CUSTOMERS. TO-DO PILES AND THE SELF-COORDINATION OF
UNPRESCRIBED WORK
INTRODUCTION
Desk Sales Managers' tactics to address the tension between the push to enforce sales and
saleswork targets and the pull to adapt to their Desk Salespeople's low skill and will to sell had
consequences for Desk Salespeople. Desk Sales Managers addressed this tension by enforcing
representation work on Desk Salespeople. Desk Salespeople had to engage in a considerable
amount of service work to be able to create the representation of compliance with sales and
saleswork targets that their Desk Sales Managers enforced. This service work included a large
amount of low complexity tasks and a smaller set of complex service issues. This mix of service
work created three self-coordination challenges for Desk Salespeople: remembering their
outstanding service tasks, remembering the information needed to complete each of these tasks,
and prioritizing among them. This chapter explains how Desk Salespeople were able to address
each of these three challenges without the prescribed organizational elements that are designed
for these three purposes: the authority relationship, prescribed work procedures and a prescribed
information system.
Desk Sales Managers instructed Desk Salespeople to use Siebel to create a representation
of compliance with sales and saleswork targets. Desk Sales Managers rewarded Desk
Salespeople who created this representation and punished those that failed to do so. Complying
with saleswork targets posed no major difficulty for Desk Salespeople. It was just a matter of
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putting the effort to use Siebel to report seven calls to customers a day. Using Siebel to create a
representation of compliance with sales targets was much more challenging. Desk Salespeople
needed field salespeople's permission to report some of field salespeople's sales as their own.
Alternatively, Desk Salespeople could get customers to place orders to them instead of placing
them to service units. Desk Salespeople could then report these orders in Siebel as their own
sales - contracts the customer signed because of Desk Salespeople's efforts instead of
customers' decision to renew services or upgrade equipment. Both of these sources of sales for
Desk Salespeople to report as their own required Desk Salespeople to engage in service work.
Field salespeople routinely received service requests from customers. Field salespeople passed
these service issues to E-Tel's service units, but customers called field salespeople, not service
representatives, to be updated on their service issues. Early in their relationship with field
salespeople, Desk Salespeople offered to take over the management of customers' service issues.
Desk Salespeople's motivation to make this effort was twofold. First, as I explained in the
account of Desk Sales Managers experience of the first-line manager's dilemma, Desk
Salespeople traded the effort needed to manage customers' service issues for field salespeople's
permission to report some of field salespeople's sales as their own. Desk Salespeople's target of
$350,000 in sales was less than one percent of field salespeople's sales target - a small price to
pay to be rid of customers' calls asking for updates on their service issues. Second, Desk
Salespeople also offered to take on field salespeople's service work because this increased their
opportunities to be the person their customers called to place orders - the same rationale behind
Desk Salespeople's attempt to get their customers to call them directly for service issues. These
tactics to obtain visibility of sales and orders and to earn the permission to report these as their
own sales kept Desk Salespeople supplied with a constant stock of outstanding service issues.
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DESK SALESPEOPLE'S SERVICE WORK
Desk Salespeople's service tasks could be classified in four types, depending on the
task's complexity and its duration. Low-complexity/short-duration tasks were isolated service
issues. These issues were often urgent but did not present any particular difficulty for Desk
Salespeople. Low-complexity/long-duration service tasks were often part of a large back of
service work which also presented little if any difficulty for Desk Salespeople. High-
complexity/short-duration tasks were serious equipment or service faults, or urgent information
requests. Finally, High-complexity/long-duration tasks were large scale changes to customers'
information and communication infrastructure, requiring Desk Salespeople to step in a role akin
to that of a project manager. Tasks with different durations and levels of complexity created
different self-coordination challenges.
Desk Salespeople attempted to find a niche for themselves in their account teams by
engaging in a low complexity and long duration task which allowed them to have frequent
contact with their customers and find a continuous stream of small orders that they could log on
Siebel as the outcome of their own saleswork. At the time of my research, E-Tel was launching a
DSL internet service and field salespeople had been able to sell this service to a number of their
accounts under the guise of a work-from-home benefit to middle managers. The implementation
of a DSL connection required contacting each customer's middle manager individually, setting
uLip an installation appointment time and following up to check that the installation had proceeded
without problems. Desk Salespeople took over these tasks because they could claim the revenue
on their own and because they were able to interact frequently with their customers' managerial
ranks. One morning, as I joined Mark, one of the older Desk Salespeople in the unit, at his desk
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he had a spreadsheet with a list of people who had been designated to receive DSL by one of
Mark's customers decided to buy DSL. As with all such lists that I had seen at DeskSales, this
one was color coded, but only cells in the 'name' and the 'installation date' columns were
colored. Most were green, which meant that the installation had been done, but others were red
and yellow. Mark explained that in his case, "I am managing DSL from the desk." Mark told me
that the reason for that is "I need to see what's going on in the account," and it also "provides me
an opportunity to speak with very senior management, people to whom I wouldn't have access in
many circumstances." He continued, "they can mention my name within the company and people
will know who I am."
Although tasks such as managing a DSL rollout were simple, their extended duration and
their multi-stage nature created self-coordination challenges. Desk Salespeople needed to keep
track of the progress of such tasks through time and keep a record of the customer information
needed to complete these tasks. The long duration of these tasks required Desk Salespeople to
devise a set of rules to prioritize the rest of their service work around them to be sure that
customers did not experience delays in service.
Most Desk Salespeople tasks, however, were of short duration and low complexity.
These tasks included processing small orders, passing fault reports to service units and finding
how much progress service units had made in addressing customer problems.
Desk Salespeople did not have much to gain by engaging in these simple, short term
tasks. The orders they took from customers were generally low in value and thus had little, if any
impact on their revenue targets. Faults, problems and update requests were received via email
and thus afforded little opportunity of contact with customers. Nonetheless, Desk Salespeople
could loose much if they did not engage in these simple, short term tasks. Occasionally, these
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tasks involved senior managers at Desk Salespeople's customers whose dissatisfaction with a
DSL installation or a phone installation could jeopardize their willingness to favor E-Tel over its
competitors in large deals. For this very reason, Desk Salespeople treated these simple, sort-term
tasks very seriously although they found this type of service work to be somewhat menial.
Lena, a young Desk Saleswoman, faced such a situation while she was assigned to one of
DeskSales larger accounts. She received an email from her field salesperson saying that the
mother of a senior executive at their customer was changing phone numbers and that the
executive's mother wanted her old number to answer with a message giving her new number.
Lena called her service center and, after a long wait, she was told the price and the requirements
for this option. Lena jotted this information on her notepad. The service representative told Lena
that she had to call the residential customers' service center to find all the required information
on the executive's mother old and new phone numbers for which she needed to order the number
change messaging service. She wrote all this information on an email to her field salesperson
and, after sending it, said that "our job, really, is to keep customers happy, especially at the top
level so that when they want to do large purchases they come to [E-Tel] and so that the [field]
salespeople can go in and deal with the big sales." She concluded, "we [Desk Salespeople] are
not here to dig big sales, that's the [field] salesperson's role, I don't even try because I'd just
look silly."
Desk Salespeople's challenge in coordinating these tasks across time was not related to
each individual task. Instead the challenge lay in the volume of such tasks that Desk Salespeople
received daily. When asked how he decided what to do each day, a Desk Salesman explained:
It's as things come in, it's an ongoing thing, [... but] it's too much, I can't deal with
everything at once. Will I ever finish one thing?
Another Desk Salesman reported:
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I should plan, but I never have. [...] Normally I'm driven by email. If I want to do
something, I'll leave the email in the inbox. I don't really [know what to do first]. It's just, I'd
rather do that and then I'll be doing it, and 'shit, I forgot to do that.' It's quite the panic but it's
organized chaos.
This uneven, non-stopping flow of simple short-term tasks created a perpetual backlog of
this type of service work. Desk Salespeople needed a way to keep track of all these simple, short
term tasks that they had to do, keep a record of those that were completed and find a way of
assigning a priority to each of these tasks.
Occasionally, customers or field salespeople sent Desk Salespeople complex problems
and requests that had to be addressed in a short amount of time. This type of problem or
request typically included pricing complex sets of products and services, and dealing with
serious equipment and service faults.
Desk Salespeople had much to gain by addressing these problems and requests.
Successfully dealing with a customer's problem allowed Desk Salespeople to earn their
customers' trust and to show their value to the field sales team.
Simone, one of the most experienced Desk Salespeople in the unit, went through such an
experience when she received a fault report in one of her customers' main payment servers.
Simone received a telephone call from an IT manager in a large television channel complaining
that their cell phone payment system was off-line. Simone was able to persuade an E-Tel service
representative to move a backup server that E-Tel had stored in another customer's premises to
her customer and program it to work as a cell phone payment server. Some time later, Simone
received a praiseful email message from this customer, which was cc'd to Daniel, Simone's Desk
Sales Manager. Daniel announced this message in one of his team's audio-calls. He asked
Simone to read the electronic mail but Simone was reluctant. People on the team insisted and
Simone read a couple of lines, "we no longer call her Simone, we call her 'ray of sunshine'."
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People asked her to read more and Daniel replied, "there's no need, I just forwarded the
electronic mail to everyone on the team." Among cheers of "that's brilliant," "that's fantastic,"
Daniel said "this kind of stuff is worth its weight in gold. Whenever you get a message like this,
let me know." He added, "there are two parts to our job, customer service and sales and when we
get this kind of stuff from the customer we really need to shout about it." The other Desk
Salespeople on Simone's team read the message and Lena said, "That's a brilliant bouquet,
'living the E-Tel values!"'
Additionally, if Desk Salespeople were able to price a complex set of products and
services for their customer, the customer placed the order through their Desk Salesperson instead
of going through the account team or through E-Tel's service units. Desk Salespeople could then
report this order as the outcome of their own saleswork without having to persuade their account
team or their service units to allow them to do so.
Although this type of request or problem was short lived and infrequent, it also posed
coordination challenges. Tasks of this type required gathering information from a number of
different systems and databases. Desk Salespeople needed a way to record and store all these
pieces of information in one system, to able to access them at a glance and give the proper
instructions to service units or give all the necessary information to a customer. When Desk
Salespeople received more than one complex problem or request - an infrequent but not rare
occurrence - they also needed a way to record these problems and requests and prioritize among
them.
Desk Salespeople occasionally got involved in complex tasks which extended across
time. These tasks involved significant changes in customers' information and communication
technologies and systems, such as company relocations and call center installations. Karin, one
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of DeskSales' most experienced Desk Salespeople, spent two months working on the relocation
of the headquarters of one of her two accounts, a Big Six accounting firm. The amount of daily
work that Karin had to do for this relocation varied across those two months. There were days
when she only checked E-Tel's information systems to see if all the different processes related to
her customer relocation were on-going and on time. On other days, Karin spent most of her
workday filling order forms and pricing products required for the move. On most days, she was
on the phone with many of E-Tel's service units, arranging equipment relocation, number
portingl3, and equipment deliveries.
These tasks often involved a large value in equipment and service orders, which Desk
Salespeople could report as the outcome of their own saleswork, in exchange for doing all the
work needed to place the orders for this equipment and for these service engagements.
These long-duration/high-complexity tasks were very difficult to coordinate. They
included a large number of activities, some of which were highly complex, involving multiple
service units. Desk Salespeople had to gather information about all the necessary activities to
carry out this type of task successfully and record that information in a way that allowed Desk
Salespeople to track what they had accomplished and what was yet outstanding. Desk
Salespeople also needed a process to prioritize these tasks and a way to update their customers
on their progress.
The four types of service tasks that Desk Salespeople engaged in generated three broad
self-coordination challenges: remembering their outstanding tasks, remembering the information
needed to carry out those tasks and prioritizing among those tasks. Desk Salespeople received
more service work than what they were able and willing to accomplish each day. This meant that
_' Number porting allows companies and individuals to change phone lines (as when moving to a different
geographic region) without changing phone numbers.
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Desk Salespeople needed to keep some sort of record of the service work they had yet to
complete. Moreover, even the simplest of Desk Salespeople's tasks required multiple pieces of
information, often spread across multiple information systems. This information could included
anything from customer contact details, the equipment and software that customers had installed,
the description of the service problem or request and other details submitted by the customer.
Desk Salespeople needed to keep a record of this information that was accessible when
customers or service units called about each specific service issue. Finally, the amount of service
work that Desk Salespeople had to engage in required some process to answer the question,
"what should I do next?" Desk Salespeople needed a process to prioritize their service work.
DESK SALESPEOPLE'S SELF-COORDINATION PROCESSES
The three self-coordination challenges that Desk Salespeople had to address are not new
to the literature on coordination. This literature has documented how organizations can design
and implement authority relationships, information systems and work procedures to address
employees' self-coordination challenges. At DeskSales, Desk Sales Managers paid little if any
attention to their Desk Salespeople' service work. They framed Siebel as a reporting tool and
they did not design or implement any prescribed procedures to aid Desk Salespeople coordinate
their service work across time. Desk Salespeople used a set of three artifacts - to-do lists, to-do
piles, and running logs - to scaffold the coordination of their own service work across time,
while relying on customers to prioritize that work.
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Desk Salespeople prescribed self-coordination mechanisms
Desk Salespeople had a set of prescribed self-coordination mechanisms - prescribed
procedures, Siebel and their authority relationship with their Desk Sales Manager - to
accomplish their prescribed work as salespeople. These resources were of little if any avail to
help Desk Salespeople coordinate their own service work.
Prescribed procedures were of little if any avail to Desk Salespeople when attempting to
address the self-coordination challenges created by their service work. The prescribed procedures
available to Desk Salespeople were based on their prescribed sales role and thus of little, if any
use to their service work. The three self coordination challenges that Desk Salespeople faced
were part of the reasons that Siebel was implemented at DeskSales. Desk Salespeople's first
coordination challenge - keeping a record of their outstanding tasks could be addressed by using
Siebel's "activity management" module. This module displayed outstanding tasks as a task-list
arranged by priority as a more detailed description of each task. Exhibit 5.1. shows a Siebel
screen with a task list, Exhibit 5.2. shows a single task record.
Siebel thus provided users with a system that gave them visibility of their outstanding
tasks at a fine and at a coarse level of detail. Siebel could also be used to keep the information
needed to accomplish each service task, including the customer's name and contact details, a
description of the problem or request, product and service references, and other details such as
the type of equipment the customer had on premises and the type of maintenance contract the
customer had signed with E-Tel. Siebel's individual activity records had a free-form "comments"
field where users could enter any information in text form. Additionally Siebel allowed users to
embed any electronic document in an activity record (in Exhibit 5.2., the user attached a PDF file
with an application manual).
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Exhibit 5.1. - A Siebel task list screen.
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Exhibit 5.2. - A Siebel task record screen.
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This allowed users to keep any type of information related to any activity in a single
place. Siebel activity records also included pre-designed fields, such as the customer name and
the sale the activity was related to. Selecting either field would bring the full customer contact
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record or the full sale record, when Desk Salespeople needed this information to complete their
customer service tasks.
Siebel could also be used to address the third and final self-coordination challenge that
Desk Salespeople faced: decide the order in which they were going to engage in each of their
outstanding tasks and keep a record of that order. Siebel allowed users to assign one of four
levels of priority to each of their tasks. Tasks could then be sorted according to priority and
assigned to a reminder to prompt Desk Salespeople to start or finish their tasks (see the "priority"
column in Exhibit 5.2.).
Desk Salespeople, however, did not use Siebel to address the three self-coordination
challenges they faced when engaging in service work. Desk Salespeople enforced the use of
Siebel to produce a representation of compliance with sales and saleswork targets. This led Desk
Salespeople to interpret Siebel as separated from their actual service work. When asked how he
felt about Siebel, Gregory, a Desk Salesman in one of the Technology and Media teams replied:
Siebel is... Siebel [sigh] If Siebel was used correctly, you're going to be surprised that
I'm saying this, if Siebel was used correctly, I think it would be an absolute nightmare [laughter].
Because it would take up so much time [laughter]. If Siebel is being used correctly, every call you
make, you have to do a contact, and do an opportunity and then write notes on that activity. [...]
So the time involved in doing it correctly and the information that's on Siebel in theory works
very well, but in practice, if done correctly [laughter]. Do you see where I am coming from?
Yeah... It's a reporting tool and a reporting tool only, and this is why I'm amazed we're paid off a
reporting tool. I am amazed that I am paid off a reporting tool.
Siebel was an information system that represented managers' interests, not those of
employees. It was not Desk Salespeople's tool, but managers' - and thus not a legitimate
resource for improvisation.
Desk Sales Managers offered little, if any more help than prescribed procedures and
Siebel in Desk Salespeople's self-coordination challenges. In their team audio-calls, Desk Sales
Managers not only motivated and enforced representation work but also made Desk Salespeople
aware of the extent to which DeskSales General Manager and E-Tel's senior managers used
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Siebel to supervise that work. However, when asked to describe their Desk Sales Manager's
management style, Desk Salespeople unanimously replied, "hands off." Ron, a Desk Salesman in
the team with the least experienced Desk Sales Manager described his sales manager in a
positive tone:
I am very happy with my manager at the moment. He happens to be a friend of mine for
the last three years, but, yeah very good, everyone else is very happy as well. There were a few
things at the beginning but now everyone is happy. Very kind of a hands off approach he has. He
stands back and lets people get on with things but all the relevant information is passed on and all
the things that need to be done are done. So yeah, very good.
George, a Desk Salesman in the team with the most experienced Desk Sales Managers in
the unit complained that Desk Sales Managers had no choice but to adopt a non directive style:
[Desk Sales Managers] are boss[es] in the terminology but I don't see them acting as boss
because they have so much clerical work to do themselves. [...] All these reports, there are all
those reports they have to produce for management for that or the other, so I don't see that they
come across as bosses and they don't have enough time to be a boss although the boss is in the
title, they have a lot of work put on them by their own bosses, by their own superiors as well
because of all the reports that need to be written, so they have to spend a lot more time doing that
than actually being proactive and run the sales team. So the vast majority of the sales teams stand
on their own two feet.
Desk Sales Managers focused on supervising representation work, not the customer
service activities that Desk Salespeople considered to be their "real work." Frances, a Desk
Saleswoman, explained the difference between Nina, her Desk Sales Manager and her field
salespeople as follows:
I suppose I consider Nina my direct manager, but I'd say I answer to the [field sales]
team, really. Although Nina is there if I'm late for work and things like that, for the bread and
butter things, do you know what I mean, the actual content of my work, it's my account team,
Nina wouldn't notice if I actually did anything. But ultimately, [the field sales team] I would say,
is the people you have to please if you want to get any work, and make any bonus.
Moreover, Siebel was customized to their prescribed role: selling. Therefore there was no
official or formal system that Desk Sales Managers could use to supervise Desk Salespeople's
service work. Furthermore, Desk Sales Managers did not attempt to supervise Desk
Salespeople's service work informally. Desk Sales Managers were never present when Desk
Salespeople met with their field salespeople, although a relationship with their Desk
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Salespeople's account teams would allow Desk Sales Managers to have informal visibility of
their Desk Salespeople's service work. When Desk Salespeople were first assigned to their field
accounts, field salespeople came to DeskSales to meet their Desk Salespeople and go over their
account development plan together. The protocol for this visit included a meeting between the
Desk Salesperson's Desk Sales Manager and field salespeople so that the Desk Sales Managers
could go over the account development plan, approve it and sign it. In practice, Desk Sales
Managers told their Desk Salespeople to keep copies of their account development plans for
Desk Sales Managers to sign in bulk. Desk Salespeople were also reluctant to discuss the details
of their relationship with their field sales teams, thus hindering any informal supervision over
their customer service work.
Coordinating service work across time
Unable to rely on their supervisors and their prescribed information system, Desk
Salespeople had to improvise their own processes to keep a record of their outstanding service
work. Desk Salespeople used their own improvised system to keep track of their customer's
service work and store the information needed to complete it. Each Desk Salesperson improvised
an information system which was tailored to their own preferences and to the type of customer
service tasks they engaged in more frequently. However, all of Desk Salespeople's improvised
information systems were based on three different types of material artifacts: to-do lists, to-do
piles and running logs.
To-do list
Desk Salespeople used a to-do list to record their outstanding tasks in an index format.
To-do lists were adapted to each Desk Salesperson's personal preferences. To-do lists could be
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compiled in a single document, such as a page in a notebook, a page in a calendar or a loose
sheet of paper (see Exhibit 5.3. for a notebook page), which were often placed between the Desk
Salesperson and their computer keyboard. Alternatively, to-do lists could be distributed across
multiple documents, often as a number of post-it notes on Desk Salespeople's desks and around
their computer screens, but also as jottings on any scrap of paper at hand, from credit card
receipts to shopping vouchers (Exhibit 5.4. below shows a how Desk Salesman placed post-it
notes on their desks, Exhibit 5.5. shows two post-it notes taken from a Desk Saleswoman's
screen).
Independently of the format of their to-do lists, Desk Salespeople used them to have visibility of
all their outstanding tasks without having to rely on their memory and without being distracted
by the details of those tasks. Alexander, one of the most experienced Desk Salespeople at
DeskSales, used a numbered to-do list that he kept on a loose sheet of paper. The following is a
10-minute slice of a day in Alexander's work that illustrates how Desk Salespeople used to-do
lists.
Alexander got a call from a customer asking about an escalated order. Alexander said that
he would call the person that was handling it and get back in touch with the customer. He jotted it
down on his to do page "25) Paul - Circuit Escalation." He then looked at his to do list. Item 19,
had a "4" in front of it, which reflected its priority. Alexander wrote "do later" in front of it.
He then looked at item 20 on his to do list, which had a "5" in front of it, indicating
priority and opened an email which was a thread of discussion between the customer and the field
salesperson on a DSL availability issue. Alexander said that he didn't understand why he had been
involved. He said that it was plain that the service person had made a mistake. He wrote that in an
email to his field salesperson.
He then picked up a letter from UNICORP with a check from a pile of paper on his desk.
He said that UNICORP sent it to the wrong person (himself). He called UNICORP's accounting
department, and told them that they were sending their payment to the wrong address and that he
had the correct address for them. He then got up and mailed the customer check and letter of
payment to the correct billing address. He comes back and scratches another item on his to do list
(24) Send UNICORP CHQ, "another one bytes the dust!"
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Exhibit 5.3. - A to-do list page on a notebook.
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Exhibit 5.5. - Two Post-It notes from
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Alexander's use of his to-do list highlights three aspects of Desk Salespeople's use of this
type of artifact to keep a record of their outstanding tasks. The first is how they used this artifact
throughout the work day. Desk Salespeople added and removed items from the list as they
received and completed service tasks. This allowed Desk Salespeople to be able to quickly assess
the amount of service work that they had completed and the amount of service work that they
had yet to carry out. The second aspect of Desk Salespeople's use of their to-do lists was the
index' nature of this artifact. The description of each service task was very short - "Paul -
circuit escalation" -- which highlights that these artifacts were used to scaffold memory of
outstanding service work, not to keep a detailed record of it. The third aspect of Desk
Salespeople's use of their to-do lists was to enact a sense of progress through the large amount of
service tasks that they received day in, day out. To-do lists were thus not only used to scaffold
the memory of what needed to be done but also the memory of what had already been done.
Alexander accounted for his use of his to-do list as follows:
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It's an on-going thing. Every morning I've got it there, so every morning I'll write a new
one. There will be old stuff there that is ongoing and that I haven't done yet, which is kind of at
the top. I will go through emails and messages that come in overnight. Add them to the list, then
I'll prioritize the things that I have to do through the day. I then I go through it. Phonecall comes
in, add it to the list, email comes in, add it to the list, it's just kind of an always on-going never
ending list.
Alexander's description of how he used his to-do list highlights that Desk Salespeople
improvised a set of procedures to structure their use of their to-do list down to the position of
records of tasks in the list. To-do lists were thus structured-in-use providing Desk Salespeople
with a material resource to scaffold their progress through their service tasks.
To-do pile
Desk Salespeople used a set of printed and annotated emails that aggregated detailed
information about Desk Salespeople's complex customer service tasks). As with to-do lists, Desk
Salespeople's to-do piles had different formats. To-do piles took two main shapes. One was that
of a pile of annotated printouts kept in a folder or drawer in Desk Salespeople's desks. Exhibit
5.6. shows a Desk Salesman using his to-do pile. The other shape that a to-do pile took was that
of multiple "piles" kept in a set of binders organized by account (see Exhibit 5.7.).
The following vignette illustrates how Jeremy, a Desk Salesman who had joined
DeskSales right after graduating from high school, used his to-do pile:
As he sat at his desk, Jeremy turned on his computer and picked up a pile of annotated
printed emails from the top drawer of the drawer box on his desk, "this is my to-do pile," he
announced. Jeremy then opened his email software. He had an email from a customer asking for a
quote for a complex private circuit. Jeremy spent a few minutes reading that email and then said
that instead of scrolling up and down, he was just going to print the email so that "the products are
easier to find." He went to pick the email up from the printer and, when he came back, he put the
email printout at the bottom of his to-do pile. He then went through all the printed annotated
emails in his to-do pile, He put some emails to the side "I have to do that this afternoon," "this
relates to that," "I need to find out what's going on about that," "I've dealt with that" (he ripped the
printed email message it and put it in the trash can), "this is one I've done": "see I do go through
my list and get it done, just not as quickly as I'd like." Jeremy put a couple more printed emails on
the trash can and said: "my to-do list is now manageable." He put all the remaining emails in a
neat pile to the far right side of his desk and picked up the one that he got today with an order for
several products. He did the calculations for ISDN prices next to the ISDN product description on
that email. Jeremy then sent an email with this ISDN order to the ISDN specialist service unit.
Jeremy pushed his keyboard against his computer screen and, before he got up to go to
lunch, said "I don't particularly like paper but it's a bloody good reminder, and sometimes things
go so far back that you need a good reminder." He added that the two things paper is good for is
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that things are easier to find - "you don't need to scroll up and down" - and "you can also take
notes on them." He explained that he could take notes on printouts because on email the notes are
at the end of the email, not next to the information they refer too.
Jeremy's use of this to-do pile illustrates three core feature of this artifact as a resource to
scaffold Desk Salespeople's self-coordination of their service work. One of the most interesting
features of this artifact was its hybrid nature. Desk Salespeople used to-do piles to keep a record
of all the information the needed to complete a task. This information was collated from multiple
sources, including E-Tel's information systems, phone conversations with service representatives
and with the customer, and electronic communication systems. To-do piles thus allowed Desk
Salespeople to have an at-a-glance access to all the information related to each of their service
tasks.
The second f eature of to-do piles was that of being a task-specific, material cognitive
resource. To explain, Jeremy's use of his customer's email to calculate ISDN prices suggests that
Desk Salespeople needed material resources to scaffold some of their activities, such as
calculating prices. I)esk Salespeople used the printed email messages that constituted their to-do
pile for this purpose. However, they did not do so indiscriminately. Each printed email message
was only used to scaffold the activities pertaining to the task that each message referred to.
The third feature of to-do piles was to allow Desk Salespeople to keep track of their
progress in completing their service tasks. As Jeremy suggests, the heights of their to-do pile
allowed Desk Salespeople to keep track of how much work they had done and how much work
they had to do already. In this sense, to-do piles were used much like a to-do list. To-do piles,
however, fulfilled a self coordination task that to-do lists did not. To-do lists only allowed Desk
Salespeople to track whether each of their service tasks was completed or not - enough to
coordinate their simpler service tasks across time. More complex service tasks, however, often
involved a number of activities that also needed to be coordinated across time.
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Exhibit 5.6. - A Desk Salesman using his to-do pile.
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Exhibit 5.7. - A to-do pile organized in folders.
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Desk Salespeople's annotated the email messages that constituted their to-do piles to coordinate
these activities. Desk Salespeople could keep track of the activities they had completed for a
specific task by looking at the traces of their action in printed emails (such as calculations, in
Jeremy's case) or by using notes to tag the completion of each specific activity.
Although for most Desk Salespeople, their to-do pile was an actual physical pile of
annotated printouts, there were a few Desk Salespeople who experimented with an electronic
version of this artifact. In electronic format, a to-do pile was composed of electronic mailboxes,
more specifically Desk Salespeople's email inbox and outbox. Email messages were annotated
by using flags - which allowed Desk Salespeople to color-code messages - and by editing
subject lines to include a reference number. Casey, a Desk Salesman who used his email
software as his to-do pile for two months explained that his system consisted of "flagging" items
in his inbox and outbox. He described his color coding scheme by saying that messages
"'flagged" red meant "this is me asking people to do stuff' and that messages "flagged" white "is
when people actually do it." He further said that "I litter everything with reference numbers, it's
a bit of information overload but that means that I cannot ignore it, even if I want to." Whereas
Desk Salespeople using paper-based to-do piles recorded phone conversations as annotations on
the printed emails that made up their to-do pile, Desk Salespeople that used email as their
electronic to-do pile summarized phone conversations in email messages which they sent to
customers, service representatives and field salespeople, not so much to communicate but to
produce a record of activity. When finishing a call, Toby, a Desk Salesman on one of the Finance
teams, told the service representative he was talking to, "I'll send an email for our records
because I use [email] as my diary." After he hung up, Toby went to his email software and wrote
a summary of his conversation with the service representative, noting "as much for my records as
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for yours, here's a summary of what we discussed." After finishing the email and sending it to
the service representative, Toby complained:
The only reason I've done this is so that it goes to my own sent items [i.e. his outbox in
his email software]. I'm forced to communicate. [I sent] the email to put it as a record in my sent
items. I [had] to send an email I [did]n't want to.
After only a few months of using email as their to-do pile, those Desk Salespeople that
used this system reported that it was difficult to keep track of their outstanding tasks without a
paper based artifact. Simon, a Desk Salesman on one of the Retail teams, voiced a common
concern:
I converted to paper because I couldn't do it anymore [use email as a to-do pile], I was
always going through my emails in the back of my mind. I was always afraid that I forgot
something.
Independently of their form, to-do piles were used in two ways. They were used as a
repository to record and retrieve all the information related to a customer request or problem.
Additionally, as Simon suggests, they were occasionally used as a substitute for to-do lists as a
record of outstanding tasks - instead of using check marks, Desk Salespeople could use the
height of their pile as a measure of their progress.
Running 1og
Desk Salespeople used two types of running logs. The first was a short-term repository of
information - the daily running log - for the tasks that they engaged in during the course of their
working day (see exhibit 5.8. for a daily running log). Desk Salespeople used this type of
running log to write down telephone numbers, product references, product details and the
customer details they needed to carry out their outstanding tasks. The daily running log was kept
on a single sheet of paper, often a page in a notebook, that Desk Salespeople placed between
themselves and their computer keyboard (see Exhibit 5.9.).
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Exhibit 5.8. A Desk Saleswoman's daily running log.
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Exhibit 5.9. -- A Desk Salesman using a daily running log.
The following vignette shows how Scott, a Desk Salesman on one of the Information and
Media teams used his running log while engaging in two separate tasks:
Scott received a call from a customer. The customer told him that he needed a toll-free
number that people would be able to call from any country in Europe and from the US. Scott
jotted down the customer's name and his request in the notepad that he had in front of him. The
customer asked how long the quote would take and Scott replied that he was going to do it today.
Scott got an email with an order for a set of virtual private circuits. He jotted down the
details in his notepad and then went to the quick quote tool on E-Tel's intranet. He jotted down the
prices in front of each circuit's details in his notepad.
After he did all of the circuits, he added them using his desk calculator and jotted the
result on the same page in his notepad. He then copied the prices on the sheet of paper and
included the site names, product and price. He emailed the customer asking for the term and for
confirmation of the site details.
Scott then said that he needed to call the billing department to find out how much the
cancelled circuits were worth. He called the billing department and gave them the circuit reference
numbers and jotted down on his notepad the billing values he was given. After he finished the call,
he grabbed his calculator and added all the prices he was given. He jotted down this total next to
the prices he was given during the call.
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Scott's use of his daily running log specifies the role that this artifact played in Desk
Salespeople's self-coordination processes. Daily running logs scaffolded temporary task
memory. Desk Salespeople's used their daily running logs to temporarily store information
which was only needed for the duration of their current task, but which was difficult to commit
to memory (e.g., phone numbers and addresses).
Desk Salespeople used another type of running log in addition to their daily running log.
This log - the task running log - was a record of the activities that a Desk Salesperson had
accomplished towards a specific, long-running task. Desk Salespeople used this artifact to keep
track of their progress towards long term tasks and to keep track of the outstanding activities
needed to complete these tasks. Task running logs often took the form of a Microsoft Excel
spreadsheet that was designed for each of the longer running tasks that Desk Salespeople
engaged in. Every Desk Salesperson at DeskSales that was doing a DSL rollout created such a
spreadsheet to be able to track which DSL installation had been completed, which required more
customer information to be completed and which were waiting for the customer to schedule an
appointment with an engineer. Bruce was one of the Desk Salespeople who had a large DSL
rollout. Whenever his customers' IT department sent Bruce an employee's name and information
to put in an order for DSL, Bruce not only filled out the order form that he had to send to the E-
Tel service unit responsible for DSL installations, but also entered that information on a
spreadsheet that he designed to keep track of the DSL rollouts for his customers (see Exhibit
5.10. for a DSL task running log). Bruce's spreadsheet was color-coded. Completed installations
were green, those that required more customer information were blue, those that were waiting to
schedule the installation date were orange and those that were recent orders were in yellow.
Bruce explained that he color-coded his spreadsheet because "immediately I can see what's
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going on." At the end of his working day, Bruce sent this spreadsheet to his customer "it
demonstrates that I am actually trying to deal with this." He complained that the IT manager at
his customer "just likes to know what stage things are at and that I am dealing with it. He's a
funny old man."
To-do lists, to-do piles and running logs allowed Desk Salespeople to create a ready-at-
hand representation of their outstanding tasks. This allowed them to address the problem of
knowing which task they had to engage in. However, none of these artifacts was used to decide
on task priorities. When facing a to-do list or a to-do pile, how would a Desk Salesperson know
where to start and what to do next?
Exhibit 5.10. - A Desk Salesman DSL task running log.
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Prioritizing outstanding tasks
Desk Salespeople gave priority to the problems or requests of customers and field
salespeople who "shouted the loudest." Kyle, a Desk Salesman on one of the retail teams,
explained that customer "shouting" meant:
Getting your attention. There's something that he needs acted on very, very quickly and
he needs our full attention focused in that area for him. [... I]f someone is shouting then that will
be a pain to me so the easiest thing to do is [to deal with their issue]. [I]f somebody is shouting
and I have other things, I can't concentrate fully or getting caught up in finding information if I
know that the next phone call I get will be somebody saying 'have you done that for me yet?' so
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therefore it's always a case of- I mean, if the customer has got a valid reason to shout that's fine.
If he tells me, 'look I need this information, I'm going to get something done in three days, I'll
have a decision' then that's fair enough. If he just turns around saying - If he says, 'look, I really
messed up, I should have placed this order three weeks ago, I really need some help', that's fine.
What I really don't like, is people that shout... I mean, if someone shouts all the time, for
everything I get in then that's not... If it's a valid reason to shout, then I'll look at it first.
"Shouting the loudest" was thus both a measure of how visible the customer or the field
salesperson was (due to their frequency of contact) and a measure of the importance and urgency
of a task (due to the interpretation of the task as "needing your full attention"). Alan, a Desk
Salesman on one of the Finance teams, described his technique for deciding which task to do
first:
[I have] no technique really. It depends on the person you talk to. It depends on how the
email is formulated. If it's my account director and says I want this done by midday and
somebody else says I want a quote, you know[, y]eah, I'll do it. If he says, 'I want this to be done
by this morning', 'I want this to be done by midday', I'll say 'I'll do my best'. Because I'm not
really quite sure of that, I put it in an email and send it. It depends on the type of queries but you
obviously can put them in some categories, you know. If your manager says 'I want something
done on Siebel now', 'now' doesn't mean in two hours or three hours, it means now. That is a
priority. If they tell you, 'I'm going to a meeting, I want this to be done now', it's a priority and
you do it. Forget about the rest.
The priority of the remainder of Desk Salespeople's tasks, which were neither interpreted as
important or as urgent, was decided on the basis of personal preferences and criteria. The three
main criteria used by Desk Salespeople were the revenue tied to each task, how easy the task
was, and the status of the person that had asked for assistance. Edward, a Desk Salesman on one
of the two Media and Technology teams, explained how these criteria came together:
It's a whole host of factors. If I was going to start a whole scrap from today, with nothing
pressing, I would probably prioritize the ones worth the most to me. Other factors to take into
account, it's kind of who it's for. I might have a big deal but I might have a DSL to do for the
president of MEGACORP, which I put to the top. If I have a little thing and I haven't done it but it
has been on my list a week then that will come to the top, and then I'll use my judgment.
Nancy, a Desk Saleswoman on one of the four retail teams described her own
prioritization process as a set of nested criteria:
If nobody is shouting then it's what's going to give me the biggest revenue. If something
that's going to bring in 40, 60, 80 pounds it gets slotted out quite a way down the pile. If someone
wants a quote for something that is going to give me 30, 40, 50 thousand pounds worth of sale,
that's going to get looked at first. So I prioritize on time, I mean obviously if it's 40, 50, 60
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pounds and I can do it in two seconds it will be done and sent off without any problem, but if it's
something that I need to be a bit more involved, such as a telephone headset etc... then it will go
to the bottom of the pile. I don't just look at the pure value and say 'no, I'll do that... it'll take me
three minutes but I'll do it in three days time'. If it can be done straight away, I'll do it. If I've got
a customer who needs something urgently, that will get priority and then I look at it on a value
basis. What's going to get me the most value.
The medium through which Desk Salespeople received problems and requests was of
significance to the interpretation of their urgency and importance. Although the physical cues of
email and phonecall are very similar, Desk Salespeople used their phone as a synchronous
communication medium and email as an asynchronous one. Table 5.1. below compares the
features of both mediums.
Table 5.1. -- A comparison of features and uses of Desk Salespeople's phone and email
technology'4.
John, a Desk Salesman on one of the four Retail teams explained how he interpreted
phone-calls as "shouting" and emails as regular communication:
[People shout] only [on] phone calls. It's normally phone calls. If it is urgent then it's
gone past the email stage and people... phone is quicker than email! Email also shows up
immediately and it rings but it doesn't get acted on immediately [b]ecause very often if you have
an email about something which is on your desk already, then you'll take a look at that email and
go, 'oh yeah I can do that in half an hour or something,' and you'll continue to do what you're
doing first. But if you get a phonecall, that jumps the queue, that gets your attention straight away.
An email doesn't. It may get your attention but it doesn't guarantee that it will be acted straight
away on. A phonecall is almost guaranteed to be acted straight away on. What you find is that
either an email or a phonecall needs to be acted on unless it's for information only. If someone
sends you an email or makes a phonecall and wants some information from you. If it's information
they need quickly they will pick up the phone because by the time they write an email, then send
it, goes through the system, I read it and act on it, send it back through the system to them, could
be a couple of minutes, could be an hour or two, could be two or three hours. But on a phonecall,
14 Sources: Outlook Software Manual and Meridian Phone Manual.
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Features and uses Phone Electronic mail
Incoming communication Beep Beep
alert Light Pop-up window
Message storing features Message is stored as a voice Message is stored as a text
___________ recording or HTML file
Asynchronous uses Let the call go into Let the email remain in the
____________ voicemail and listen later inbox and read later
Synchronous uses Answer the phone upon Reply to email on receiving
receiving call message
people perceive that they get my attention straight away and if they think it is something that I can
act on straight away, I will act on it then and there and I will possibly back it up by email. This is
why they're phoning. If it's something they need quickly then they'll pick up the phone and they
expect me to act on it while I'm on the phone and it's all right. It's a queue jumper. Irrespective of
what else I'm doing, if that phone rings I answer it and that's why it's there. I don't let it go to
voicemail. If I was coming down [for lunch] on my own, and the phone rings I'd have picked it
up.
Although the alerts for a phonecall and email were the same, Desk Salespeople ignored
email while engaging in a task, but expressed distress when their customers called in and they
were already working on another customer issue. Larry, a Desk Salesperson in one of the Retail
teams, expressed such distress when his phone rang while he was calculating prices for a private
circuit. Larry raised his head abruptly from the notebook he was using to perform his
calculations and made a rude gesture15 towards his phone, and then went back to pricing the
private circuit he was working on. After being insistently called by Roger, an IT manager at one
of his customers, during a morning that he had devoted to log sales on Siebel, Joseph, a Desk
Salesman on one of the two Finance teams, finally picked up the call. Just before picking up the
phone, Joseph sighed, "fuck you, Roger." He then picked up the headset and adopted a helpful
tone, proceeding to explain to Roger how line resiliencel 6 worked. Joseph let Roger hang up and
then banged his headset down with a cathartic "fuck offl"
When Desk Salespeople were in the middle of a task that they did not want to interrupt,
they used their phone in a way that gave their customers a 'line busy' signal. This was
accomplished in two ways. One was by dialing into recorded phone conferences on product
training and let their headset rest on their table. E-Tel kept a database of training seminars on the
multiple products it offered to corporate customers that could be accessed over the phone. This
mneant hat Desk Salespeople could keep their phone line busy while having a legitimate reason
]5 This gesture is often described in slang as "giving the finger."
16 Line resilience is a technology offered by E-Tel to its corporate customers that prevents loss of communication
during equipment faults in phone exchanges.
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for doing so - they were doing training. The other tactic to keep their line busy was to enter into
a conference call with each other. This tactic was used more frequently because it would prevent
calls from being automatically passed to another Desk Salesperson on the team.17
In summary, instead of using Siebel - the formal information system put in place at E-Tel
- each Desk Salesperson improvised their own information system to keep a record of their
outstanding tasks and to keep a record of the information they needed to complete those tasks.
These improvised information systems did not address the problem of deciding which task to
engage in first. Desk Salespeople scaffolded that decision in a two-step process. First, they
carried out those tasks sent by the customers and by field sales teams which were most visible.
Second, they prioritized the remaining tasks according to their personal preferences.
DISCUSSION
This chapter answers a particular puzzle of Desk Salespeople's experience at DeskSales.
Desk Salespeople engaged in enough service work to face considerable self-coordination
challenges. However, Desk Salespeople had no formal process to address these coordination
challenges. The process that Desk Salespeople improvised to address these challenges speaks to
the problem of self-coordination of unprescribed work and to the problem of control of
unprescribed work.
The problem of self coordination of unprescribed work
Desk Salespeople's tactics in addressing their self-coordination challenges provide a
model of self-coordination - one of the least studied coordination problems in studies of
17 The digital phone switch used at DeskSales had a cyclic hunting system that worked as follows: if the intended
recipient of the call did not take it, the phone switch would transfer the call to the first open line on the team. If no
one answered then the phone switch redirected the call to the intended recipient's voicemail.
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organizations - for work that is constituted by a flow of tasks with varying duration and level of
complexity, and with ambiguous priorities.
Since its inception (see e.g., Barnard, 1938; Follett, 1940; Taylor, 1947), the literature on
coordination in organizations has focused on the problem of interpersonal coordination.
According to the literature on coordination (see Crowston, 1997; Gupta, Dirsmith, & Fogarty,
1994), the main challenges that organizations and managers face is that of bringing together the
efforts of individual workers into a common outcome, such as creating a product or delivering a
service. The assumption is that the design of the production or service delivery process scaffolds
the coordination of individual work across time. When self-coordination problems moved from
the assembly line to the cubicleS, culture - especially occupational culture - replaced process
design as the scaffold for coordinating individual work across time. This transition, however,
shifted focus to the norms that workers draw on to decide what tasks to engage in but kept silent
about the specific practices that scaffolded self-coordination, as the materiality of assembly lines
and customer queues sublimated into the immateriality of"knowledge work" (see Ouchi, 1980
for a discussion of this shift, with a focus on coordination) 19 . Looking at the literature beyond
that on coordination strictu sensu suggests that there is still ample room to develop a richer
understanding of the coordination of individual work across time, even in the assembly line and
at the service counter. Burawoy (1979) showed that assembly line workers had to improvise a set
of self-coordination practices for their 'goldbricking work' because they could not rely on the
prescribed self-coordination of the assembly line because they needed to keep their goldbricking
18 As many have documented (e.g (Garson, 1988; Zuboff, 1988)) there are many jobs in which cubicles might as
well be slots in an assembly line. Here, however, I am referring to work such as that done by engineers and
designers where at each point in time workers have a choice of a number of different tasks to engage in ((see Barley
& Kunda, 2004 for examples of such workers)).
'9 Carlile ((2002)) does discuss the role of material artifacts in coordination but he does so only for interpersonal
coordination, not for the coordination of individual work across time.
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work hidden from their supervisors. Mars (1983) showed how jobs that were permeable to
individual deviance ("donkey jobs") required workers to improvise a way to track their deviant
work practices across time and avoid detection.
Desk Salespeople self-coordination challenges and the processes that Desk Salespeople
enacted to address them suggest that these challenges are not solely the province of deviant
behavior. They are also present in employees' unprescribed work tasks. My analysis of Desk
Salespeople's experience at DeskSales suggests that there are three basic self-coordination
problems: keeping a record of outstanding work; storing and accessing the information needed to
complete that outstanding work; and prioritizing among the tasks that constitute such work. Desk
Salespeople's tactics to deal with each of these problems suggests that each requires a different
information system. To address the need to remember their outstanding tasks and the information
needed to complete those tasks, Desk Salespeople improvised three sets of artifacts: to-do lists,
"to-do piles", and running logs. That agents draw on improvised artifacts to scaffold memory is a
well documented finding in the management literature (e.g., see chapters in Heath et al., 2000;
see also Weick, 1979; and Weick & Westley, 1996) and in the broader literature on cognition
(Clark, 1997; Lave, 1988).What the practices that Desk Salespeople enacted with these artifacts,
especially "to-do piles" and running logs, highlight is that distributed memory can be profitably
scaffolded in convergent artifacts. Studies on the use of artifacts in organizations for distributed
memory (e.g., Hutchins, 1991) have focused on how agents use different artifacts to scaffold
their memory of different processes and different types of information. Desk Salespeople used
the same artifact to scaffold their memory of the different processes and the different types of
information related to each task. This allowed them to use these artifacts not only to scaffold
their memory of each task but also to assess their progress towards its completion.
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The process that Desk Salespeople improvised to assign priorities to each of their tasks
contributes to the literature on coordination and organizations by showing how coordination
process can cross organizational boundaries. To be sure, there is previous research that suggests
that agents external to the organization have a say in its coordination processes. Institutional
theory (Meyer et al., 1977) has suggested that organizations mimic coordination process of other
organizations to earn legitimacy. The literature on occupations and organizations shows that the
coordination systems used by occupational groups in organizations may draw from occupational
norms instead of the organization's policies (see Van Maanen & Barley, 1984). Neither of these
literatures however addresses the role of external agents in the coordination process. At
DeskSales, Desk Salespeople drew on their customers' and their field salespeople practices to
decide the priority of each of their outstanding tasks. Those tasks whose customers "shouted the
loudest" were given priority over other tasks. All remaining tasks were assigned a priority based
on personal criteria such as revenue or preference for a given type of task. Customers and field
salespeople were thus used by Desk Salespeople to manage their prioritization process.
The outcome of these tactics was threefold. First, Desk Salespeople were able to
successfully coordinate across time a set of tasks of varying duration and complexity. Desk
Salespeople were able to do so in the absence of any formal system to scaffold the self-
coordination of their service work. Secondly, as Desk Salespeople used their improvised self-
coordination system, they reproduced it and diffused it to incoming members. To-do lists, to-do
piles, running logs and annotated emails constituted a defacto parallel information system that
ran alongside Siebel. Thirdly, the process that Desk Salespeople enacted to prioritize their
service tasks eroded Desk Sales Managers' power over them. By responding to "shouting"
customers Desk Salespeople reproduced a dual reporting structure: Desk Sales Managers held
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Desk Salespeople accountable for representation work, customers held Desk Salespeople
accountable for service work.
The problem of control of unprescribed work
Desk Salespeople's self-coordination processes shaped the practices that supervisors had
to engage in to observe and to have the ability to control and coordinate their employees work.
At DeskSales, Desk Salespeople used artifacts such as pen and paper, and Microsoft Excel
spreadsheets to scaffold keeping track their work. To see Desk Salespeople's customer service
work, Desk Sales Managers would have to either go to each Desk Salesperson's desk and
computer and go through their to do list, "to do pile" and running logs, or have Desk Salespeople
create a representation of these on Siebel or another information system that made Desk
Salespeople's customer service work visible to Desk Sales Managers. If Desk Salespeople had
used Siebel to improvise their to-do list, their to-do pile and running logs, then Desk Sales
Managers would have only to issue a query on Siebel that would allow them to have real-time
visibility of Desk Salespeople's service work. This shows that even in contexts of computer-
mediated supervision, it is possible to keep work away from supervisors' gaze. This
accomplishment, however, did not depend solely on Desk Salespeople's ingenuity but also on
their Desk Sales Managers disregard for Desk Salespeople's service work. If Desk Sales
Managers chose to monitor and enforce Desk Salespeople's service work, Desk Salespeople
would have to put in more effort to keep their service work away from Desk Sales Managers.
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CONCLUSION
The goal of this chapter was to look at the relationship between the formal and the
informal elements of organizations in processes of self-coordination. Desk Salespeople's
experience provides a rich look into this relationship because customer service tasks - their "real
work" - created a number of self-coordination challenges that were not met by any formal
coordination mechanisms. This mismatch opened up the process through which self-coordination
practices emerged as Desk Salespeople dealt with their everyday self-coordination challenges.
The analysis conducted in this chapter shows that emergent self-coordination practices led to a
disconnect between the formal and the informal elements of organizations. Desk Salespeople did
not use Siebel the formal artifact they had available to coordinate their own work across time.
Instead, they improvised their own artifacts out of general purpose, ready-at-hand resources,
such as pen and paper, Microsoft Excel spreadsheets and printed email messages. Siebel
represented Desk Sales Managers' interests, not those of Desk Salespeople and it was interpreted
as a resource that was alien to Desk Salespeople's customer service work. Siebel was not a
resource to improvise with when addressing self-coordination problems. Instead, Desk
Salespeople improvised a parallel information system that was invisible to the formal
organization. This system represented Desk Salespeople's interests, allowing them to engage in
the service work they needed to do for others in exchange for taking credit for others' sales.
Desk Salespeople's emergent self-coordination practices also inform our understanding
of the emergent process of coordinating individual work across time. It suggests that the
construction of self-coordination processes does not stop when incentives (Kerr, 1975), linking
mechanisms (Mintzberg, 1995) and monitoring systems (Ball et al., 2000) are designed. Instead
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self-coordination is an everyday, improvised and material achievement. Self-coordination
requires adaptation to local condition for action, which can vary not only because of the
punctuated influence of external agents but also because of the interaction of incremental and
emergent organizational processes. This situated adaptation is a material process - its success
depends on how individual agents use the resources they have available to improvise the
practices necessary for concerted work. This study thus builds on Weick's (1990) and
Orlikowski's ( 996) observations of self-coordination practices by articulating a model of self-
coordination based on the challenges that Desk Salespeople face in the course of their everyday
work, the tactics Desk Salespeople enacted to address those challenges, and the intended and
unintended outcomes of those tactics.
Self-coordination was but one of the challenges that Desk Salespeople faced when
engaging in service work. Desk Salespeople could not address their customers' service issues
themselves. They did not have the knowledge to do so and, even if they did, they were not
allowed to leave their desks to visit their customers' premises. Desk Salespeople needed to enlist
the cooperation of E-Tel's service units to successfully respond to their customers' service
requests. Desk Salespeople, however, had no prescribed relationship with these service units and
no formal grounds to enforce this cooperation. Desk Salespeople also lacked the formal ties
needed to enlist the cooperation of E-Tel's service units. The next chapter explains how Desk
Salespeople addressed this challenge.
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CHAPTER 6:
UNPRESCRIBED COOPERATION THROUGH MEDIATED PERSONAL TIES AND
BEYOND
INTRODUCTION
Desk Salespeople needed to be able to address customers' and field salespeople's service
issues. Desk Salespeople's service work allowed them to report sales field salespeople's sales
and customers' orders as their own sales. Desk Salespeople, however, lacked the skill, the
resources and the authority to do service work on their own. They needed the help of E-Tel's
service units. Desk Salespeople, however, had no prescribed relationship with these units. Desk
Salespeople had to build unprescribed cooperation ties with the service representatives working
in these different service units. Only E-Tel's Central Service's representatives were permeable to
this type of tie with Desk Salespeople. Service representatives in E-Tel's specialists service units
and its Escalation unit were behind a wall of electric channels that made personal ties with these
service representatives very difficult to establish and maintain. In this chapter, I show how Desk
Salespeople were able to maintain mediated personal ties with Central Service representatives
and engage the unprescribed cooperation of specialist service units and the Escalation unit
without establishing enduring personal ties with service representatives in either. By explaining
how Desk Salespeople were able to do so, my goal is to add to the research on unprescribed
cooperation in organizations by showing that there are other tactics for unprescribed cooperation
beyond enduring personal ties.
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DESK SALESPEOPLE'S CONDITIONS FOR SERVICE WORK
Desk Salespeople's prescribed role placed them at a disadvantage to engage in service
work. Desk Salespeople's prescribed sales role lacked the training to understand and solve
customers' service issues, the access to E-Tel's service information systems, and the authority to
engage the cooperation of E-Tel's service units to address those issues.
Desk Salespeople could not do their service work on their own. Desk Salespeople did not
have the formal training nor did they have the work experience to address equipment faults. Only
a handful of Desk Salespeople had any formal education beyond a high-school diploma. Not a
single Desk Salesperson had any technical education whatsoever. Moreover, Desk Salespeople's
work experience was limited to customer information call centers. Their job history did not
include any technical experience that might qualify them for service work. Also their prescribed
role was that of a salesperson. Therefore, they were not eligible for any of the many in-house
training programs that E-Tel offered to its service people.
Even if Desk Salespeople had the necessary knowledge and skill to engage in service
work, they would still be prevented from actually doing so. The problem was one of access.
Customers' service problems and requests required two types of access, physical and electronic.
Some service requests, such as repairing a telephone switch or installing telecommunications
equipment required physical access to customers' premises. Desk Salespeople's role, as its label
implies, was desk-based. Desk Salespeople had no permission and no budget to visit their
customers. The remainder of customers' service problems and requests could be performed
remotely, though E-Tel's many service-related information systems. However, Desk Salespeople
d(lid not have access to any of these information systems for two reasons. One was that Desk
Salespeople's prescribed role did not require access to any service-related information system.
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The other was that E-Tel, because of its past as a monopolist telephone service provider was
heavily regulated. One of the norms that the company was subjected to was full separation
between the information accessible to service units and the information accessible to commercial
units such as DeskSales, to prevent anti-competitive practices.
Desk Salespeople lack of knowledge and access to do customer service work meant that
they needed the cooperation of E-Tel's service units. However, Desk Salespeople's relationship
with other parts of E-Tel was based on Desk Salespeople's prescribed sales role. Desk
Salespeople had but three formal relationships within E-Tel. Desk Salespeople had a subordinate
relationship with DeskSales' management, they were part of their field sales teams, and they
could issue simple product orders to E-Tel's order fulfillment unit - the unit that was responsible
for ensuring that customers' orders were recorded and delivered. Only one of these relationships,
the relationship with E-Tel's Order Fulfillment, was with a service-related unit. However, E-
Tel's Order Fulfillment did not address, nor did it have the power to address, customers' service
requests and problems. E-Tel's Order Fulfillment only function was to record and deliver
customer orders. Desk Salespeople had no prescribed relationships with any of the service units
whose cooperation they needed to do their unprescribed service work. Cynthia, a Desk
Saleswoman in one of the Retail sales teams, summarized Desk Salespeople's plight:
[When] we [... ] hit the floor [i.e. when a Desk Salesperson first sits at their desk], [ . .]
it's an upside down world. So when you come out of training and then you hit the desk the reality
is that you're in a surreal world for a moment. What you have to learn to do is not dealing with
your customers - dealing with customers over the telephone is an easy task to do. The difficult
task was finding the relevant chains, the relevant lines, the uplines and downlines of
communications within E-Tel to, for example, fill out [an order form] correctly. To deliver the
expectation you already made to your customer and fill out the paperwork, find the contact to give
you the information for that. Find a way to go to that. So the biggest dilemma was, within E-Tel
we're selling relationships and [...] making relationships internally, but there is] no guideline.
There's no idiot's chart. There's no, 'this is your [general service] team, this is your [private
circuit specialist service] team'. So the experience of the Desk Salesperson was very exciting to
start with. You're in a corporate environment, you're high, fast moving, you're dealing with top-
10 [... ] customers, great selling point to your friends, to your family and to everybody else that
wants to know what you're doing in E-Tel. The reality of it is that you're selling internally, you're
not selling to your customers really. [...] You have to build relationships internally which is a sale
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of me to personnel within E-Tel. If you don't make that relationship within E-Tel you're not going
to sell anything, in the real world. You can sell [private circuits] to the customer, you can sell
[DSL] to the customer, but without having that relationship internally, you can't go any further.
And that was the reality as a Desk Salesperson.
As Cynthia suggests, Desk Salespeople needed to enact a set of tactics to enlist the
unprescribed cooperation of E-Tel's service work. Without such unprescribed cooperation, Desk
Salespeople could not help their customers with their service issues. This would jeopardize Desk
Salespeople's ability to use Siebel to create a representation of compliance with sales and
saleswork targets. Cynthia's explanation is suggestive in regards to the breadth of Desk
Salespeople's unprescribed cooperation tactics. Cynthia used two very different expressions:
"selling internally" and "building relationships." This suggests that unprescribed personal ties
were one of the many tactics that Desk Salespeople enacted to enlist the cooperation of service
units.
DESK SALESPEOPLE'S UNPRESCRIBED COOPERATION TACTICS
The unprescribed cooperation tactics that Desk Salespeople enacted were shaped by the
complexity of their service work and by the specific features of each service unit. E-Tel had
three types of service units: Central Service, specialist service units, and E-Tel's Escalation unit.
Central Service addressed most of E-Tel's customers' service issues. It was the unit with which
Desk Salespeople had the highest need and the highest opportunity to establish unprescribed
personal ties. As they interacted with Central Service representatives, Desk Salespeople were
able to establish such ties with them and use these ties to enlist Central Service representatives'
unprescribed cooperation. Building enduring personal ties with specialist service representatives
was more difficult because Desk Salespeople had a much lower frequency of interaction with
this type of unit. Desk Salespeople were able to use these units' prescribed channels to place
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orders. For simple service issues, Desk Salespeople allowed specialist service representatives to
take credit for orders customers place to Desk Salespeople in exchange for specialist service
representatives' unprescribed cooperation in Desk Salespeople's service work. For complex
issues, Desk Salespeople exposed specialist service representatives to customers, who put
pressure on specialist service representatives to get their service issues addressed promptly and
effectively. E-Tel's Escalation unit could only be reached through an on-line form, precluding
the use of any of the tactics that Desk Salespeople enacted to get the unprescribed cooperation of
Central Service representatives and specialist service representatives. To enlist the cooperation of
this unit, Desk Salespeople disguised their service tasks, increasing their importance to ensure
that they would be one of the issues that this unit would choose to benefit from faster service.
Central Service.: Mediated informal ties and taggedformal channels
Desk Salespeople had the highest need of and opportunity for establishing unprescribed
personal ties with E-Tel's Central Service unit. Desk Salespeople needed the cooperation of
Central Service for their unprescribed service work because this service unit was equipped, and
had the formal responsibility to address most of the service problems and requests that Desk
Salespeople received from their customers. This need for frequent interaction with Central
Service created the opportunity to establish personal informal cooperation ties with Central
Service representatives. This opportunity, however, was limited by Central Service's prescribed
work processes and prescribed communication channels. Central Service managed its workload
through a First-In-First-Out (FIFO) system. Unlike Desk Salespeople, Central Service
representatives were not assigned to specific accounts. Instead customers' service requests
arrived to a general electronic mail address for Central Service (CENTSERV@e-tel.com) -
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called the "bucket" in E-Tel's lingo - to which all central service representatives had access.
According to Central Service's prescribed procedure, Central Service representatives were
required to address the problem or request that had been in the queue for longest. The description
of the ordering process that Desk Salespeople received during their initial training upon joining
described Central Service's FIFO process in practice. In the second training session for the
fourth batch of newly hired Desk Salespeople, Christine, their trainer, explained that when Desk
Salespeople received an order from a customer they should fill all the necessary forms and "kick
it to [Central] Service," "if [Central] Service has any queries, they'll come back to the customer
or to you if the customer can't answer." Christine said that the order then went to Order
Fulfillment ("people that spend the whole day entering orders into [the ordering system], that's
all they do"). If Order Fulfillment could not fill the order, it went to the bottom of their "bucket,"
when it reached the top of the bucket again, the order then went to the bottom of the Central
Service's "bucket" and the first available service representative worked on it: "it can stay in this
loop for 20 days," Christine warned. The bucket nature of service had thus two consequences.
Problems and requests were assigned to the first available service agent and the same problem
and request could be assigned to different service agents as it moved from "bucket" to "bucket."
These two consequences created two challenges for Desk Salespeople when establishing an
informal cooperation tie with Central Service representatives. First, Desk Salespeople could not
be sure that the Central Service representatives with whom they had informal cooperation ties
would be the ones working on the service problems and requests Desk Salespeople sent to
Central Service. Secondly, Desk Salespeople could not be sure that the same Central Service
representative would address each service problem and request as it bounced between Central
Service and Order Fulfillment.
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Central Service's prescribed communication channels made informal personal ties
between Desk Salespeople and Central Service representatives even more difficult. Central
Service representatives did not have personal electronic mail addresses that Desk Salespeople
could use to reach individual Customer Service representatives directly. Central Service
representatives did, however, have a direct telephone number but it could only be found in E-
Tel's internal telephone directory by using the service representative's full name. It was not
possible to find Central Service representatives' telephone numbers by specifying their function
or the service center they belonged to. To summarize, Desk Salespeople needed the individual
cooperation of Central Service representatives to accomplish their unprescribed service work.
However, Central Service's work processes and formal communication channels hampered the
creation of the personal informal ties that the literature suggests that such cooperation needs.
For routine customer service tasks, Desk Salespeople improvised on Central Service's
formal work processes and communication channels to engage in the mediated construction of
informal ties. At the beginning of their tenure at DeskSales, Desk Salespeople used Service's
bucket system to report their customers' problems and requests. Once Desk Salespeople found a
Service representative who was willing to help them with their routine service tasks, they used
the telephone to establish a friendship tie with this service agent and used the telephone, not
service's "bucket" electronic mail to engage the cooperation of Service representatives in Desk
Salespeople's prescribed routine service tasks. One of Desk Salespeople's routine service tasks
was to confirm that their customers' orders were delivered on time. Mark, a Desk Salesperson in
one of the Technology and Media teams, called Marie, a Service representative in E-Tel's
Corporate Customers Service Center, every morning to monitor the delivery of his customers'
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orders. In one such call, Mark was not only able to get immediate information on the status of his
customers' orders, but also to reinforce his good relationship with Marie.
Mark started the conversation by saying, with a smile, "I haven't spoken to you in a
while." Marie replied with a giggle, "but we spoke yesterday." Mark immediately retorted,
widening his smile "but you're so wonderful that time spent without speaking to you is counted
in dog years!" Marie giggled and sighed, "Mark, you're such a charmer!" Mark then went into
more serious matters, asking Marie about orders directly placed to Central Service. Marie
confirmed that the orders had been placed and that installation was due to occur within the time
frame requested by the customer. After he hung up Mark said, "I call them everyday and cheer
them up, then they [check the status of any orders] I need, I don't work with any of [E-Tel's]
systems."
When dealing with non-routine service tasks, Desk Salespeople faced a more difficult
informal cooperation challenge, even when they had a relationship with Central Service
representatives such as the one that Mark had with Marie. This cooperation challenge came from
the mediated nature of that relationship. Routine tasks could be addressed in one or two
phonecalls. Non-routine tasks required exchanging complex information across a longer time
span - these tasks were too complex to coordinate over the telephone. In such tasks, Desk
Salespeople improvised with Service's "bucket" electronic mail address to be able to
communicate directly with the Service representatives with whom they had friendship ties. The
goal was to ensure that it was these representatives, and no others, dealing with Desk
Salespeople's non-routine problem or requests. Desk Salespeople worked around Service's
prescribed communication channel in two ways. One was to write the name of the service
representative with whom they had a friendship tie in the electronic mail message's subject line.
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Service representatives responded to this tactic by moving to the next electronic mail in the
Service queue and leaving these electronic mail messages in the "bucket" so that the named
Service representatives would address them.
Desk Salespeople also used the phone to circumvent the difficulty of establishing a direct
communication channel to a specific Central Service representative. Desk Salespeople called the
Central Service representative with whom they had an enduring personal tie to alert her or him
that they were sending an email to the bucket. Central Service representatives monitored
Service's electronic mail "bucket" and picked their Desk Salespeople's message as soon as it
entered the "bucket." These two improvisations allowed Desk Salespeople to place a tag on
formal impersonal communication channels to personalize service problems requests and the
information needed to address them. The way Jeremy, a Desk Salesman in one of the four Retail
teams, got a Central Service representative to help him address a problem with the EPROM of a
telephone switch installed at one of his customers highlights the micro-practices that constituted
this informal cooperation tactic. Jeremy had sent an electronic mail message to the Switch
service center- a specialist service unit at E-Tel that delivered, repaired and answered queries
about large telephone switches. Jeremy received a reply via electronic mail that stated the switch
specialist service center would not deal with this problem because it was a "Service Center /
Desk Salespeople activity." Jeremy called Tom, the Service representative to whom Jeremy sent
his routine service problems and requests. Jeremy wanted to let Tom know that Jeremy was
sending him an electronic mail regarding this EPROM problem. Tom did not answer Jeremy's
call, so Jeremy wrote Tom an electronic mail giving him the details of the EPROM issue. Jeremy
also included a thread with all the electronic mails he had exchanged with the customer
regarding this issue. He sent the electronic mail to Service's "bucket" electronic mail inbox but
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put Tom's name in the subject line: "to the attention of Tom Campbell." Jeremy repeated this
line at the start of the electronic mail message in underlined red characters. After sending the
message, Jeremy called the customer to get more information on the switch configuration.
Jeremy then called Tom and gave him a summary of the customer's own diagnosis of the
problem. Tom asked Jeremy for additional details on the customer's switch setup and Jeremy
replied that he was going to get a switch specialist "to do a bit of legwork." Jeremy said that he
would then report to back to Tom with the information. Jeremy finished the call thanking Tom
for his help.
Jeremy's interaction with Tom shows a familiar pattern of unprescribed cooperation
based on personal ties except for one important difference - the mediated nature of their
interaction. It suggests that when unprescribed cooperation is mediated, there is an additional
layer of work in the process of unprescribed cooperation: parties need to improvise ways to use
prescribed communication channels for unprescribed ends.
Desk Salespeople's mediated relationships with a small number of Service
representatives allowed them to engage Service representatives' cooperation in their
unprescribed service work. There was, however, the possibility that these Service representatives
were away from their workplace on training or on holidays. Away from the telephone and
electronic mail that connected them to Desk Salespeople. In such occasions, Desk Salespeople
drew on a practice frequently described in the sociological literature on informal networks:
referrals (e.g., Fernandez, Castilla, & Moore, 2000). When Central Service representatives went
on holiday or went on training, Desk Salespeople asked to be referred to other service agents that
would honor informal cooperation ties. Larry's use of a referral to get information on all the
telephone lines invoiced to one of his customers highlights the features of this tactic. AllesCorp,
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one of Larry's customers, was switching all its analogical telephone lines to digital lines. This
switch was being done in batches. Every three months Larry needed to look up all the telephone
lines that were rented by one of AllesCorp's subsidiaries and create a service request to convert
those lines to digital. Larry got Paul, his contact in Central Service, to do the analog line report
for him. However, Paul was on holiday for the month of August, when one of AllesCorp's
subsidiaries, TetraCorp, was due to have its lines converted to digital. Before Paul left for his
holidays, Larry called him and got the name of another Central Service representative - Tom
Andersen- who would be willing to help him. When Larry needed the report on TetraCorp's
analog lines, he sent the following electronic mail to the Central Service "bucket."
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Howard,P,Larry,ETDS64 HOWARL R
> Sent: 13 August 2003 14:01
> To: E-TEL SERVICE G
> Cc:
> Subject: FOR TOM ANDERSEN - TETRACORP LINE REPORT
> A few months ago, I contacted Paul Morten and he did a report for me on lines for
> some of ALLESCORP subsidiaries. I believe he is on annual leave this week and gave >me your
name as a contact.
> I was wondering whether you could help me in a similar way. I need to run a report on
>TETRACORP, which is now part of ALLESCORP. I need to find all the lines that are
> (including featurelines) invoiced to them. Is it possible if you could do this. If so
> how long would it take to run this report? If you have any queries or questions please
>get in contact with me. Many thanks!
Larry said that "this guy is Paul's buddy at the service center" and that "he doesn't really
have to do this, but I hope he will." Larry got an electronic mail with a Microsoft Excel
spreadsheet with the information on TetraCorp's lines the next day.
Taken together, the tactics that Desk Salespeople enacted to enlist the unprescribed
cooperation of Central Service representatives focused on creating and maintaining an enduring
mediated personal tie with a small number of these service representatives. The success of these
tactics hinged on the frequency of communication between Desk Salespeople and Central
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Service representatives. It was this frequency of communication that provided Desk Salespeople
both the opportunity and the motive to establish enduring personal ties with Central Service
representatives. Desk Salespeople has a much lower frequency of interaction with specialist
service units. Although Desk Salespeople interacted with specialist service units on a daily basis,
they seldom did so with the same specialist service unit. This jeopardized the opportunity and the
motivation to establish enduring personal ties with specialist service representatives.
Specialist service units.: Channeling, trading and exposing
Desk Salespeople only needed the help of each specific service unit occasionally.
Consequently, Desk Salespeople had less of a need and less of an opportunity to build enduring
personal ties with specialist service representatives. However, Desk Salespeople did need the
unprescribed cooperation of these units for their service work. Desk Salespeople enacted three
different tactics to enlist the unprescribed cooperation of specialist service representatives,
depending on the complexity of the service task at hand. For orders, Desk Salespeople relied on
specialist service representatives use of their prescribed ordering channels. Specialist service
representatives placed any order they received through these channels even if they were form E-
Tel units that were not allowed to place orders to specialist service units (such as DeskSales). For
simple service tasks, Desk Salespeople allowed specialist service representatives to report some
of the orders that customers placed to Desk Salespeople in exchange for specialist service
representatives' cooperation in Desk Salespeople's service work. For complex service tasks,
Desk Salespeople gave their customers the phone number of specialist service representatives to
get customers to put pressure on them.
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Desk Salespeople's relationship with specialist service units was different from their
relationship with Central Service in two important ways. First, whereas Desk Salespeople had
frequent contact with Central Service, they only had occasional contact with specialist service
units. Whereas Central Service dealt with most service requests and problems for Desk
Salespeople's customers, specialist service units dealt only with service problems and requests
for specific products. DSL and Billing were two examples of specialist service units. The DSL
specialist service unit only received DSL orders, only answered DSL questions and only repaired
faults with DSL connections and equipment. The billing specialist service unit made changes to
customers' billing options, answered billing questions and resolved payment and invoicing
disputes. Desk Salespeople only called a specific specialist service unit when their customers
placed requests or problems related to a specialist unit's knowledge. Desk Salespeople's
relationship with Central Service thus entailed much more frequent interaction than their
relationship with specialist service units.
Second, whereas Central Service shared with Desk Salespeople a high level of exposure
to the customer, specialist service units were shielded from customer interaction. There were no
formal communication channels for customers to contact specialist service units with problems
and requests. Moreover specialists rarely called the customer directly when needing more
information about a reported problem or service request. Instead specialist service
representatives called Central Service or the account's Desk Salesperson and had them talk to the
customer. Specialist service units were, however, similar to Central Service in that they used a
"bucket" electronic mail address and dealt with problems and requests on a first-in-first-out
basis.
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Desk Salespeople had less of an opportunity to establish informal cooperation ties with
specialist service representatives and, to some extent, less of a motive to do so. Desk Salespeople
frequently needed the assistance of specialized service units, but they rarely needed the help of a
specific specialized service unit at a frequency that would require informal cooperation ties.
Nonetheless, Desk Salespeople needed a set of tactics to engage specialized service
representatives in Desk Salespeople's unprescribed service work. The tactics that Desk
Salespeople drew on to achieve the cooperation of these units depended on Desk Salespeople
interpretation of how routine their customers problems and requests were for the specialist
service unit whose cooperation Desk Salespeople needed.
The most routine of service tasks for which Desk Salespeople needed the help of
specialist service units was placing orders. As Chapter 5 shows, one of Desk Salespeople's main
sources of reported sales were the orders that customers placed directly with them. Desk
Salespeople needed the cooperation of specialized service units to place orders for their
customers because Desk Salespeople did not have access to any of the specialized order-placing
information systems and no formal authority to initiate product installations at their customers'
premises. Desk Salespeople used the formal communication channels to specialized service units
to place these orders, in spite of not having any formal tie to these units. In practice this
channeling tactic consisted of using the formal communication channels meant to receive
product and service orders from Central Service. E-Tel's DSL specialist service unit used an
electronic form to receive DSL orders from Central Service at its DSL-ORDERS(e-tel.com.
DSL orders, however, not only provided revenue for Desk Salespeople to claim as the outcome
of their own saleswork but also provided an opportunity to contact the upper echelons of their
customers' management levels. Because of this, Desk Salespeople took on their customers' DSL
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implementation and placed these orders themselves. For DSL specialist service representatives,
the only difference between the orders received from Desk Salespeople and the orders received
from customers was the internal E-Tel electronic mail address on the order's "From" field. DSL
specialist service representatives, however, fulfilled Desk Salespeople's DSL orders without
questioning their origin. This suggests that DSL specialist service representatives used their
formal order channel canonically - they fulfilled every order they got in the shape of an order
form sent to DSL-ORDERS(e-tel.com. However, specialist service representatives did not
follow their formal ordering process- they took orders from Desk Salespeople instead of just
taking orders from Central Service as they were supposed to.
Channeling - the tactic of using prescribed communication channels to support
unprescribed work processes - allowed Desk Salespeople to engage the unprescribed
cooperation of DSL specialist service representatives for their service work. Desk Salespeople
used communication channels prescribed for Central Service in placing DSL orders, to make
DSL orders directly on behalf of their customers. By doing so, Desk Salespeople created a de
facto unprescribed but impersonal cooperation relationship with DSL specialist service
representatives. This impersonal cooperation relationship, however, depended on DSL specialist
service representatives' practices. If DSL specialist service representatives followed their
prescribed relationships, they would have refused Desk Salespeople's DSL order forms thus
compromising Desk Salespeople's ability to use DSL to establish a "central point of contact"
relationship with their customers that allowed them to report customers' orders as the outcome of
their own saleswork. It was specialist service representatives' disregard for their prescribed
relationships with the rest of E-Tel that allowed Desk Salespeople to do so.
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Desk Salespeople also needed the cooperation of specialist service units for routine
service problems and requests. Enlisting the cooperation of specialist service units for routine
service tasks was a more complex challenge than enlisting the cooperation of these service units
to place orders. Whereas orders required no interaction between Desk Salespeople and specialist
service representatives, this was not the case with service problems and requests, no matter how
routine they were. Desk Salespeople needed to persuade specialist service representatives to
accept work from a part of E-Tel with which they had no prescribed relationship with, through
an informal use of the communication channel that connected specialist service representatives to
the rest of E-Tel. When Desk Salespeople needed the cooperation of specialist service units to
address a routine customer problem, Desk Salespeople engaged in a spot trading arrangement
with a service representative in that specialist unit. In these spot trading arrangements, Desk
Salespeople offered the right to represent work in exchange for specialist service representatives'
assistance in addressing the service problems and requests that customers sent to Desk
Salespeople. Specialist service representatives received a small bonus (10% of their salary, an
average of $3,000) for the value of the equipment their customers purchased as a result of service
upgrades. If Desk Salespeople had unreported orders for the type of equipment that specialist
service units billed for, Desk Salespeople allowed specialist service representatives to report
these equipment orders as the outcome of their own service work in return for the help of
specialist service representatives' help in addressing Desk Salespeople's service problems and
requests.
Eric, a Desk Salesman in one of the two Technology and Media teams, received a call
from a customer asking him to change the type of private circuits that connected all the stores of
the customer's retail network. The customer wanted to change those circuits from a virtual
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private network to an integrated private network. This required using E-Tel's private circuit
information system to change several hundred circuits individually Eric wrote the following
electronic mail to the central electronic mail address of the private circuit specialist service unit:
-----Original Message-----
> From: Rogers,T,ERIC,ETDS55 ROGERSER6 R
>Sent: 2 June 2003 16:22
> To: E-TEL PRIVCIRC G
> Cc:
> Subject: CHANGE FROM VPN TO IPN
> Hi,
> I received the following orders from TRICORP:
> 2 private circuits between Northville and Southville @ 150Kb per circuit
> 5 virtual private circuits between Athens and New York @ 500Kb per circuit
> I have not raised these orders so you can raise them yourself.
> TRICORP is wants to convert the VPN with their stores into an IPN (see attached
> spreadsheet for circuit references). Could you please execute this change and electronic mail
confirmations to me (jrogersge-tel.com) and the customer (mrifkingtricorp.com)
Eric explained, "I can only see the front end of [E-Tel's private circuit information
system], so I sent this to [the private circuit specialist] service [unit] because it's not my job, I
also sent them a 30K [thousand dollars] order to make them happy." Eric's expectation was that
the specialist service representative that read this message was willing to make the circuit
changes that Eric's customer requested in return for being allowed to place the order that Eric's
customer had made.
Engaging the help of specialist service representatives for non-routine service problems
and requests was more difficult than enlisting their help to address routine service tasks. Not only
had Desk Salespeople to persuade specialist service representatives to accept work from a part of
E-Tel they had no relationship with, but also to exert extra effort when doing so. In Desk
Salespeople interpretation, this was especially challenging because specialist service had a
relatively low exposure to customers, making them unresponsive even to customer problems that
resulted from their own action. John, a Desk Salesman in one of the retail teams received a call
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from a customer complaining about a virtual private network (VPN) that the VPN specialist
service unit had installed for that customer. John said that customers always talk to Desk
Salespeople for service issues, offering this analogy: "if there's a problem with the car you
bought last week," he said as an example, "you're not going to call service, you're going to call
the bloke who sold it to you." John explained that the exact same thing happens with Desk
Salespeople, "I really shouldn't be dealing with this, as a Desk Salesperson, but who else is going
to deal with it with the same urgency as I am?" John said that he could send it to the VPN
specialist service center again but, he complained making a gesture of putting a sheet of paper
under a big pile of paper on his desk exemplifying specialist service representatives putting his
issue in the bottom of their "bucket," "they don't see the angry customer and they don't care if the
customer doesn't buy from us anymore, in fact it's less work for them, but we're paid on what the
customers buy." He called the VPN specialist service unit and the specialist service
representative who answered his call told John that he was going to see what was going on at the
customer's site. John said that "if they don't call me in an hour, I'll call them because the
customer will call me asking what's going on."
To address specialist service units' isolation from the customer, Desk Salespeople
improvised a tactic to give specialist service representatives the same exposure to customers that
Desk Salespeople endured. Donald's successful attempt to have one of his customers put
pressure on a DSL specialist service representative to address a line fault complaint highlights
the central features of this tactic. Donald, a Desk Salesman in one of the Finance teams, received
a call from a customer's senior manager reporting a DSL line fault. This fault was preventing
this senior manager from participating in a virtual conference call. Donald needed the DSL
specialist service unit to address this fault immediately. Donald lied to the DSL specialist
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service representative who took his call saying that he was unable to diagnose the customer's
problem, which meant that a DSL service representative had to call the customer directly. The
DSL service representative said that he would call in an hour. Donald said that he was going to
call the customer and tell them that they would get a call in an hour and asked for the DSL
service representative's name (Gary). Donald also asked for a surname, and was told it was
Harrison. Donald then called the customer and told him that he would get a call in an hour and
gave him Gary's telephone number and full name and told the customer to call Gary if Gary
didn't call him within an hour. Donald finished the call asking the customer to get in touch with
him, if he didn't get a call from Gary and had trouble reaching Gary by himself.
As Donald's improvisation shows, exposing specialist service representatives to
customers required two accomplishments. The first was to create a legitimate reason for a
specialist service representative to call the customer. The second was to obtain the specialist
service representative's contact information and pass it on to the customer. This made service
representatives visible to customers and gave customers the possibility of making themselves
visible to the specialist service representatives and get their problems and requests addressed.
E-Tel's escalation service unit.: Disguising
E-Tel had a small set of units that, because of their function, had only very limited formal
communication channels with the rest of the company. Desk Salespeople needed the cooperation
of one such unit for their unprescribed service work - E-Tel's escalation unit. In E-Tel's lingo,
escalating a customer's problem or request meant addressing it within a much shorter time span
than usual. If a hospital had a problem with its telephone switch, E-Tel's escalation unit would
address the problem immediately to prevent potential hazards for patients. A problem with a
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regular company's telephone switch would be addressed by Central Service within a 3-day time
span. E-Tel's escalation unit accepted escalation requests form Central Service via an on-line
form and acted only on 5 of such requests per week.
Desk Salespeople needed the cooperation of E-Tel's escalation unit for their service work
on two types of occasions: (i) when they forgot to ask for Central Service's help in addressing a
customer's problem or request and would miss the deadline they had promised to their customer
because of it; (ii) and when customers or field salespeople demanded urgent service in return for
allowing Desk Salespeople to report an order as the outcome of their own saleswork. The
challenge that Desk Salespeople faced when attempting to have escalation requests approved was
threefold. First, Desk Salespeople had no formal relationships with E-Tel's escalation unit. E-
Tel's escalation unit only had prescribed relationships with Central Service and with specialist
service units. Formally, E-Tel's escalation unit could refuse Desk Salespeople's escalation
requests on the grounds of not having a prescribed tie to DeskSales. Second, Desk Salespeople
not only had to ensure that escalation engineers accepted their escalation requests, they also had
to find a tactic to increase the likelihood that their escalation request was among the ones
selected for escalation. Third, E-Tel's escalation unit could only be reached through E-Tel's
escalation on-line form on the escalation unit's website. This precluded Desk Salespeople from
forming personal informal ties with escalation engineers, ties that Desk Salespeople could use to
have their escalation requests approved through reciprocity.
The way Todd, a Desk Salesman in one of the retail sales teams attempted to have an
escalation request approved highlights the core features of the disguising tactic that Desk
Salespeople drew on to enlist the cooperation of E-Tel's escalation unit. Todd received a call
from a customer asking him to confirm a telephone switch installation, ordered three weeks ago
- 203 -
and due within the next two days. Todd realized that he had not placed the order with Central
Service, which meant that he would miss the date that he had promised to his customer by at
least three days. To avoid this, Todd wrote an escalation case to get his customer's telephone
switch installed within 2 days. Todd lied on the escalation form to increase the likelihood of
having his escalation case accepted. After completing the on-line escalation form, Todd said that
this escalation case was "a work of Tolstoy, just pure fiction." He pointed to the value he entered
on the form and said, "I put in $100 000, but it's really at best $42 000. He then showed the dates
he had put for the promised lead time and told me: "I put June 7 because I know that's their
criteria, it can't be less than half the standard lead time." He explained: "I know the criteria
because on an electronic mail I got about a rejected escalation case they inadvertently noted that
it was under half the promised lead time." Todd added "I know they don't have access to
systems. I once put in an escalation case for an ISDN that I said was worth 85K, as much as a
private circuit! They don't even have access to pricing!" Todd said that "everyone knows that all
escalation cases are made up." He told me that he also did it the last time he had to put one
through. Todd said that the last one he put through was for a customer's store that was opening
and had to wait 10 days for a telephone line. He told me that he wrote that it was "a life or death
situation," saying that the store could be robbed and there would be no way to call the police, or
if the store had a fire and be unable to call the firemen.
Todd's attempt to anticipate the installation of a private circuit for his customer shows
how Desk Salespeople were able to engage E-Tel's escalation unit in their unprescribed service
work, in spite of not having any possibility of establishing any personal informal ties with
escalation service representatives. First, E-Tel's escalation unit used its prescribed
communication channel canonically while not following its prescribed relationships with the rest
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of E-Tel. E-Tel's escalation unit only evaluated escalation requests that it got through its on-line
escalation form. However, E-Tel's escalation unit considered every request that it received
through its web-form, even if that request originated from units other than service and specialist
service units such as DeskSales.
Second, Desk Salespeople had to disguise their urgent service requests and problems to
fit E-Tel's escalation unit's criteria for selection. A small number of Desk Salespeople, such as
Todd, knew some of the selection criteria and wrote their escalation cases to match those criteria.
The Desk Salespeople who did not know those criteria inflated the importance of their service
problems and requests with the hope that the threat of loosing a large amount of revenue was
enough for their escalation cases to be selected.
The third and final point was that Desk Salespeople took advantage of the isolation that
protected E-Tel's escalation unit from the pressure of customer-facing units to create escalation
cases that were more likely to be selected. Todd's awareness that E-Tel's escalation unit had no
access to pricing information systems allowed him to inflate prices to increase the likelihood that
his escalation case was selected for action.
Taken together the tactics that Desk Salespeople enacted to enlist the cooperation of E-
Tel's multiple service units highlight the importance of managing the visibility of work in
unprescribed cooperation and suggest that unprescribed cooperation can unfold across spot
personal ties and also through impersonal mechanisms.
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DISCUSSION
The literature on unprescribed cooperation in organizations has focused on explaining
how agents draw on enduring personal ties to enlist the unprescribed cooperation of others
(Bower & Abolafia, 1995; Ezzamel et al., 2001). My analysis of Desk Salespeople's experience
at DeskSales adds to this literature in three ways. First, my analysis underscores the problem of
visibility in unprescribed cooperation. The mediated nature of Desk Salespeople's personal ties
with service representatives was a challenge when Desk Salespeople needed to make their work
visible to Central Service representatives. Second, my analysis shows that unprescribed
cooperation can be achieve through 'spot', ephemeral ties. Desk Salespeople were able to
establish a single-task cooperation tie with specialist service representatives through trading
arrangements or by exposing specialist service representatives to customers. Finally, my analysis
shows that unprescribed cooperation can be an impersonal process. Desk Salespeople used E-
Tel's escalation unit's on-line form to enlist the unprescribed cooperation of this unit without
having a single interaction with its members.
Making work visible
Desk Salespeople's use of their personal ties with Central Service representatives for
non-routine work surfaced the problem of making work visible. The literature on unprescribed
cooperation in organizations has not paid much attention to this problem. This literature has
mostly studied settings where mediated communication does not represent an obstacle to
unprescribed cooperation (e.g., Burawoy, 1979; Dalton, 1957; Gouldner, 1954; Walther &
Burgoon, 1992). The literature on computer-mediated cooperation has also mostly focused on
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settings where work arrangements are designed to facilitate communication to overcome spatial
and temporal distance (Cunha & Cunha, 2001; Jarvenpaa et al., 1999; Schultze et al., 2001). As
E-Tel's "bucket" communication system highlights, managers may adopt criteria other than
fostering intra-organizational interaction when designing communication systems. E-Tel's
"bucket" system was created to make service work more efficient. The FIFO workflow that this
communication channel supported minimized the ability of other E-Tel units to interrupt Central
Service representatives' work. This gave Central Service representatives more control over the
pace of their work. This communication system was an obstacle to Desk Salespeople's
unprescribed cooperation with Central Service representatives. Desk Salespeople had no way to
send information about non-routine customer service issues to Central Service representatives.
Desk Salespeople were nonetheless able to improvise on Central Service representatives'
"bucket" system to establish a direct communication channel with Central Service
representatives. By enacting this improvisation, Desk Salespeople were able to use a 'one-to-
many' communication technology to create a 'one-to-one' communication channel. This
improvisation allowed Desk Salespeople to make their service work visible to those Desk
Salespeople with whom they had a personal tie. Without this communication channel, Central
Service representatives could only have helped Desk Salespeople in their routine service tasks.
Desk Salespeople's challenge to make their unprescribed work visible and the
improvisations they enacted to address this challenge adds to the current accounts of
unprescribed cooperation by articulating one of the crucial tasks to carry out this type of
cooperation - making their work visible. Unprescribed cooperation requires a process through
which the party seeking assistance to carry out a specific task is able to provide information
about that task to the party providing assistance. When unprescribed cooperation is carried out in
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contexts where unprescribed communication is not hindered by prescribed communication
channels, it is easy to provide that information. However, if managers implement communication
technology to hinder unprescribed communication, then unprescribed cooperation will require
more work than simply establishing and maintaining personal ties. Agents will need to make
their work visible through communication channels that are hostile to unprescribed cooperation
based on personal ties.
'Spot' unprescribed cooperation
The literature on unprescribed cooperation in organizations has documented how agents
use enduring personal ties to enact unprescribed spot arrangements (Burawoy, 1979; Dalton,
1950; Manning, 1977). Research on unprescribed cooperation practices associated with formal
performance measurement (Ball et al., 2000) and the broader literature on performance
measurement in organizations (Van Maanen et al., 1994) have shown that employees can engage
in trading to achieve performance targets without engaging in the level of effort necessary to
reach those targets. However, these studies show that these trading arrangements occur in the
context of enduring personal ties. That was not the case at DeskSales. Desk Salespeople were
able to trade the right to report customers' orders in exchange for specialist service
representatives' unprescribed cooperation in their service work. The difference is that trading in
the context of personal ties hinges on delayed reciprocity (cf. Gouldner, 1960): employees in
these studies have similar interests and trade like for like. In such cases, reciprocity has a
temporal element. The spot trade is not carried out simultaneously. Thus, a policewoman allows
a policeman to log her arrests as his own, knowing that if she falls short of her target next month
she can go to him for help.
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Desk Salespeople's trading with specialist service representatives was instantaneous.
Desk Salespeople offered specialist service representatives orders to report as their own in the
same email message where they asked for specialist service representatives' help. There was no
need for personal ties to ensure reciprocity. Moreover, Desk Salespeople's spot training with
specialist service representatives did not lead to personal ties. Desk Salespeople did not require
the help of each specific specialist service unit frequently for specialist service representatives to
be able to rely on Desk Salespeople to meet their targets for reported orders. The low frequency
of interaction with specific service unit also limited Desk Salespeople's motivation to establish
personal ties with specialist service representatives. Together, the limited motivation that
specialist service representatives and Desk Salespeople had to establish enduring personal ties
with each other and the instantaneous nature of their trading arrangements reproduced the 'spot'
nature of this tactics.
Desk Salespeople's tactics to enlist the cooperation of specialist service representatives
also adds to the literature on unprescribed cooperation in organizations by showing how external
agents can participate in unprescribed cooperation among organizational units Desk Salespeople
were able to establish 'spot' relationships between their customers and specialist service
representatives to enlist the help of the latter in their non-routine service tasks. By enacting this
tactic, Desk Salespeople were deflecting to specialist service representatives the pressure that
customers placed on them. Once Desk Salespeople exposed specialist service representatives to
customers, they considered their role regarding that specific service issue completed. Desk
Salespeople's expectation was that specialist service representatives responded to customer-
induced pressure like Desk Salespeople did. The low frequency with which each customer
experienced the same type of complex service issue limited the establishment of personal ties
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between customers and specialist service representatives. Moreover, specialist service
representatives shun away from customer contact to avoid this pressure, further hindering the
possibility of personal ties between specialist service representatives and customers.
Together, Desk Salespeople's enactment of trading and exposing tactics shows that spot
unprescribed cooperation arrangements are not only possible but also viable. Enduring personal
ties are not a necessary condition for unprescribed cooperation. Instead, they are one of the
possible conditions in which such cooperation may occur.
Impersonal unprescribed cooperation
The literature on unprescribed cooperation in organizations tends to equate unprescribed
cooperation with cooperation based on enduring personal ties (e.g., Krackhardt, Brass, &
Galaskiewics, 1994). Research on unprescribed cooperation in organizations has focused on how
agents use personal communication channels, such as meetings (Watson, 2001), telephone (Bain
et al., 2000) and email (Romm et al., 1998), to engage in unprescribed cooperation.
Desk Salespeople's channeling tactic and especially their disguising tactic show that
unprescribed cooperation can also be achieved by impersonal means. Desk Salespeople were
able to enlist the cooperation of E-Tel's escalation unit without ever directly communicating to
anyone in the unit. Instead, they used formal impersonal channels to obtain the help of E-Tel's
Escalation unit in their service work, even for service tasks that this unit would otherwise reject.
This suggests that when documenting and explaining unprescribed cooperation in organizations
researchers have not only to observe the network of communication, which includes impersonal
channels such as the escalation forms used by E-Tel's Escalation unit.
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CONCLUSION
The goal of this chapter was to explain how Desk Salespeople were able to accomplish
their service work without being able to do that work on their own and without having the
authority to make others do it for them. Desk Salespeople were able to carry out their service
work by enlisting the unprescribed cooperation of E-Tel's service units through personal and
impersonal tactics. Desk Salespeople's unprescribed cooperation tactics show that unprescribed
cooperation can happen through personal ties that last only as long as a service task and that
vanish once that task is completed. What is more, Desk Salespeople's 'channeling' and
'disguising' tactics show that unprescribed cooperation can happen in the absence of any kind of
personal interaction.
This chapter makes the case for complementing the study of unprescribed cooperation
practices based on enduring personal relationships with the study of unprescribed cooperation
tactics based on thinner relationships and in the improvisational use of formal communication
channels. Desk Salespeople's unprescribed cooperation tactics reveal a 'shadow' organization
much broader than the "organization behind the charts" that enduring personal ties constitute.
These tactics show how formal organizational resources, such as communication channels,
performance appraisal systems and incentive systems can be used to ends that may even conflict
with their intended purposes. The communication channels designed to protect E-Tel's escalation
unit from pressures from the rest of the organization were used by Desk Salespeople to increase
that pressure on behalf of Desk Salespeople's customers. Desk Salespeople used the incentive
systems that were designed to motivate specialist service representatives to upgrade their
customers' equipment to get specialist service representatives to help Desk Salespeople with
their routine service tasks.
-211 -
More importantly, my analysis of Desk Salespeople's unprescribed cooperation tactics
shows that the network of unprescribed personal ties in an organization accounts only for part of
the unprescribed cooperation in that organization. That network of personal ties is but a part of
the network of unprescribed practices that supports unprescribed cooperation in organizations.
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CHAPTER 7: FACADES, WORK VISIBILITY AND THE PRODUCTION OF FORMAL
REPRESENTATIONS OF WORK
My goal in this chapter is to integrate my analysis of Desk Salespeople's experience into
two theoretical contributions. The first theoretical contribution is to provide a view of agency in
the production of computer-generated formal representations of work. This view complements
the dominant view of agency in this process. This dominant view shows how information
technology generates formal representations of employees' action as they use this technology to
engage in their everyday work (Ball et al., 2000). The role of employees in this process is one of
more or less unwilling subjects of observation. The role of managers is that of willing agents of
observation through these computer-generated formal representations of work. My analysis of
Desk Salespeople's experience shows that managers and employees can take the leading role in
the production of computer-generated formal representations of work. At DeskSales, they did so
by participating in the creation of a facade of compliance with prescribed goals, rules, roles and
procedures. By creating this facade of compliance for upper-level managers, they were able to
:reap the organizational and personal benefits of complying with prescribed targets for sales and
saleswork without doing the work needed to reach those targets.
The second theoretical contribution is to provide an alternative tactic for agents to shape
the visibility of their action to others. The dominant view of practice visibility argues that
managing the visibility of one's practices is accomplished by regionalizing spaces of interaction
into front stages and back stages (Giddens, 1986; Hagerstrand, 1967; Turner, 1974). My analysis
of Desk Salespeople's experience shows that agents can also regionalize spaces into facades.
When doing so, agents attempt to shape their audience's interpretation of the space of interaction
-213-
as a back stage, providing full visibility of agents' practices. However, agents use that space as a
front stage to put out a performance for their own benefit.
Before explaining these two contributions in detail, I summarize my analysis of Desk
Salespeople's and Desk Sales Managers' experience at DeskSales.
A SUMMARY OF REPRESENTATION WORK AT DESKSALES
The preceding three chapters have highlighted the following: Desk Sales Managers were
under pressure to create a formal representation of compliance with the sales and saleswork
targets that DeskSales' two General Managers imposed on the unit. Desk Sales Managers had to
create this representation of compliance by leading a team of inexperienced and poorly trained
Desk Salespeople with little will or skill to sell. Desk Sales Managers were able to have their
Desk Salespeople create a representation of compliance with their prescribed sales and saleswork
targets. Desk Sales Managers succeeded in this goal by enforcing the creation of such
representations instead of enforcing the sales and saleswork that would produce a representation
of compliance with prescribed goals, rules, roles and procedures. Desk Salespeople could
produce a representation of compliance with saleswork targets by improvising with their
prescribed information system - Siebel - because upper-level managers only had access to very
aggregate reports of Desk Salespeople's sales and saleswork. These improvisations in Siebel
were not enough to see Desk Salespeople through as far as their sales targets were concerned.
Field Salespeople stood between Desk Salespeople and their ability to represent customers'
orders and some of field salespeople's sales as the outcome of their own saleswork. Field
salespeople guarded their accounts jealously from other E-Tel units including DeskSales. By
taking on field salespeople's service work, Desk Salespeople were able to persuade field
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salespeople to allow Desk Salespeople to report some of field salespeople's sales and all
customers' orders as the outcome of their own saleswork.
Engaging in customer service was far from a trivial task. Customer service work posed
self-coordination and cooperation challenges for Desk Salespeople. Desk Salespeople interpreted
Siebel - their prescribed information system - as a "reporting tool." Siebel was there to produce
a formal representation of compliance with sales and saleswork targets. Desk Salespeople's
service work was nonetheless complex enough to require an information system for three
purposes. First, Desk Salespeople needed an information system to scaffold the memory of their
outstanding service tasks. Second, Desk Salespeople needed an information system to scaffold
the memory of the information they needed to complete their outstanding service work. Thirdly
and finally, Desk Salespeople needed an information system to prioritize their service tasks and
keep a record of those priorities. Desk Salespeople improvised a paper-based information system
to scaffold their service work. Also, Desk Salespeople prioritized their service work according to
how visible each service task was made by their customers.
Desk Salespeople did not have the knowledge, nor did they have the resources to engage
in service work on their own. Desk Salespeople needed to enlist the unprescribed cooperation of
E-Tel's multiple service units to this end. Desk Salespeople were able to establish mediated
personal ties with Central Service - E-Tel's main service unit. Desk Salespeople drew on these
personal ties to invoke the cooperation of central service representatives in Desk Salespeople's
service tasks. Desk Salespeople were able to get the cooperation of specialist service units in
three different ways. One was by taking advantage of specialist service representatives' use of
order forms. Desk Salespeople sent orders to specialist service units although they were not
allowed to do so. Specialist service representatives filled any order as long as it was in a form,
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allowing Desk Salespeople to use these units to fill their customers' orders. Desk Salespeople
were also able to trade with specialist service representatives representation rights for
cooperation in service work. Desk Salespeople allowed specialist service representatives to
report some of the orders that customers placed to Desk Salespeople as their own. In return
specialist service representatives helped Desk Salespeople with their service tasks. Third, Desk
Salespeople were able to expose specialist service representatives to customers. This allowed
Desk Salespeople to transfer the pressure they got from customers to specialist service
representatives and thus enlist their cooperation in service tasks.
This summary of my analysis of Desk Sales Managers and Desk Salespeople's challenges
at DeskSales and the tactics that they enacted to address those challenges suggests that Desk
Sales Managers and Desk Salespeople played a central role in the production of formal
representations of their work in Siebel. This not only suggests a complementary view of the role
of managers and employees in the production of computer-generated formal representations of
work, but also an alternative approach to managing the visibility of action in organizations.
To make the first point, I articulate six differences between the view of agency in the
production of computer-generated formal representations of work suggested by my research at
DeskSales and the dominant view of agency in this process espoused by the literature on
information technology and organizations.
To make the second point, I explain how agents can shape the visibility of their action by
regionalizing their information system into a facade which combines elements of front stages
with elements of back stages.
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ON AGENCY IN COMPUTER-GENERATED FORMAL REPRESENTATIONS OF
WORK
My analysis of Desk Salespeople's and Desk Sales Managers' practices with and around
Siebel suggests a view of the role of agency in producing computer-generated formal
representations of work that complements the dominant approach to this topic. Specifically, my
research at DeskSales suggests a role for agents in the production of computer-generated formal
representations of work that differs from the dominant view on their role in this process in six
aspects.
First, I show that at DeskSales, the production of computer-generated formal
representations of work was a labor intensive process. Desk Salespeople not only had to enter a
representation of compliance with sales and saleswork targets, but also do service work to obtain
permission to report others' sales as their own. This is more work that what the dominant view
on the production of computer-generated formal representations of work suggests. According to
this view, formal representations of work are produced by employees as they engage in their
everyday work because the information technology that employees use in their work is the same
that managers use to supervise that work.
Second, I explain that at DeskSales, Desk Sales and the DeskSales General Manager used
computer-generated formal representations of work to showcase their employees' performance to
upper-level managers. This complements the dominant view on managers' use of formal
representations of work to supervise downwards. Desk Sales Managers only supervised
representation work using their own improvised representations of Desk Salespeople's
production of a representation of compliance with prescribed targets in Siebel. Formal
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representations of work, such as Siebel reports were instead used to showcase their Desk
Salespeople's reported performance to their own managers.
Third, I show that Desk Sales Managers and the DeskSales General Manager, enforced
Desk Salespeople to do representation work. A majority of Desk Salespeople cared little for how
much bonus they received and how fast they could climb up E-Tel's corporate ladder. Desk Sales
Managers enacted a set of practices to make these Desk Salespeople engage in representation
work in spite of their lack of motivation to do so. The dominant view in the literature on the
production of computer-generated formal representations of work focuses on employees'
motivation for and enactment of deviant practices. My research at DeskSales shows that
managers have at least as much will and skill in enacting deviant practices in the production of
computer-generated formal representations of work.
Fourth, I show that at DeskSales managers from Desk Sales Managers up supervised the
work of those below them through summarized formal representations of work. Managers used
formal representations of compliance with prescribed goals and procedures to showcase their
competence and success to their won managers. Scrutinizing their employees work could only
jeopardize that compliance. This complements the dominant literature on the production of
computer-generated formal representations of work by highlighting that managers may be more
effective in accomplishing their own goals if they forfeit the detailed scrutiny that this literature
underscores as one of managers' major uses of computer-generated formal representations of
work.
Fifth, I show that Desk Salespeople were not only able to create a formal representation
of compliance with sales targets without doing any sales but also that they were able to engage in
service tasks without creating a formal representation of this work. This suggests that the tight
-218 -
coupling between work and its representation that grounds the dominant view on the role of
agency in the production of computer-generated formal representations of work can be
complemented with a view that makes the coupling between work and its representation a
deliberate choice of employees and first line managers.
Sixth, I show that computer-generated formal representations of work are not only at
stake in hierarchical relationships, as the dominant view on the role of agents in these
representations suggests. Instead, computer-generated formal representations of work are also at
stake in horizontal relationships when agents seek to enlist the cooperation of others with whom
they have no personal ties.
After explaining each of these six points below, I integrate them into a view of the role of
agency in the production of computer-generated formal representations of work that
complements the dominant view of agency in this process.
1. Working for representation work, not just representing work
My analysis of Desk Salespeople's experience highlights how labor-intensive the role of
agents in computer-mediated representation work is - the production of formal representations of
work. The effort that Desk Salespeople made to produce a representation of their saleswork
targets is familiar to students of representation work in the context of human-generated formal
representations of work. When Carmen was their General Manager, Desk Salespeople had only
tlo call friends, colleagues and relatives to meet their customer call targets. When Mariah took
over as General Manager, Desk Salespeople had only to log seven to ten calls to customers a day
in Siebel to meet their saleswork targets. Desk Salespeople had to spend some time during their
workday or their work week entering this information in Siebel. Desk Salespeople routinely
complained about having to engage in this representation work. However, this work and Desk
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Salespeople's complaints about it echo similar practices and interpretations of employees and
lower-level managers in earlier studies of representation work. Van Maanen and Pentland's
(1994) research on the production of human-generated formal representations of work by police
people and auditors documents similar practices in shaping formal representations of work.
The effort that Desk Salespeople had to put in to produce a representation of compliance
with their sales targets was much higher and thus more difficult than that observed in the current
literature on formal representations of work. Desk Salespeople had to engage in service work to
earn field salespeople's permission to report some of field salespeople's sales as the outcome of
their own saleswork. Desk Salespeople spent most of their time at work engaging in service tasks
that ranged from the very menial (e.g., correcting errors in field salespeople's Siebel records) to
the very complex (e.g., coordinating the information and communication technology service
work for a company moving headquarters). As Desk Salespeople's motivation patterns highlight,
the core reason for Desk Salespeople's service work was to earn field salespeople's approval for
their representation work regarding their sales targets. This suggests that when a group has fine-
grained visibility over the representation work of an agent, such as field salespeople had of Desk
Salespeople's use of Siebel, then an arrangement emerges between the agent and the group
regarding the agent's representation work. That agreement may be a tacit one based on personal
ties (cf. Tirole, 1986). However, at DeskSales that agreement entailed a significant amount of
work. The current literature suggests that producing a formal representation of work requires at
most the introduction of data in formal the organization's formal information system (e.g.,
Zuboff, 1988). At DeskSales, that was just the tip of Desk Salespeople's work. Desk
Salespeople's everyday service work was only carried out so that Desk Salespeople had
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something to provide to field salespeople in return for being allowed to report customers' orders
and field salespeople's sales as their own sales.
2. Showing upward, not only seeing downward
The second contribution that my analysis of Desk Salespeople's experience makes is to
provide an alternative view of agency in the production of computer-generated formal
representations of work is to explain an alternative to the literature's current understanding of
managers' use of these formal representations of their employees' work.
Desk Sales Managers used Siebel differently than the dominant view of the production
and use of computer-generated formal representations of work would predict (cf. Ball, 2003;
Findlay et al., 2003; Sewell et al., 1992; Townsend, 2005). Desk Sales Managers did not use
Siebel to supervise Desk Salespeople. Instead, Desk Sales Managers used Siebel to create a
formal representation of Desk Salespeople's compliance with prescribed roles, rules and
procedures and, most importantly, with prescribed goals. Desk Sales Managers did not even
enforce the use of Siebel in Desk Salespeople's everyday work - be it service or sales. Instead,
Desk Sales Managers used audiocalls to have their Desk Salespeople create a representation of
compliance with prescribed sales and saleswork targets. Desk Sales Managers did not use Siebel
to enforce the creation of this representation. Instead they used their team's whiteboard to record
Desk Salespeople's efforts to create a representation of compliance in Siebel. These very
whiteboards, however, were used to show compliance upward when the opportunity arose. Desk
Sales Managers changed their team's whiteboard to present sales and saleswork achievements,
which were not even recorded in Siebel, when upper-level managers visited DeskSales. Desk
Sales Managers were not alone in their use of Siebel to show compliance upwards, rather than
using it to supervise compliance downwards. The DeskSales' General Manager did not verify
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how closely Desk Salespeople's work reflected the formal representation of their work in Siebel.
Quite the opposite. Mariah designed and advocated a specific formal representation of Desk
Salespeople's work - the Market Manager's Report. This report was a Microsoft PowerPoint
presentation compiling a set of indicators from Siebel. Mariah prepared one such report for each
Desk Sales Team every month and sent it to their respective field sales directorate's General
Manager. These reports only contained limited information. Field directorates' general managers
would thus be hard pressed to link Desk Salespeople's achievements to specific sales and
saleswork records. Taken together this shows that formal representations of work need not be
used to supervise compliance downwards. They can also be used to project a fagade of
compliance upwards, even if there is no action to support it.
3. Managerial deviance, not only employee deviance
The third contribution that my analysis of Desk Salespeople's experience makes to a an
alternative view of agency in the production of computer-generated formal representations of
work is to show that lower-level managers can have as much if not more at stake than employees
in formal representations of employees' work.
It was Desk Sales Managers who enforced Desk Salespeople's representation work, not
Desk Salespeople who attempted to obtain Desk Sales Managers' collusion for compliance (cf.
Kemper, 1966; Webb et al., 1998). Desk Sales Managers enforced Desk Salespeople's
representation work to create a fagade of compliance that they could show upwards. Only a small
number of employees exhibited a motivational pattern that led to compliance with sales and
saleswork targets. All the other Desk Salespeople either cared only for representing compliance
with sales targets or, as with the case of wage-earners, cared for neither. Desk Sales Managers,
however, had much at stake in their Desk Salespeople's success in creating a formal
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representation of compliance: their bonus, their political strength at E-Tel, and their career
prospects. Desk Sales Managers could not just create a representation of compliance nor could
they rely on Desk Salespeople to do so. Siebel checked E-Tel's payment tracking system to make
sure that any reported sales in Siebel was matched to a customer's payment. Therefore, the only
way to report a sale in Siebel without selling was to get the permission to report others sales as
one's own. Desk Sales Managers thus needed Desk Salespeople to persuade field salespeople to
allow them to report field salespeople's sales as their own. Desk Sales Managers had to
improvise and enact a full set of supervision practices to have Desk Salespeople create a
representation of compliance.
To be sure that all the Desk Salespeople in their team met both sales and saleswork
targets, Desk Sales Managers had to improvise their own supervision resources and their own
incentive systems on top of those prescribed by E-Tel. Desk Sales Managers used their team's
audiocalls as their major forum for supervision. Desk Salespeople, especially those more
committed to representation work kept sales off Siebel until it was to their advantage to report
those sales. Desk Sales Managers needed to learn about these unreported sales to have Desk
Salespeople report them when the team as a whole was lagging behind its sales targets. Desk
Sales Managers had no possibility of learning about these sales without directly asking Desk
Salespeople during their team's audiocall. Desk Sales Managers improvised with their team's
whiteboard to substitute for Siebel's role in enforcing compliance. Desk Sales Managers used
whiteboards to shame Desk Salespeople lagging behind in using Siebel to represent compliance
with sales and saleswork. Desk Sales Managers also improvised their own ad-hoc incentives to
foster representation work for specific types of sales and saleswork where their team was lagging
behind its targets. Taken together, this shows that Desk Sales Managers and a number of Desk
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Salespeople had the motivation to engage in representation work and both participated in the
production of a facade of compliance with sales and saleswork targets in Siebel.
The motivation to improvise these supervision practices did not result solely from Desk
Sales Managers' monetary aspirations and their career aspirations. It also resulted from
DeskSales General Manager's pressure to represent compliance with sales and saleswork targets.
General Managers had Desk Sales Teams report sales and saleswork, even when Desk
Salespeople were on holiday or sick at home. General Managers also routinely supervised Desk
Sales Teams reported sales and saleswork figures in Siebel and enforced representing
compliance when those figures lagged behind the unit's targets.
At DeskSales formal representations of work were used to show compliance upward, not
to monitor it downward. Consequently, upper-level managers were at least as motivated as
lower-level managers and employees below them to enforce a representation of compliance.
4. Supervision based on summarized formal representations of work, not supervision based
on detailed formal representations of work
The fourth contribution that my analysis of Desk Salespeople's experience makes to an
alternative view of agency in the production of computer-generated formal representations of
work is to explain how upper-level managers' use of these representations shaped their
production. Upper-level managers only had access to Siebel-generated statistics at a very
aggregate level. They only received reports on the total value of sales per Desk Salesperson, split
in "created and owned" and "involved" sales. Upper-level managers also only received aggregate
level data on Desk Salespeople's reported saleswork. Moreover, the way DeskSales' General
Manager's designed the reports received by upper-level managers using Microsoft PowerPoint
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presentations, made any attempt to scrutinize Desk Salespeople's actions in close detail a very
difficult endeavor.
DeskSales' General Manager supervised Desk Salespeople's work in much the same
way. Desk Sales Managers prepared weekly reports for the unit's General Manager, which
summarized their team's reported sales and saleswork for the week. These reports were created
in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. However, these spreadsheets did not include links to Siebel,
making details about reported sales and saleswork difficult to scrutinize. DeskSales General
Managers only used these reports to produce their own Microsoft PowerPoint-based reports to
upper-level managers and thus saw no reason to scrutinize the formal representation of Desk
Salespeople's sales and saleswork.
Upper-level managers and the DeskSales' General Manager did not know and did not
check that most reported customer calls were logged in Siebel at the time of Wednesday's
audiocalls, a few hours before weekly sales and saleswork reports were created by Siebel. Siebel,
of course, was designed to be a self-entry information system. Employees had to use Siebel to
log their work for Siebel to produce accurate formal representations of work. However, upper-
level managers used reports from automated work reporting systems in much the same way.
Eyetel recorded Desk Salespeople's calls automatically, but Carmen only required and only had
access to aggregate statistics, such as the total number of calls and the total time each Desk
Salesperson spent on the phone. Desk Salespeople could thus call their friends, their family, pre-
recorded E-Tel conferences, and each other to reach their call targets. One Desk Salesman
reported that Desk Sales Managers started to hold morning team audiocalls to help their Desk
Salespeople hit their talk-time target.
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Upper-level manages and the DeskSales' General Manager used formal representations
of Desk Salespeople's work at face value. In their reports to the managers above them, they used
reported sales and saleswork as if they were automatic, computer-generated formal
representations of work. As Mariah, the second General Manager to head DeskSales put it, it was
because formal representations of work were generated by Siebel - a shared and automated
reporting system - that these representations were credible performance assessment tools.
For Desk Sales Managers, Siebel was a reporting tool. E-Tel's information systems were
a window into their team's work. But not just any kind of window. These information systems
were their team's "shop window." A representation that Desk Sales Managers could shape
through their Desk Salespeople's reporting work. Desk Sales Managers used this interpretation
when enacting their own managerial practices in response to their own experience of the first-
line manager's dilemma. Desk Sales Managers had to make their Desk Salespeople create a
representation of compliance with sales and saleswork targets while knowing that their Desk
Salespeople were not able, and more often than not, were not willing to do the sales and
saleswork needed to ground such formal representations. Desk Sales Managers addressed this
challenge by having their Desk Salespeople use Siebel to create a formal representation of sales
and saleswork without doing the sales and saleswork to match that representation. Desk Sales
Managers were able to enact this tactic successfully because the unit's General Manager and
upper-level managers interpreted formal representations of work in Siebel as computer-
generated, allowing Desk Sales Managers and Desk Salespeople to use these representations as
human-generated. The use of Siebel as a self-entry information system thus allowed Desk Sales
Managers to have Desk Salespeople produce a representation of compliance without actually
complying with sales and saleswork targets.
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The visibility of Desk Sales Managers' use of Siebel hinged on the way the DeskSales'
General Manager and upper-level managers used and interpreted these computer-generated
formal representations of work. If these representations were interpreted as automatic outcomes
of an information system used to show compliance upwards, not supervision downwards, these
representations were not scrutinized and could thus be empty of any actual sales and saleswork.
5. Loose coupling, not tight coupling, between work and its representation
The fifth contribution that my analysis of Desk Salespeople's experience makes to an
alternative view of agency in the production of computer-generated formal representations of
work is to explain how the distance between work and its representation is an outcome of agents'
use of information technology. Making this point entails two tasks. The first is to explain how
Desk Salespeople could create a representation of sales and saleswork without actually engaging
in either. The second is to show how Desk Salespeople were able to engage in service work
without creating a formal representation of such work.
The first task has been attempted in the previous four points. The second task requires
explaining how Desk Salespeople were able to engage in service work without creating a
representation of that service work in Siebel. The literature on IT and organizations has shown
that employees use information systems to scaffold the coordination of their work across time
(Hutchins, 1991). Because the information system that managers use for supervision is typically
the same as the one employees use to scaffold their work, employees' work - prescribed or not -
is inevitably open for scrutiny (Orlikowski, 1991). Desk Salespeople needed an information
system to scaffold the coordination of their service work across time, but they were able to
improvise such a system without making their service work visible to upper-level managers.
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Desk Salespeople dealt with the service requests that customers sent to field salespeople
in exchange for field salespeople's permission to report part of field salespeople's sales as their
own. Desk Salespeople, however, did more work in service requests than field salespeople. Field
salespeople forwarded service requests to Central Service and often told customers to call
Central Service themselves. Desk Salespeople oversaw service requests personally, monitoring
their progress and enacting tactics to speed up work on their customers' service issues. Desk
Salespeople's goal was to build personal ties with their customers, so that they would place
orders directly with Desk Salespeople. Desk Salespeople could then report these orders as the
outcome of their own saleswork.
The effort that Desk Salespeople put into managing their customers' service issues took
over most of Desk Salespeople's time at work. Desk Salespeople often had a large enough
portfolio of service issues to require an information system to keep track of their outstanding
service work. Moreover, service issues were complex enough to require an information system to
store all the information required to oversee those service tasks. The current literature on IT and
organizations would suggest that Desk Salespeople would improvise with Siebel to scaffold their
service work (Gasser, 1986). However, Desk Salespeople did not do so. Desk Salespeople drew
on their Desk Sales Managers' use of Siebel to interpret Siebel as a "representation tool." Desk
Salespeople did not interpret Siebel as a resource that they could draw on when improvising the
information system that they needed to coordinate their own service work across time. The use of
Siebel to create a formal representation of compliance was of consequence to Desk Salespeople's
interpretation of this information system. Desk Salespeople kept Siebel at the margins of their
everyday service work because Siebel embedded their managers' interests in producing a formal
representation of compliance. It did not serve Desk Salespeople's interests in managing their
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customers' service work. Instead, Desk Salespeople improvised their own information system to
coordinate their service work across time. Desk Salespeople's used hybrid local representations
of their work such as annotated printed email messages and paper-based to-do lists to keep track
of their outstanding service work. This improvised, paper-based information system mimicked
many of Siebel's features. However, it differed from Siebel in one important point. It embedded
Desk Salespeople's interests, not managers' interests. This local information system was thus
more 'ready-at-hand' for employees and less so for managers. Desk Salespeople often
complained of the difficulty of scaffolding the coordination of their service work in Siebel. It
was difficult to make Siebel their own. However, Desk Salespeople's local improvisational
information systems made supervising their service work very difficult. Only by exerting a
considerable amount of effort could Desk Sales Managers hope for some level of visibility over
this work. For upper-level managers the commitment of time and resources would require
extensive improvisation. Supervising Desk Salespeople's service work would entail going
through Desk Salespeople's paper-based to-do lists, which were as likely to be on a single sheet
of paper as they were to be spread across of a number of small post-it notes spread across Desk
Salespeople's computer screen, their paper calendar, their desktops and even their wallet. In
alternative managers wishing to supervise Desk Salespeople's service work could also go
through Desk Salespeople's printed and on-line email messages and find out which of these
messages corresponded with completed work and what messages to played a pivotal role in these
local improvised information systems. It kept them away form scrutiny and from having to be
reported on. The use of Siebel created a facade of compliance that kept managers' scrutiny away
from Desk Salespeople's service work.
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6. Representation work aiming outward, not upwards or inwards
The sixth and final contribution that my analysis of Desk Salespeople's experience makes
to an alternative view of agency the production of computer-generated formal representations of
work is to specify representation work as aimed outwards, not only upwards or inwards.
The literature on information technology and organizations has focused on the use of
formal representations of work along two paths. One path, which was also discussed in the
previous five points, is the vertical path that takes formal representations of work up the
hierarchy. The current literature describes this path as downward flow of supervision (cf.
Dandeker, 1990). Desk Salespeople's experience describes it as an upward flow of represented
compliance.
The other path for formal representations of work studied in the literature is the circular
path of shared visibility among co-workers. The current literature on IT and organizations argues
that when managers use computer-generated formal representations of work to show employees'
performance to each other (Sewell, 1998), feelings of shame will ensue and compliance with
prescribed rules, roles, procedures and goals will be ensured. Desk Sales Managers attempted to
create this same effect with whiteboards, but with one important difference. They intended
whiteboards to be used by Desk Salespeople to engage in representation work, not in actual sales
and saleswork.
There was, however, a third path through which representations of Desk Salespeople's
work flowed. Desk Salespeople could not address their customers' service issues on their own,
they needed the help of E-Tel's service units. Desk salespeople were able to enact multiple
tactics that allowed them to use enduring or spot personal ties to enlist the cooperation of E-Tel's
service units for part of their service work. However, some of Desk Salespeople's most
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important service tasks required Desk Salespeople to improvise with formal representations of
their work to enlist the help of E-Tel's service units. Desk Salespeople represented their service
work according to the genres used by service units to ensure that service units would act on Desk
Salespeople's customers' service issues. Desk Salespeople's use of E-Tel's Escalation unit's
business case form is a telling illustration of this horizontal representation work. Desk
Salespeople were able to represent their customers' service issues in this formal representation in
a way that had E-Tel's Escalation Unit address issues that were below its requirements for
escalations. While Desk Sales Managers had Desk Salespeople create a facade of compliance to
earn the approval of upper-level managers, Desk Salespeople created a facade of service work to
trigger the unprescribed cooperation of E-Tel's service units. This extended representation work
from formal representations for control to formal representations for coordination.
Coda: An alternative view of agency in the production of computer-generated formal
representations of work
Desk Salespeople's experience with using Siebel to produce a formal representation of
compliance to upper-level managers suggests an alternative view of agency in the production of
computer-generated formal representations of work that complements the dominant view of the
role of agents in this process. Although the dominant view of the production of computer-
generated formal representations of work was outlined in Chapter 2, it is useful to summarize it
here before contrasting it with the view of this process resulting from my study of Desk
Salespeople's experience at DeskSales.
The dominant view of the production of computer-generated formal representations of
work hinges on the assumption that work and its formal representation on information systems
are tightly coupled. This assumption has two corollaries. One is that managers use computer-
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generated formal representations of work to supervise work down the organization. The other is
that employees have agency over these representations because these are generated by
information technology as employees use it in the course of their everyday work. This view
places deviance squarely with workers and establishes access to information as the core element
of the struggle for power in organizations. However, studies of the production of computer-
generated formal representations of work that follow a structurational approach to IT suggest that
the tight coupling between work and its formal representation is dependent on the everyday
practices of managers and employees. This tight coupling is thus not a feature of technology but
a consequence of people's actions (cf. Orlikowski, 1991).
I want to suggest that Desk Salespeople's experience explains how a different role for
agency in the production of computer-generated formal representations of work can emerge and
be sustained. At DeskSales, work and its representation in Siebel were, at best, loosely coupled.
Desk Salespeople could produce a representation of compliance with sales and saleswork targets
without any sales and without engaging in any saleswork. Desk Salespeople could spend their
working days doing service work and not the slightest trace of it would be visible in Siebel. Desk
Salespeople's experience suggests that Desk Sales Managers and Desk Salespeople participated
in the production and reproduction of the distance between work and its representation. The
literature on IT and organizations argues that managers' goal is to supervise work downs the
hierarchy (Dandeker, 1990). Because of that, this literature suggests that managers will use the
powers of scrutiny afforded by computer-generated formal representations of work to their
fullest extent - enforcing compliance with prescribed rules, roles, procedures and goals to have
positive formal representations of their employees work (Garson, 1988). Employees play an
important role in reproducing this pattern. If they choose to forfeit their prescribed use of the
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information system, there is little that managers can do to set a close surveillance, no matter what
the technological possibilities are. But it is managers who frame employees' conditions for
action. My research at DeskSales shows that managers can enact an alternative set of practices.
Managers can use computer-generated formal representations of work to show compliance
upward and forfeit scrutiny except when employees are not representing compliance. When
enacting such a set of practices, managers produce condensed, closed summaries of the work of
lower-level managers below them and the work of their employees. The goal is to make scrutiny
more difficult and less likely.
Under such conditions, managers can focus exclusively on enforcing representation work
- the work of producing a representation of compliance with prescribed roles, rules, procedures
and goals, without actually complying with any of these. Managers can use their own improvised
information system to enforce representation work by supervising down based on informal
representations of work. This pattern of production of computer-generated formal representations
of work widens the gap between work and its representation. When that gap is wide enough,
representation work goes beyond the mere reporting of action that has not taken place.
Desk Salespeople placed calls to their customers, not to make sales, but to respond to
service issues. There was then only a gap in purpose between their calls to engage in service
work and the representation of those calls as saleswork. The distance between representing their
work as selling to customers and barely making any sales was wider and thus required a constant
effort in service work. Only in this way were Desk Salespeople able to get the help of other parts
of E-Tel in maintaining the facade of compliance that their managers demanded.
The view of the production of computer-generated formal representations of work that I
inferred from Desk Salespeople's experience at work is not a replacement, but a complement to
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the dominant view on this phenomenon. Desk Salespeople's experience and that of the research
settings featured in the current literature on IT and organizations are two patterns that are
produced by the same process, a process that hinges on the tightness of coupling between work
and its representation in computer-generated formal representations of work, as determined by
managers' and employees' practices.
This view on the role of agents in the production of formal representations of work not
only contributes to research on IT and organizations but also to social studies of practices.
Specifically, my analysis of Desk Salespeople's experience at DeskSales shows that agents can
shape the extent to which their practices are visible to others by regionalizing spaces of
interaction into facades. This complements the current focus of social theory in the
regionalization of spaces of interaction into front stages and back stages to shape the visibility of
agents' practices.
ON FA(ADES AND THE VISIBILITY OF ACTION
My analysis of Desk Salespeople's experience at DeskSales suggests that the core
problem of the unit was managing the visibility of work. The DeskSales General Manager and
Desk Sales Managers focused their efforts on making their Desk Salespeople create a
representation of compliance with sales and saleswork targets while hiding their representation
work. The problem of the visibility of work at DeskSales is an instance of one of the central
problems in the social study of practices - the visibility of action. My analysis of Desk
Salespeople's experience contributes to this literature by adding a pattern of regionalization of
spaces of interaction to the pattern most often discussed in the literature: the production and
reproduction of front stages and back stages. Desk Salespeople, Desk Sales Managers and the
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DeskSales General Manager enacted a different pattern of regionalization of spaces of interaction
- the production and reproduction of a facade. When regionalizing spaces of interaction into a
facade agents shape others' interpretation of the interaction in that space as allowing them to
observe agents' practices while using that space to create a representation of practices that does
not correspond to their actual action.
The current research on the visibility of practices focuses on the production and
reproduction of front stages and back stages as the dominant tactics to shape others' visibility of
an agent's practices. When regionalizing spaces of interaction into front stages, agents produce a
set of norms that define that space as a place where agents' practices are visible to others. When
regionalizing a space as a back stage, agents produce a set of norms that define that space as a
place where agents' practices are hidden from others.
My analysis of Desk Salespeople's experience at DeskSales suggests that spaces can be
regionalized as facades. When regionalizing a space of interaction as a facade, agents produce a
set of norms that define that space in two different ways. In the audience's interpretation, the
space of interaction makes agents' practices visible. In the agents' interpretation, the space of
interaction allows them to display a representation of their practices that does not correspond to
their true action. At DeskSales, Siebel was regionalized as a facade. Upper-level managers used
Siebel as a window into Desk Salespeople's everyday work. But for the DeskSales General
Manager, Desk Sales Managers and Desk Salespeople that window was a "shop window." Siebel
gave upper level managers visibility of a representation of compliance with sales and saleswork
targets that was not grounded in actual sales and saleswork.
The DeskSales General Manager enacted a set of practices that shaped upper-level
managers' use of Siebel as a transparent representation of Desk Salespeople's work. The
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DeskSales General Manager reported monthly to upper-level managers on the unit's
performance. These reports were based on Microsoft PowerPoint presentations which
summarized the sales and saleswork that Desk Salespeople reported in Siebel. The DeskSales
General Manager thus relied exclusively on Siebel to present the unit's performance to upper-
level managers. Upper-level managers used the figures in these reports when preparing their own
reports for their own managers, reproducing the regionalization of Siebel into a facade. Indeed,
upper-level managers never scrutinized the information on the DeskSales General Manager's
reports. They took these reports at face-value as accurate representations of the amount of sales
and saleswork accomplished by Desk Salespeople.
Desk Salespeople and Desk Sales Managers had a different interpretation of Siebel.
For Desk Salespeople, the representation of compliance with sales and saleswork targets
they created in Siebel was a fabrication that had little connection with their "real [service] work"
except as their motivation to engage in service work. Desk Salespeople reported their expectation
of a "day of reckoning" when DeskSales would be uncovered for what it truly was - a service
unit creating a facade of compliance with sales and saleswork targets without actually making
sales or engaging in saleswork. Creating a representation of compliance in Siebel was "crap
work" or "admin work", a nuisance in Desk Salespeople's everyday experience at DeskSales.
For Desk Sales Managers, Siebel was their Desk Sales Team's "shop window." It was the
locus of surveillance of their Desk Salespeople's representation work but it was also a resource
for their own political maneuvers. The representation of compliance with prescribed sales and
saleswork targets afforded Desk Sales Managers face time with upper-level managers - an
opportunity to join informal networks of influence and thus advance one's career at E-Tel. Desk
Sales Managers' interpretation of the representation of their Desk Sales Team's work in Siebel
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was close to that of their Desk Salespeople. Desk Sales managers were, after all, enforcing their
Desk Salespeople's to do representation work. For Desk Sales Managers these representations of
compliance were only a facade that they had their Desk Salespeople create, but a facade that
allowed Desk Sales Managers to ensure that they received their bonus and improved their career
prospects.
Together, the articulation of an alternative view of the role of agency in the production of
computer-generated formal representations of work and the articulation of the 'faqade' pattern of
regionalization of spaces of interaction, constitute this study's contributions to the management
literature and to the broader literature on social theory. The next and final chapter concludes by
tying this study together and discussing its implications.
-237-
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS ON MAKING THE NUMBERS AND THE CREATION
OF ELECTRONIC FACADES
There is a theme that has persisted across the history of organizational research: the
prevalence and the importance of unprescribed work in organizations (Blau, 1955; Burawoy,
1979; Cleverley, 1971; Dutton, Ashford, O'Neill, & Lawrence, 2001; Gouldner, 1954; Roy,
1960; Van Maanen, 1973). Organizational designs need to be adapted to the everyday
idiosyncrasies created by customers and clients (Lipsky, 1980) and stakeholders (Crozier &
Thoening, 1976). Employees play a central role in this adaptation, not only by benefiting the
organization (Selznick, 1949) but also for their own benefit (Mars, 1983). Unprescribed work has
thus been a frequent object of scrutiny of organizational researchers. Self-proclaimed
management gurus have also consistently heralded the benefits of unprescribed work for
organizational renewal and survival (e.g., Peters & Waterman, 1982).
With the advent of the informated organization (cf. Zuboff, 1988), employees ability and
motivation to engage in unprescribed work seem to be in jeopardy. The dominant view on
managers' use of information technology in contexts of computer-mediated work is that
managers use information technology to scrutinize employees work (Dandeker, 1990).
According to this view, employees interpret managers' supervision practices as reducing their
ability to deviate from prescribed goals, roles, rules and procedures, even for the benefit of the
organization (Garson, 1988; Sewell et al., 1992). This interpretation of their experience as being
under constant supervision at work not only reduced employees' ability to engage in
unprescribed work practices, but also their very willingness to do so. The possibility of constant
scrutiny created by managers' use of information technology is enough to foster an interpretation
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of being under constant surveillance. The sense is that any attempt to deviate from prescribed
roles, rules and procedures will be immediately detected and punished (Sewell, 1998).
A few studies have shown that managers can use computer-generated formal
representations of work to supervise the outcomes of their employees work but not their work
process. Orlikowski's (1996) study of the implementation of a service tracking system and the
ethnomethodological literature on the use of computers for complex tasks (Heath et al., 2000;
Suchman, 1992) has shown that employees can have significant discretion over their work
process because managers' are chiefly concerned with outcomes. In such conditions, employees
can engage in unprescribed work practices as long as they meet prescribed goals.
My research builds on these studies by showing how employees and low-level managers
can engage in unprescribed work that does not contribute towards their organization's prescribed
goals, even in a context where work and its supervision are computer mediated. I showed that
employees and low-level managers at DeskSales were able to use information technology to
shape the computer-generated formal representation of their work. I also show, however, that the
way employees and especially managers' use information technology to this end can create
challenges that require much more effort to produce formal representations of work than the
simple entering of information in the organization's prescribed information system. The
centrality of agency in computer-generated formal representations of work, as I explain it here,
allows for at least two strategies of 'information'. One is that documented in the literature on
information technology and organizations - the surveillance strategy. In this strategy, managers
use information technology to have visibility over their employees work. Managers use that
visibility to enforce compliance with employees' prescribed goals, roles, rules and procedures
through surveillance and discipline. The other strategy - the fagade creation strategy - is
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articulated in this study. In this strategy, low-level managers use information systems to
showcase their employees' compliance with prescribed goals and procedures to the managers
above them. To do so, low-level managers enforce their employees' representation work - the
work needed to use information technology to create a representation of compliance with
prescribed goal, roles, rules and procedures. That was the case at DeskSales. Desk Sales
Managers and the DeskSales General Manager used Siebel, the company's prescribed
information system, to showcase Desk Salespeople's compliance with sales and saleswork
targets to E-Tel's upper-level managers. At the same time, the DeskSales General Manager and
Desk Sales Managers used their own improvised supervision systems to monitor and enforce
representation work on their Desk Salespeople. They had their Desk Salespeople use Siebel to
report sales and saleswork, although Desk Salespeople interpreted their role as lacking the
conditions (and themselves as lacking the skills) to do either. Creating a representation of
compliance with saleswork targets was easy. It was just a matter of reporting customer calls in
Siebel. Creating a representation of compliance with sales was more difficult. Desk Salespeople
needed to get the permission of field salespeople to report field salespeople's sales as their own.
Because of that, Desk Salespeople took on field salespeople's service work in return for field
salespeople's permission to report field salespeople's sales as the outcome of Desk Salespeople's
saleswork. This created two challenges for Desk Salespeople. First, they needed to build an
information system that kept their service work visible to themselves, so that they could
coordinate it across time, but invisible to upper-level managers so that DeskSales' facade of
compliance with sales and saleswork targets was not challenged. To these ends, Desk
Salespeople improvised a paper-based information system that allowed them to scaffold the
memory of their outstanding service tasks and the information they needed to complete them.
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Second, Desk Salespeople needed to enlist the cooperation of E-Tel's service units without
having any formally prescribed ties to those units. Desk Salespeople improvised a set of personal
and impersonal tactics to achieve that cooperation, successfully co-opting these units to help
them in their service work.
My main ambition in this study was to complement the dominant view of managers' use
of information technology by showing that managers not only use this technology to supervise
downward but they also use it to showcase their employees' work upwards. In attempting this
contribution, I have made three other contributions to the study of information technology in
organizations which come from the three analytical cuts of my ethnography at DeskSales. First, I
have articulated the first-line managers' dilemma in contexts of computer-mediated work and
supervision. At DeskSales, first-line managers faced a strong bureaucratic push created by
ambitious sales targets and a strong improvisational pull created by their employees' inability
and unwillingness to sell. I showed that first-line managers did not follow any of the dominant
strategies documented in the literature, enforcing goals and rules or supporting their employees
improvisations (Gouldner, 1960; Orlikowski, 1991; Orlikowski, 1996). Instead, I showed that
first-line managers at DeskSales enacted a facade-creation strategy: they limited the bureaucratic
push to a push to create a representation of compliance with prescribed targets and the
improvisational pull to a pull to motivate and make employees create that representation of
compliance.
Second, I showed how employees were able to address the self-coordination challenges
involved in working under an unstructured workflow. Desk Salespeople had no prescribed or
unprescribed rules and procedures to prioritize their service tasks. Desk Salespeople also had no
information system to scaffold the memory of their outstanding service tasks and the memory of
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the information needed to carry out those tasks. Desk Salespeople used the importance of their
service tasks for their customers and their customers' persistence to prioritize their service work.
Desk Salespeople used paper to-do lists and annotated email printouts to scaffold the memory of
their service tasks and of the information needed to complete them. As I interpret them, these
practices reveal the three main challenges in the self-coordination of unstructured work and a set
of specific practices to address those challenges.
Third, I showed how Desk Salespeople were able to enlist the unprescribed cooperation
of other E-Tel units under adverse conditions for establishing personal ties with these units. I
showed that Desk Salespeople were able to improvise a one-to-one communication channel by
using a one-to-many communication system to enlist the cooperation of Central Service
representatives for some of their non-routine service work. I also showed how Desk Salespeople
were able to enlist the cooperation of E-Tel's specialist service representatives through 'spot'
personal arrangements that were not supported by enduring personal ties. I also showed how
Desk Salespeople were able to use impersonal mechanisms to enlist the cooperation of E-Tel's
service units. By doing so, I showed that unprescribed cooperation can be achieved through
means other than enduring personal ties.
Taken together, these three contributions add to the literature on unprescribed work in
organizations by providing an account of unprescribed work motivated by first-line managers
and by showing how unprescribed work is coordinated through time (self-coordination) and
space (unprescribed cooperation).
The contributions that my research makes to organizational theory can be translated into
contributions for managerial practice. My interpretation of the facade-creation strategy is
relevant to understanding one of the most common practices in organizations: management by
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objectives. The dominant view in the managerial literature on management by objectives (e.g.,
Drucker, 1993) is that linking desired behaviors with measurable objectives will promote those
behaviors. As Deming (Deming, 1986: 40) emphasized when summarizing this approach, "what
gets measured gets done." At DeskSales, linking sales and saleswork behaviors with
measurements promoted the representation of compliance with those behaviors. At DeskSales,
"what got measured, got showed [i.e., represented]." My research at DeskSales suggests that
upper-level managers should be aware of facade-creation as a viable strategy to respond to
management by objectives. If lower-level managers and employees enact such a strategy, then
upper-level managers will be rewarding the creators of a representation of compliance but not
compliance itself.
My analysis of Desk Salespeople's self-coordination practices also contributes to
managerial practice in two ways. First, in the same line as Malone (1983), I have provided a list
of possible specifications for self coordination systems in organizations. I have shown that these
systems need to perform three main tasks: provide criteria to prioritize work, provide a material
resource to scaffold the memory of outstanding work, and provide a material resource to scaffold
the memory of the information needed to accomplish these tasks. I have further specified some
of the features of these two material resources. The material resource needed to scaffold the
memory of outstanding tasks needs to be able to link task descriptions to task priorities and to
task deadlines. The material resource to scaffold the memory of the information needed to
complete outstanding tasks needs to be able to accept free-form comments on representations of
communication such as electronic mail messages and to organize tasks in a 'stack' whose order
can be freely manipulated by the user. I have also shown that employees can draw on their
managers' use of information technology to interpret that technology as a managerial tool and
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exclude it from their everyday practices. At E-Tel Siebel was little more than a very expensive
way to create a faqade of compliance with prescribed sales and saleswork targets.
Finally, my analysis of Desk Salespeople's unprescribed coordination practices opens up
managers' toolset to foster unprescribed cooperation in organizations. The managerial literature
has focused on social gatherings as the main tool to foster that type of cooperation (e.g., Deal &
Key, 1998). The assumption is that these events foster the spontaneous creation of personal ties
which employees can then draw on for unprescribed cooperation. This strategy limits
unprescribed cooperation to people that can be brought together in face-to-face gatherings - an
increasingly difficult and expensive proposition as organizations expand geographically. My
research at DeskSales shows that unprescribed cooperation does not require personal ties. It can
even be accomplished through impersonal tactics such as using forms.
Taken together, my research provides managers with a rich case of unprescribed work,
which can be used to think about how to foster or how to hinder this type of work in their
organization.
More important than the theoretical or practical implications that my analysis of Desk
Salespeople's experience, is how inspiring Desk Salespeople's success in dealing with the
multiple pressures they endured at work for those embarking into endeavors as demanding as a
career in academia, where formal representations of work have the power of Salomon's sword
over one's career. Publication counts, dissertation awards, and point systems - all are but
imperfect representations of what each of us endures for little external reward.
An ethnography is above all a burden. I have the burden of being the carrier of
DeskSales' tale and the burden of the duty of telling that tale in a useful way. It is to honor Desk
Salespeople's tale, as much as it is to fulfill my own personal goals as an academic, that I have
- 244 -
attempted the contributions to theory and practice outlined above. Sam Gamgee's musings
(Boyens, Jackson, Shaye, & Walsh, 2002) on the experience of the main protagonists of the
stories that really matter seems thus a fitting closing to this contribution to explain the hidden
labors that are behind the everyday work of making one's numbers:
It's like in the great stories, Mr. Frodo. The ones that really mattered Full of darkness
and danger they were. And sometimes you didn't want to know the end Because how could the
end be happy? How could the world go back to the way it was when so much bad had happened
But in the end, it's only a passing thing, this shadow. Even darkness must pass. A new
day will come. And when the sun shines it will shine out the clearer.
Those were the stories that stayed with you. That meant something. Even ifyou were too
small to understand why. But I think, Mr. Frodo, I do understand I know now. Folk in those
stories had lots of chances of turning back only they didn't. They kept going. Because they were
holding on to something.
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